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This thesis is concerned with a certain kind of counterfactual conditional, namely
the elliptic variant occurring in discourses like e.g.
(1) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
Frank Veltman makes in Veltman (2005) as an aside a rather intriguing observa-
tion1: while (1) paraphrases the full conditional
(2) If John had drunk any wine, he would have become sick.
the negative counterpart of (2) does not allow for a paraphrase like (1) in which
the antecedent of the conditional is left implicit. Even though – just as in the
above examples – the first sentence of (4) corresponds to the presupposition of the
if -clause of the full counterfactual in (3), the resulting sequence of sentences is
pragmatically not acceptable, but infelicitous (and thus marked by #):
(3) If John had not drunk too much wine, he would not have become sick.
(4) # John drank too much wine. He would not have become sick.
This strange asymmetry in discourse behavior and paraphrasability of counter-
factual if -sentences – to which I will refer to as Veltman’s puzzle – provides the
starting point and initial concern of this thesis. In the following analysis I will
1Cf. Veltman (2005), p. 160.
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formulate a solution to this problem that will go beyond the narrow confines of
the issue, but will be of general importance for understanding the semantics and
pragmatics of counterfactuals.
The analysis divides into four chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with in-
formal empirical groundwork, while Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are devoted to the
formal aspects of the analysis.
In Chapter 1 an in depth introduction to the data is delivered in order to get ac-
quainted with the problem and to sharpen intuitions. Based on observations that
will be spelled out in the course of the chapter the phenomenon and research
questions are more neatly defined. By focussing on the role that negation seems
to play for the felicity of the data also a first working hypothesis is formulated. It
suggests that discourse felicity is determined by the presence resp. absence of a
negation induced alternative – a concept for which clear and independent empiri-
cal confirmation will be delivered – that acts as a contextually determined filler for
the implicit antecedent. Following this lead the concern is generalized and other
alternative inducing phenomena like focus are briefly discussed as possible dis-
course contexts that allow to leave the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional
implicit. However, a set of additional examples that clearly defy the sketched pro-
posal necessitates a re-assessment of the phenomenon and of the initial working
hypothesis. The key to the successful analysis is eventually gained after some fur-
ther contemplation upon the semantics of the discourses of concern here. Crucial
is the observation that for most of the data under consideration a paraphrase in
form of a because-sentence is available.
After having gained a clearer idea of the phenomenon and how to account for it
in Chapter 1, the informal overview is rounded up in Chapter 2 by a discussion
of the empirical (and theoretical) vicinity of the phenomenon. The concern lies
with data that follows a similar scheme as the discourses I am concerned with in
that contextually supplied implicit information plays an important role in its inter-
pretation and felicity. First, the concept of modal subordination (cf. for instance
Roberts (1987), Roberts (1989), and Roberts (1996a)) is discussed. Second, the
2
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elliptic counterfactuals examined in Schueler (2008) are addressed. Although on
the surface similar, it turns out that the data and analysis with which Schueler
is concerned are incompatible with what is at issue here. With respect to modal
subordination more overlap exists. The discussion however reveals that either
– contrary to what Roberts suggests – the discourses under consideration can not
be subsumed under the phenomenon, or that the concept of modal subordination
is too narrowly defined.
In Chapter 3 the formal framework in which the analysis will be spelled out is
introduced. Point of reference here is the update semantics for counterfactuals
formulated in Veltman (2005). Veltman (2005) thus provides not just the starting
point for the empirical aspect of this thesis, but also for its theoretical account.
As a dynamic framework Veltman’s update theory takes the essence of meaning
to be its potential to change information states. In the first half of this chapter
Veltman’s particular account of counterfactuals finds detailed motivation, while
in the second half the formal definitions are presented and expounded.
Finally, in Chapter 4 the solution to Veltman’s puzzle is laid out. Elaborating on
the idea that the logical structure of the premise set is crucial for the explanation
of the data – which gained contour at the end of Chapter 1 in connection with the
observation that a because-paraphrase exists for the examples – and employing
the formal tools presented in Chapter 3, a semantic account for the pragmatic in-
felicity of the discourses under consideration is given. Concomitant to this comes
another result of general importance that also has, as far as I know, not been ad-
dressed in the literature. Based on the observation that counterfactuals without
appropriate contextual support are more often than not accepted as true, although
they are trivially false, a pragmatic account of the semantic acceptability of these
cases is developed. Adapting a notion introduced by Donald Davidon in Davidson
(1973), the analysis is about the radical interpretation of counterfactuals. Finally,
also questions concerning the semantics of the because-paraphrase from which the
crucial insight for the solution of Veltman’s problem derives are addressed. Doing
so a revision of a Lewis-style semantics of indicative because (cf. Lewis (1973a))
is formulated that captures the meaning of subjunctive because-sentences, and
3
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In an effort to motivate a decompositional semantics for counterfactual condition-
als Frank Veltman observes in Veltman (2005) that the antecedent in a counter-
factual figures as only but one possible (syntactic and semantic) context for the
would have + past participle verb phrase projection that acts as the conditional’s
consequent. To illustrate the point Veltman provides the following examples (cf.
Veltman (2005), p. 160):
(1) If John had drunk any wine, he would have become sick.
(2) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
Not only does the consequent of (1) reappear as the second sentence of (2), but
moreover, both (1) and (2) seem to be synonymous. (At least on the account that a
counterfactual antecedent like If John had drunk any wine presupposes the factual
truth of the sentence John did not drink any wine.1) While, as Veltman points
out, ”[s]entences with a verb phrase consisting of ’would have’ + past participle
make no sense if they are presented without context” (Veltman (2005), p. 160),
1Although this presupposition does not generally apply (for counterexamples see e.g. Ander-
son (1951)) the data to be discussed will exclusively be data with a false (i.e. presuppositional)
antecedent. Most of the examples bear contexts that entail the truth of the complement proposition
to the counterfactual’s antecedent.
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the sentence He would have become sick may nonetheless arguably be treated as a
separate update2 in the mini-text (2), since it appears here completely unmediated
by any linguistic means. Based on this observation Veltman suggests to treat the
complex of would have + past participle also as a separate update when it occurs
as the consequent of a conditional.
While so far the story is rather trifling, the case becomes interesting, and indeed
problematic, if one tries to generalize the idea. A slight revision of the data illus-
trates what is at stake. Consider the following data given by Veltman (Veltman
(2005), p. 160):
(3) If John had not drunk too much wine, he would not have become sick.
(4) # John drank too much wine. He would not have become sick.
The problem – Veltman’s puzzle – that arises from these two examples becomes
clear when contrasted with the pair of examples given in (1) and (2) : just as in
the first set of data the second sentence of (4) reappears as the consequent in the
conditional (3). But although the antecedent of (3) and the initial sentence in (4)
follow exactly the pattern of fact/counterfact exhibited in (1) and (2), the mini-text
(4) is not an acceptable sequence of sentences (which is therefore marked by ‘#’).3
While Veltman proposes an elaborate semantics for counterfactuals for which the
data just given act only as an opener, he does not discuss the asymmetry in the
examples in detail, but gives only a rudimentary sketch.4 However, once the data
base is extended, it turns out that the problem is rather intricate and that its analysis
allows for an instructive perspective on the interplay between the semantics and
pragmatics of counterfactuals and the construction of elliptic discourse.
2The concept of an update in dynamic semantics is neatly captured in the following quote: “On
the dynamic view, knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing the change it brings about in
the cognitive state of anyone who wants to incorporate the information conveyed by it.” (Veltman
(2005), p. 160) The ‘change brought about’ is eventually defined as an update.
3The convention to mark the infelicity of data by a prefixed ‘#’ will be maintained throughout
the whole study. Veltman uses ‘*’ instead.
4For a relevant quote from Veltman (2005), see my footnote 9, page 11.
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Outline of the chapter
In the following sections of this chapter the empirical side of the described prob-
lem shall be further explored. After extending the data base at hand of more En-
glish and German examples in sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 the concept of the negation-
induced alternatives is introduced in section 1.2 as a promising key to the solution
of the problem. Subsequently in section 1.3 the empirical reality of the concept
of the negation-induced alternatives is confirmed. Based on the informal proposal
sketched in 1.2 and 1.3 a generalization to data containing other alternative in-
ducing elements like focus resp. alternative questions is attempted in section 1.4,
but first doubts with respect to the feasibility of the lead arise. These concerns are
eventually deepened when in section 1.5 more data are introduced that clearly defy
the proposal to analyze Veltman’s puzzle in terms of the concept of the negation-
induced alternatives. A more promising approach gains however contour when in
sections 1.6 and 1.7 finally the possibility of a because-paraphrase for Veltman’s
examples is studied. The observations formulated here will ultimately provide
with the key to solving the problem.
1.1.1 More data – English
Before proposing a first informal account of the problem that will be based on
what I call negation-induced alternatives, more examples shall be presented that
give an impression of the extent and systematics of the phenomenon.
In the following mini-discourses the initial sentence factually describes John’s
drinking behaviour, while the subsequent counterfactual describes what would
have been the case if John’s behaviour had been opposite to his actual behaviour.
(5) John did not drink any wine. If John had drunk any wine, he would have
become sick.
(6) John drank too much wine. If John had not drunk too much wine, he would
not have become sick.
If one skips the antecedent of the conditional, the already encountered aberration
7
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may be observed again. While (7) below is inconspicuous, (8) is infelicitous and
indeed not interpretable:
(7) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
(8) # John drank too much wine. He would not have become sick.
Note that this pattern seems to be rather general, as the following mini-discourses
show. Again, the initial sentence factually details a certain scenario, while the
subsequent counterfactual describes what would have been the case if the initial
situation had been its opposite.
(9) The glass was not dropped. If it had been dropped, it would have broken.
(10) The glass was dropped. If it had not been dropped, it would not have
been broken.
When the antecedent is dropped, one example remains unproblematic, while the
other turns out infelicitous and incoherent:
(11) The glass was not dropped. It would have broken.
(12) # The glass was dropped. It would not have been broken.
The same behaviour recurs when switching from the above causal scenarios to a
deontic context in which obligations and permissions provide the frame of refer-
ence:
(13) John did not steal the purse of the old lady. If John had stolen the purse
of the old lady, he would have been punished.
(14) John did not steal the purse of the old lady. He would have been punished.
(15) John stole the purse of the old lady. If John had not stolen the purse of
the old lady, he would not have been punished.
(16) # John stole the purse of the old lady. He would not have been punished.
Also for bouletic scenarios (i.e. scenarios in which desires and wishes are of
concern) the encountered asymmetry in felicity can be observed:
8
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(17) John did not steal the purse of the old lady. If John had stolen the purse
of the old lady, his father would have been sad.
(18) John did not steal the purse of the old lady. His father would have been
sad.
(19) John stole the purse of the old lady. If John had not stolen the purse of
the old lady, his father would not have been sad.
(20) #John stole the purse of the old lady. His father would not have been sad.
1.1.2 More data – German
The phenomenon occurs also cross-linguistically, as a translation of the English
data into German shows. Example (21) translates example (5), (22) translates (7),











































































5The abbreviations used in the glosses are: AUX = auxiliary, NEG = negation, PRO = pronoun,
+past = tense: past, pp = past participle, +sbjv = mood: subjunctive, 3.ps = person: 3rd, +sg =
number: singular, +m = gender: masculine, +dat = case : dative. Only dative pronouns are marked
for case.
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Since in the overwhelming majority of examples the German translation behaves
just as the English data, I will provide further German data and translations from
English to German only whenever the picture is either to be completed, or when
deviations in intuitions are to be highlighted.
1.2 A tentative account of the data in terms of the
notion of negation-induced alternatives
In the analysis to be proposed I do not follow Frank Veltman’s suggestion to treat
the would have + past participle VP-projection as a largely autonomous unit that
could occur outside of a conditional context.6 The complex is rather considered
to appear as the consequent of an implicit antecedent in the data above. Under
this point of view (2) actually reads as John did not drink any wine. [If he had
drunk any wine] he would have become sick.7 Answering the question where the
hidden antecedent comes from will also provide with a first hypothesis about why
e.g. examples (4), (8), and (12) are incoherent. I will propose that the hidden
antecedent is given as a procedural or cognitive trade-off connected to the occur-
rence of negation in the preceding context: correlated to e.g. the initial sentence
of (2), John did not drink any wine, is the supposition that drinking is within the
behavioural capabilities of John. The intuition that negation induces such an af-
firmative alternative is arguably irrevocable. Even in cases like John did not drink
the ocean dry or John did not light the sun the intuition is that it is – absurd
as it may be – within the agent’s action alternatives (i.e. possibilities) that John
could literally drink the ocean dry, etc.8 This happenstance becomes relevant in
6For a stance similar to Veltman’s see for instance Kasper (1987).
7While at first sight this may seem to undermine Veltman’s proposal to treat the semantics of
conditionals in terms of two separate updates, the point is nonetheless actually rather superficial
and does not affect the substance of his semantics in any way.
8This point seems to fall in line with findings concerning the processing and representation of
negated information. See for instance Kaup et al. (2006), and Kaup et al. (2007) (but see also Tian
10
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combination with counterfactual conditionals: while counterfactuals describe al-
ternative scenarios, negation induces a potential, indeed counterfactual alternative
that could link up to the scenario given by a counterfactual.
The generalization that may be formulated on this ground is thus that the negation-
induced alternative of a negated, discourse-initial sentence may serve as the an-
tecedent of a subsequent counterfactual consequent whenever the discourse de-
scribes a fact/counterfact-scenario. Indeed, in a discourse sequence of an initial
negated sentence and a subsequent counterfactual consequent that lacks an overt
antecedent the negation-induced alternative (in the following abbreviated as NinA)
of the initial sentence is a natural candidate to figure as an implicit, contextually
determined antecedent. Negative discourse initial sentences thus seem to provide
a proper context for the would have-modal perfect in the consequent. The data ar-
guably confirm this thesis: unlike in (2), (7), (11) in the examples (4), (8), (12) no
such suppositional contextual fillers are available, since here the preceding con-
text is affirmative and therefore does not induce an alternative. Since however
the modal perfect is interpretable only within a conditional context, the lack of an
antecedent leaves the counterfactual incomplete. Hence, (4) is rendered unaccept-
able. And similar for (8) and (12).9
The same line of reasoning could also explain the following data that at first sight
et al. (2010) for a critical evaluation of Kaup et al.’s work).
9 Although Veltman differs in his assessment of the role of the counterfactual consequent, the
first account formulated here seems nonetheless compatible with what he thinks about the role of
negation in the initial sentence. Cf. Veltman (2005:p. 161), where he writes: “Apparently, after
processing the first sentence of (i) [= example (2) here, D. B.] the stage is set for the interpreta-
tion of the subsequent sentence, whereas in (iii) [= example (4) here, D. B.] this is not the case.
When you have to interpret a negative sentence, such as the first sentence in (i) [= (2), D. B.],
the interpretation process starts with an update with the positive subsentence, and then continues
with some operation on this intermediate result. This intermediate result is kept in memory as
an auxiliary state subordinate to the main state, and differing from it mainly in that it supports a
statement that is rejected in the main state. This subordinate state is the state the modal perfect
in the second sentence of (i) [= (2), D. B.] is looking for. In interpreting the first sentence of (iii)
[= (4), D. B.] no such subordinate state is created. Therefore the second sentence of (iii) [= (4),
D. B.] finds nothing to pertain to.” Other conceptualizations of this kind of phenomenon can be
found in Kaufmann (2000), and van Rooy (2005), as Veltman points out. But also Roberts (1987)
and Frank (1997) formally address the issue (with reference to the account of negation given in
Discourse Representation Theory (cf. Kamp (1981) and Kamp and Reyle (1993))).
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seems to rebut the proposal for exhibiting the ‘wrong’ distribution of negation:
(25) John stayed sober. [antecedent to be filled] He would have become sick.
(26) # John did not stay sober. [antecedent to be filled] He would not have
become sick.
One might argue – admittedly somewhat tentatively, though – that the reason why
(25) is an acceptable sequence, although the initial sentence lacks an overt nega-
tive marker, is that it contains a lexicalized negation. On the assumption that to
stay sober is synonymous to to not drink, the available action alternative to this is
the affirmative to drink. While thus a filler for the empty antecedent is conceivable
that describes a scenario in which no background laws are violated, no such con-
stellation can be received in case of (26). What appears as a single negation in the
first sentence of (26) is indeed a double negation with to not stay sober actually
meaning the affirmative (not not) to drink. Hence, to drink is the only informa-
tion that could enter the empty antecedent. But this would create a counterfactual
scenario that violates our knowledge about the effects drinking might have. If he
had drunk he would not have become sick is certainly not the ’normal’ situation.
Thus, (26) is rendered incoherent.
1.3 Confirming the empirical reality of the concept
of the negation-induced alternative: the particle
otherwise as a discourse mirror
Note that the analysis of another phenomenon that Veltman brings to attention in
connection with the data under discussion eventually supports the conception of
the negation-induced alternative. With respect to example (4) Veltman observes
in passing that the insertion of the particle otherwise into the discourse will alter
the picture completely (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 160).10 Adding otherwise to the
10A similar observation with respect to the semantic impact of the particle otherwise is made in
Frank and Kamp (1997) on p. 164.
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infelicitous (4) (repeated here as (27)) renders the mini-discourse (28) not only
fully acceptable, but indeed synonymous to (3), hence mimicking the behaviour
of (1) and (2).
(27) # John drank too much wine. He would not have become sick.
(28) John drank too much wine. Otherwise he would not have become sick.
While thus the observed asymmetry in discourse behaviour is revoked, it is inter-
esting to note that the particle otherwise at first sight may seem to be semantically
empty, though. This is suggested by the insertion of otherwise into (29). There is
no manifest difference in meaning between (29) and (30) (or in any of the other
felicitous examples for this matter if otherwise is inserted there):
(29) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
(30) John did not drink any wine. Otherwise he would have become sick.
The strange behavior of the data becomes explicable if one assumes that otherwise
is synonymous to IF NOT φcounterfactually, with the negation picking up and operating
on the preceding propositional context φ.11 In case of (28) with the antecedent to
the would have-complex in the consequent of the conditional thus spelled out one
arrives at IF NOT (John drank any wine)counterfactually he would not have become
sick – which is perfectly ok, while otherwise in (30) yields the conditional IF NOT
(John did not drink any wine)counterfactually he would have become sick. Since the
ensuing double negation in the antecedent is equivalent to the NinA (If ) John had
drunk any wine one arrives at the exact same (hidden) antecedent that the negation
in the initial sentence of (29) induces. Hence the impression that the insertion of
the particle otherwise in the sequence is semantically vacuous. While in effect
otherwise works like a semantic ‘discourse mirror’ – it picks up and reverses the
initial (propositional) context and thus is able to fill the empty antecedent with the
required information – the confrontation of examples (29) and (30) at the same
time positively confirms the empirical reality of the notion of the negation-induced
11The question about what scope otherwise takes is rather intriguing, but goes beyond the
present concern and will thus not be addressed in any detail. For a first study see Fuhrmann
(2011).
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alternative: only because both examples share the same implicit antecedent can
the impression arise that the particle otherwise is semantically void. If one follows
intuition and assumes that the expression otherwise indeed figures as a discourse
mirror the concept of the negation-induced alternatives provides a natural and
compelling concept to account for the equivalence of (29) and (30).
Summary: the notion of the NinA and its empirical reality
On basis of the notion of the negation-induced alternative the proposed analysis
is able to account for certain phenomena concerning the discourse behaviour of
counterfactual conditionals. In particular it is able to spell out in detail under what
conditions the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional may remain implicit in
discourse. It counters the assumption that the modal perfect that acts as the con-
sequent of a counterfactual conditional may appear outside of the context of a
preceding if -clause, and explains the effect that the insertion of the particle other-
wise into the data has.
In summary the picture with respect to the notion of the negation-induced alterna-
tive is this: while negated sentences induce (trivially counterfactual, positive) al-
ternatives, the isolated would have-complex stands as the consequent of an incom-
plete conditional. It is waiting for an appropriate (counterfactual) antecedent. In
sequence the initial negation and the isolated would have-remnant are thus a per-
fect, complementary match: the former provides in form of the negation-induced
alternative the counterfactual antecedent that the latter is lacking.
1.4 Generalizing to other alternative inducing data:
focus and alternative questions
Before turning to some challenges to the story told so far it first shall be noted
that the proposed account of discourse construction involving contextually given
information can apparently be generalized to other alternative inducing phenom-
14
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ena, like e.g. focus and alternative questions.12 Since both provide with (implicit,
respectively explicit) alternatives one may predict that both constitute suitable
contexts for the modal perfect. The next set of data suggests that this seems to be
indeed the case. The fact that a counterfactual consequent may link up to these in
discourse – as demonstrated in the below examples (in which the actually implicit
antecedent is made explicit) – arguably delivers a parallel model for and inde-
pendent support of the account in terms of negation induced alternatives given
so far.13 –The question of course being what other linguistic phenomena evoke
alternatives, and whether these also provide suitable contexts for the modal per-
fect. Just as in the case of the negation-induced alternatives the alternatives to
the focussed constituent resp. the answer alternatives mentioned in the alterna-
tive question remain available in the context of the discourse (more precisely, in
the counterfactual dimension of the conversational background). Eventually they
serve to fill in the implicit counterfactual antecedent (for perspicuity given here in
brackets) required by the would have-consequent.
(31) [MARY]F got the job. (If John had gotten it) John would have made a
mess out of it.
(32) Q: Would you like tea or coffee? A: Tea. (If I had coffee) Coffee would
get me too agitated.
12For both of these topics a vast body of semantic literature exists. I will however rely on an
intuitive understanding of both notions only, since the point shall not be studied in any detail.
A classical reference for an alternative semantics for focus is Rooth (1985), formal semantics
for alternative questions are given for instance by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), Biezma and
Rawlins (2011), Romero and Han (2003).
13Although Veltman does not seem to follow the generalization (or the idea that negation may
induce alternatives in its own right), he also points out that focus generates suitable contexts for
the modal perfect. In footnote 4 of Veltman (2005) on p. 160 he writes: “For readers who think
that it is crucial that there be a negation in the first sentence, it will be worthwhile to look at
[. . . ] We asked Mary to taste the wine. John would have become sick. If ‘Mary’ is stressed in
the first sentence and ‘John’ in the second, the second sentence makes perfect sense.” Veltman
continues to elaborate on this example in footnote 6, p. 161 in Veltman (2005): “To deal with
the example of footnote 4 one needs to invoke a theory of focus like the one presented in Rooth
(1985). According to this theory the general function of focus is evoking alternatives. (In this case,
alternatives to Mary –which other people could we have asked to taste the wine?). (sic.) These
alternatives will give rise to subordinate states and are available for sentences in which the modal
perfect is used to be interpreted in. (Apparently, we are ready to accommodate the idea that John
is one of the alternatives.)”
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The point is supported by the fact that (31) and (32) each have an otherwise-
synonym:
(33) [MARY]F got the job. Otherwise, John would have made a mess out of
it.
(34) Q: Would you like tea or coffee? A: Tea. Otherwise I would get too
agitated.14
Thus, the examples suggest a certain commensurability between the data and seem
to support the informal account sketched so far. Although the issue shall not
be explored in any depth, some more observations shall nonetheless at least be
mentioned. First, note that while the antecedent may in both cases remain implicit,
the alternative in the focus-examples apparently needs to be made explicit in the
consequent.15
(35) Did Mary or John get the job? Mary got the job. We would have been
sad.
This can not mean – unlike when the particle otherwise is inserted into the dis-
course – that If John had gotten the job, we would have been sad.
Although these observations are interesting in their own right, they shall not be
discussed any further. More important seems however the next data to follow.
The examples anticipate a problem that will be of concern later on. Since focus
induces alternatives in all contexts, one may hypothesize that the occurrence of
negation in the initial sentence is redundant. I.e. the prediction would be that the
discourse below in (37) would be acceptable in any case:
(36) [MARY]F did not get the job. If John had not gotten the job, he could not
have made a mess out of it.
14The contrastive focus that one might expect is suppressed here (and also in example (35)). It
is irrelevant for the discussion.
15Which eventually casts doubt on the necessity of a marking via an intonational focus. Without
an explicit mentioning of the alternative the data apparently become infelicitous (the reason being
arguably that without a salient alternative it is not clear which of the alternatives could figure as
the implicit antecedent).
16
CHAPTER 1. THE DATA
(37) # [MARY]F did not get the job. John could not have made a mess out of
it.
Although the discourse context is enriched not just by the NinA, but also by the
focus alternatives, (37) is nonetheless infelicitous. An extra twist to this is added
when inserting the particle otherwise. This again renders the discourse acceptable:
(38) [MARY]F did not get the job. Otherwise John could not have made a
mess out of it.
Apparently, there is more to the story of the contextually determined implicit al-
ternative as a mediator of discourse felicity than hypothesized so far. I will later
on propose a solution to the issue connected to (38), but first some more problems
shall be highlighted in the next section.
1.5 Extending the picture some more: problems for
the sketch
While the story of the negation-induced alternatives seems rather potent in ac-
counting for the data, it does not come without problems. Indeed, there are exam-
ples that apparently defy or even contradict the proposal. The following collection
of mini-discourses demonstrates the point. One discourse challenges the account
insofar as it matches the identified NinA-pattern, but nonetheless fails the story:
even though the initial sentence contains a negation and thus arguably provides a
negation-induced alternative the discourse is not acceptable. Another example es-
calates the challenge even further. The discourse does not just defy the proposal,
but moreover contradicts it insofar the discourse is felicitous although the context
fails to supply with an implicit antecedent. The confrontation with these exam-
ples will eventually lead to a new assessment of the phenomenon and the issues
deriving from it and will necessitate a re-evaluation of the account given so far.
Keeping this in mind consider now the following mini-texts with an initial nega-
tive sentence and a subsequent counterfactual conditional:
17
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(39) John did not have surgery. If he had had surgery, he would have died.
Dropping the antecedent of the counterfactual generates a discourse that is syn-
onymous to the counterfactual that is part of (39):
(40) John did not have surgery. He would have died.
Varying slightly the scenario (by negating the consequent) such that a counter-
factual situation with reverse consequences is described, acceptability changes.
Dropping the antecedent of the counterfactual generates in this case an infelici-
tous discourse even though the NinA-account and Veltman’s own conception (as
quoted in footnote 9) predict its felicity:
(41) # John did not have surgery. He would not have died.
Next, consider the case in which the discourse initial sentence is not negative:
(42) John had surgery. If he had not had surgery, he would not have died.
When this time the antecedent is dropped, the resulting discourse is, as predicted,
infelicitous:
(43) # John had surgery. He would not have died.
However, when also the negation in the consequent is dropped, the resulting se-
quence all of a sudden becomes acceptable. Indeed, (44) is synonymous to the
counterfactual in (45):
(44) John had surgery. He would have died.
(45) John had surgery. If he had not had surgery, he would have died.
This of course is rather remarkable, since the proposal of the negation induced al-
ternatives would predict the infelicity of (44), since the affirmative initial sentence
can not enrich the context with a NinA to which the modal perfect of the counter-
factual consequent could link up to to complete the counterfactual conditional.
18
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What is further worth to be noted is that the insertion of the particle otherwise into
the discourse again renders the infelicitous examples felicitous, while the felicity
and meaning of the the acceptable discourses remains unaffected by it (with (48)
and (49) being completely synonymous to (40) and (44)):
(46) John did not have surgery. Otherwise he would not have died.
(47) John had surgery. Otherwise he would not have died.
(48) John did not have surgery. Otherwise he would have died.
(49) John had surgery. Otherwise he would have died.
The same phenomenon can be observed also in the German translation of the
data. (Example (50) below translates example (41) above, and the same for the
pairs (51) and (40), (52) and (43), and (53) and (44).16) A negated counterfac-
tual consequent fails also here to present a felicitous continuation not just of a
positive initial sentence (which does not supply a NinA), but also of its negative





























































The insertion of discourse mirrors like sonst or andernfalls into the discourse once
more changes the picture. They render the initially infelicitous data acceptable17:
16The impersonal passive that occurs in the initial sentence of the examples is only detailed by
the introduction of the category AUXpsv that designates the passive auxiliary; all other abbrevia-
tions are as before.
17(54) translates (46), while (55) translates (47).
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Focussing on the English examples without the particle otherwise the observations
are summarized in the following table:
example nr. initial sentence antecedent consequent felicity
(40) negative NinA positive
√
(41) negative NinA negative infelicitous
(43) positive none negative infelicitous
(44) positive none positive
√
(Cross)comparing the discourses it suggests itself to reconsider the proposal. Ar-
guably, the key to discourse felicity in the examples is not simply the (undis-
putable) availability of a NinA, but in fact the occurrence of (sentential) negation
in the consequent. While this does not contradict the existence of the concept
of the negation-induced alternative as a whole, these considerations however lead
to question the role of the notion in explaining the behaviour of the data. If it
is not just the availability of a NinA, but apparently the occurrence of negation
in the counterfactual consequent that determines discourse felicity, the question
is of course how this can be accounted for. A first analysis of this issue will be
attempted in due course.
20
CHAPTER 1. THE DATA
1.6 Approaching a solution via the because-
paraphrase of the data
From the above it should be obvious that what initially seemed to be clear has
turned out to be rather foggy. There is a need for a re-assessment of the data and
of the naive analysis. A first step in doing so is provided by a simple diagnostics
that involves a commonplace paraphrase of the discourses in question in terms of
a because-sentence. This will expand the picture in a promising way. The initial
example (here repeated as (56)) suits to make the case in point. As it stands, in the
particular constellation of factual and counterfactual statement, the mini-discourse
(56) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
may be understood to be synonymous to
(57) Because John would have become sick, he did not drink any wine.18
This scheme works for all the unproblematic data given so far. This holds not just
for those examples that express a clear causal nexus like in (56) and (58), but also
for the discourses involving a deontic scenario (here repeated as (60)), and the
bouletic variant given earlier (which is repeated here as (62)):
(58) The glass was not dropped. It would have broken.
(59) Because it would have broken, the glass was not dropped.
(60) John did not steal the purse of the old lady. He would have been punished.
(61) Because he would have been punished, John did not steal the purse of the
old lady.
(62) John did not steal the purse of the old lady. His father would have been
sad.
(63) Because his father would have been sad, John did not steal the purse of
18One has to be cautious here with the word ‘synonymous’, since the causal flavor that char-
acterizes the particular example need not always be present. However, for most of the data under
discussion this is a dominant trait.
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the old lady.
The same holds also for the German translations of the examples. The German




































Because he would have become sick, Hans did not drink any wine.
With respect to the infelicitous discourses it is important to note that also their
because-analogues are unacceptable. The paraphrase has thus not just the same
truth conditions, but also the same felicity conditions.19
(66) #John drank too much. He would not have become sick.
(67) #Because he would not have become sick, John drank too much.
(68) #The glass was dropped on a hard surface. It would not have broken.
(69) #Because it would not have broken, the glass dropped on a hard surface.20
The fact that the because-sentences show the exact same behaviour as the respec-
tive discourses confirms the significance of the paraphrase. What renders the point
even more interesting is (i) the availability of the because-paraphrase also in con-
nection with the other alternatives invoking data -the focus and alternative ques-
tion examples- mentioned already, and (ii) the behaviour of the because-analogue
for those cases that challenge the NinA-story. While the former shall only be men-
tioned without going into detail, the latter will be elaborated on more extensively.
19This suggests to assume that the connective because lexicalizes the specific discourse relation
that is so characteristic of the NinA-examples.
20That for data of this kind a secondary, maybe marginal, but felicitous reading (in terms of an
in order to-interpretation) seems to be available will be addressed later on.
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The because-variants of the focus and alternative question examples are:
(70) Because John would have made a mess out of it, [MARY]F got the job.
21
(71) Because coffee would get me too agitated, I would like tea.
Notwithstanding the problems already mentioned, the availability and consistency
of the because-paraphrase also for the focus and alternative question-examples is
– together with the data’s behavior in connection with the particle otherwise –
rather remarkable.22
1.6.1 Because and the NinA-challengers
To begin the discussion of the because-paraphrases in relation to those exam-
ples that challenge the NinA-account I will return to the surgery-data introduced
above in (40), (41), (43), and (44). The main point derives from the contrast be-
tween (41) and (44). Recall that the example in (41) is infelicitous, although the
NinA-account would predict it to be felicitous: while the discourse initial sentence
provides a NinA to fill in the implicit antecedent, the sequence is still not accept-
able. (44) however is felicitous, whereas according to the first account sketched
21Although just a minor point, note that the because-paraphrase of the focus example is some-
what more restrictive in its meaning than the corresponding discourse. As it stands the because-
sentence gives a mono-causal reason for Mary getting the job, while John did not get it. This kind
of determinacy is absent in the original example (31): [MARY]F got the job. John would have
made a mess out of it.
22The question whether every discourse has a because-paraphrase and whether every because-
sentence can be expressed in a corresponding elliptic counterfactual discourse shall not be dis-
cussed in detail. Just note that not every discourse has a synonymous because-paraphrase, as the
following examples illustrate:
(72) John did not win the race. He would have celebrated
(73) ?Because he would have celebrated, John did not win the race
(74) The stadium was not built. It would have had 40 000 seats
(75) Because it would have had 40 000 seats, the stadium was not built.
Although the latter example is felicitous, it represents only under a special reading a synonym of
the discourse. This reading can for instance be based on the accommodation of an underlying law
according to which it is forbidden to build stadiums with 40 000 seats.
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it should not be, since the discourse initial sentence is not negated, and thus the
counterfactual consequent should not find a salient counterfactual antecedent in
its context to complete a conditional.
The first point to be observed in connection with the because-paraphrase of this
set of data is again the parallel in felicity. Whenever the original mini-discourse
is acceptable, also the corresponding because-sentence is, whereas in case the
example is infelicitous, also the because-sentence is not. (For accessibility the
examples are repeated again here.) The first example follows the NinA-pattern:
the main clause (corresponding to the initial sentence of the discourse) is negated,
and thus provides with a NinA that could act as an implicit antecedent to the
counterfactual consequent in the subordinate (second) clause:
(76) John did not have surgery. He would have died.
(77) Because he would have died, John did not have surgery.
The structural pattern of the second example challenges the NinA-account: the
main clause contains a sentential negation, and thus provides with a NinA, but
still the sentence is not felicitous:
(78) #John did not have surgery. He would not have died.
(79) #Because he would not have died, John did not have surgery.23
The third example of a because-paraphrase challenges the NinA-account once
more from a different direction. While the main clause is not negated, and thus
does not provide a NinA to complete the counterfactual, the because-sentence is
nonetheless felicitous, although the NinA-account predicts its infelicity.
(80) John had surgery. He would have died.
(81) Because he would have died, John had surgery.
Contrary to this in the fourth case (that differs from the third only in that its subor-
23Also this paraphrase and the one given in (83) allow for a second reading to the effect that it
is understood that in order to guarantee the patient’s death surgery was (resp. was not) carried out.
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dinate clause is negated, while in (81) it is not negated) the NinA-account seems
to be confirmed. The main clause is again positive, and thus can not carry a NinA.
And, as initially predicted, the because-sentence as a whole is not acceptable.
(82) #John had surgery. He would not have died.
(83) # Because he would not have died, John had surgery.
1.7 Exhaustivity as a formal constraint on discourse
felicity?
Returning to the mini-discourses of the original point of departure we will see
that a reconsideration of the data delivers a new perspective that will eventually
allow to formulate a solution to the puzzle. The starting point is provided by the
question what conditions are imaginable that could have brought about the event
hypothesized in the consequent of the mini-discourse below?:
Positive consequent
(84) John did not have surgery. If he had had surgery, he would have died.
Conceived somewhat more abstractly, the underlying question is what character-
izes the set of possible antecedents of the counterfactual conditional24:
If x had been the case, John would have died.
The answer is of course that there is a multitude of possible scenarios that might
bring about the effect described in the consequent: John could have and would
have possibly died not only if he had had surgery, but also if he had had a heart
attack, or if he had had a car accident, or if he had caught the Ebola virus, or if
he had been murdered by an assassin, or if . . . and so on. We see that only one of
the possible conditions needs to hold in order to effectuate the consequent and to
24The question that is employed here is probably best conceived as the question under discus-
sion, abbreviated as QUD (cf. Roberts (1996b); but see also van Kupperfelt (1996) or Ginzburg
(2012) for similar concepts.)
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render it true. Thus, the set of possible antecedents is disjunctive (and within the
counterfactual realm essentially unrestricted).
Negative consequent
Now let us consider next, whether this holds also for the case of a negative conse-
quent:
If x had been the case, John would not have died.
Here, again, it is easy to imagine a plethora of possibilities that present possible
antecedents to the consequent. The difference to the non-negated case however is
that for John not to die not only he must have had surgery, but also he must not
have had an accident, and he must not have been shot at, and he must not have
caught the Ebola virus, and he must not have had . . . and so on. This means, that
in this case negation in the consequent demands to exclude all possible eventual-
ities from consideration. The logical structure of the premise set is thus that of a
conjunction. In its constraining force on the premise set the negated consequent
behaves opposite to the case of the positive consequent. While the latter deter-
mines an existential constraint on the domain of possible antecedents, the former
exerts a universal demand on the set of premises.25
A tentative assessment of the observation
When assessing what to make out of this finding with respect to the (in)felicity of
the data, one might ponder the following argument26:
25Recall that the shift of attention away from the (availability of an) implicit antecedent, resp.
its source of origin in the initial context, was motivated by the observation that for the felicity of
the data under consideration it apparently did not matter whether the discourse initial sentence was
negative or not. See again the table given on page 20 which summarized the data and its behavior.
Hence, it suffices to ponder just upon the polarity of the consequent, and to disregard the polarity
of the initial sentence.
26 We will see that ultimately the argument has to be revised. Felicitous examples like
(85) John did not drink any alcohol. He would not have passed the impending drug test.
with a negative initial sentence, or
26
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The discourses under discussion are felicitous, whenever the counterfactual con-
sequent can link up to a contextually given, implicit antecedent. The antecedent
is selected from a set of possible alternatives: John would have died if he had had
surgery, or if he had had a heart attack, or if . . . . An important feature of this
set of possible premises is that it is essentially unrestricted. The context is never
so definite that it could determine the exact members of the premise set. After
all, the linguistic agent is ultimately free in what she assumes27: besides the more
common premises just mentioned one might as well assume more exotic condi-
tions under which John would have died, like for instance if he had caught the
Ebola-virus or if he had been struck by lightning. While these conditions may not
be very probable, they are still possible. And this is everything that is needed for
making an assumption.28
With the introduction of negation in the consequent neither the context, nor the
possible premises themselves are changed. What changes is rather the logical
structure of the premise set. It is no longer disjunctive, but becomes, as already
observed, conjunctive: for John not to die he (i) must not just not had surgery,
but also he (ii) must not have had a heart attack, and he (iii) must not have been
struck by lightning, and . . . . This means that in the case of a conjunctive premise
set not just one instantiation of the possible antecedents needs to obtain, but all
of the possible premises are to be excluded. However, considering that premises
(86) The pilot took the compass with him. He would not have found his way home.
with an affirmative initial sentence apparently contradict the hypothesis that negation somehow
lexicalizes the exhaustivity constraint put forth on the set of possible antecedents. Also a felicitous
discourse like
(87) John won the race. He would not have celebrated.
poses a problem for the suggested account. However, the core idea deriving from the observation
– namely the distinction between disjunctive and conjunctive premise sets (which also marks the
difference between sufficient and necessary conditions) – will provide with the key to the account
of the data under consideration.
27I take this freedom of assumption not to be total. What could possibly be assumed is restricted
by the conceptual scheme entertained.
28This does not just hold for counterfactual assumptions, but also for the assumption expressed
in the antecedent of indicative conditionals. Thus, the matter is not one of mood, as one might
think.
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are free to be assumed this seems to be a demand that can not be met. Indeed, the
semantics demands to exclude what the pragmatics determines to be in principle
not excludable: possibility. With the introduction of negation the semantics and
the pragmatics of the counterfactual consequent thus clash in a way that can not
be resolved. This eventually leads to the infelicity of the data.29
1.7.1 Wrapping things up
Yet, the analysis still needs to be driven further. A rather important question im-
mediately arises from this proposal. One needs to account for the difference in
felicity between discourses that contain an implicit antecedent versus those in
which the antecedent is explicitly given.
How could it be explained that the infelicitous discourse repeated here in (88)
becomes felicitous as soon as the antecedent is made explicit (as in (89)), al-
though both arguably specify the exact same counterfactual premise If John had
had surgery . . . (which in case of (88) is given implicitly as a NinA).
(88) # John did not have surgery. He would not have died.
(89) John did not have surgery. If he had had surgery, he would not have died.
Apparently, in the passage from an implicit to an explicit antecedent in the dis-
course the counterfactual domain of the antecedent is restricted and the exhaus-
tivity constraint met (which in turn results in the felicity of the discourse). So,
the question is how is this restriction achieved, and what grammatical object is
responsible for it?
With respect to the latter part of the question I will rely on the obvious: what
constitutes the difference between the antecedent being implicit vs. it being ex-
plicit is that the latter is actually uttered, while the former is not. Crucial for the
29One might drive the point even further. When the conclusion that John would not have died
rests on the exclusion of any conditional premise, the matter becomes literally unconditional. But
to express an unconditional claim in a conditional statement seems absurd and a contradiction in
itself.
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felicity of the non-elliptic discourse is that – although the expressed antecedent
remains but just one of a multitude of possible alternative premises – these al-
ternative antecedents are not mentioned in the discourse. But whenever none of
these possibilities is deemed worth the effort of mentioning, one might reason
that these alternatives to the actually uttered antecedent must be false and thus
irrelevant. (Which in turn satisfies the exhaustivity constraint.) Linguistically this
difference in status (and, consequently, in felicity) can be captured by assuming
an illocutionary operator ‘UTTER/ASSUME’ that is an adjustment of Krifka’s
‘ASSERT’-operator (as formulated for instance in Krifka (1999), p. 10) to the
peculiarities of conditional sentences.30
UTTER/ASSUME(M, A, c) (a sentence with meaning M and alterna-
tives A in a context c is uttered/assumed):
- the speaker claims M (in c)
- for every alternative M’ ∈A, M’ ,M, the speaker does not claim
M’ (in c).
Assuming that the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional sentence always de-
rives from a set of competing alternative premises (which is reciprocal to the as-
sumption that iff is not a lexicalized expression) this allows to motivate the choice
of a particular antecedent, since, as Krifka argues, the following holds:
There must be a pragmatic reason why the speaker introduces alter-
native propositions without actually claiming them, reasons that are
obvious to the hearer. There are, essentially, two types of reasons for
the cases that are relevant here:
• It may be that M’ is more informative than M (in c). The reason
in this case is obviously that the speaker lacks evidence for M’,
and perhaps even has evidence that M’ is false. That is, uttering
M’ instead would violate the maxim of Quality.
30An alternative approach to the issue (adopted from von Fintel (2001)) will be discussed later
on in section 4.2.4 on page 134 ff., where a related issue is examined.
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• It may be that M’ is less informative than M (in c). The reason
in this case is obviously that the speaker prefers M because it
gives more information, in c. That is, uttering M’ instead would
violate the Maxim of Quantity.
(Krifka (1999), p. 10)
How this applies to the present concern becomes obvious when recalling that for
the counterfactual consequent John would not have died the logical structure of
the set of possible antecedents is that of a conjunction. For John not to die he
must not just have had surgery, but he must not have had an accident, and he must
not have been shot at etc. The possible alternatives thus conjunctively add up.
This however means that for every alternative M’ to M, M’ is immediately more
informative than M alone: assuming that M is John had had surgery, the ‘first’
alternative to it in order to guarantee that he would not have died is that John had
had surgery and had not had an accident to which an even ‘better’ alternative is
that John had had surgery and had not had an accident and had not been shot
at etc. Hence, whenever these alternatives to the information that John had had
surgery are not mentioned, Gricean reasoning allows to conclude, as Krifka points
out in the first bullet point of his elaboration above, that these may be assumed to
be false. This in turn however sets a limit to exhaustivity, because if the uttered
proposition would not exhaust the set of relevant alternatives the Maxim of Quan-
tity would be violated.
On this account what is actually uttered and what is merely induced have differ-
ent restrictive powers due to the presence, respectively absence of an UTTER/
ASSUME-operator. In the absence of the UTTER/ASSUME-operator the domain
of the antecedent can not be restricted appropriately, and the conditional is not
strengthened.31
31Note that the point also extends to the particle otherwise. As a discourse mirror it serves
multiple functions. It not only provides with the necessary semantic content, but acts as the link
for the illocutionary operator. That expressedness has besides the discussed pragmatic effects
with respect to felicity also important semantic repercussions (in form of an influence on semantic
acceptability) will become clear later on, when the formal semantic analysis is approached.
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1.8 Summary
The main task of the chapter was to introduce the data that present the empiri-
cal basis of this thesis and to formulate the observations and problems that derive
from the examples. The starting point is provided by observations made in Velt-
man (2005) that yield what I call Veltman’s puzzle. This puzzle connects to the
discourse behavior and felicity conditions of certain kinds of counterfactual dis-
course. These discourses consist of two sentences: some (atomic or negated)
factual proposition ϕ expressed by a discourse initial sentence S 1 that is followed
by a counterfactual conditional S 2 the antecedent of which opposes the preced-
ing factual information. (Actually, in the discourses under discussion the dis-
course initial sentence corresponds to the presupposition of the counterfactual’s
antecedent.) The general form of the sequence is thus: [ϕ]S 1 . [¬ϕ ψ]S 2 with
the boxed arrow ‘’ formalizing that the conditional is a counterfactual condi-
tional.
What is peculiar to this sequence is a difference in discourse felicity once the
antecedent of the counterfactual is left implicit. Whenever an acceptable se-
quence with implicit antecedent (given below by . . . ) is inverted, it becomes
infelicitous. Or, more formally exemplified at hand of an instantiation, while
[¬p] . [. . . q] is felicitous, its opposite is not: # [p] . [. . . ¬q]. Thus, the
initial problem is a pragmatic problem. One has to account for the felicity con-
ditions of implicit counterfactuals. This necessitates an analysis of their interplay
with context and negation.
That negation plays a special role for the felicity of the data is recognized in a
first, tentative account. Key to this is the formulation of the concept of negation-
induced alternatives (NinAs). The gist lies in the hypothesis that a negated dis-
course initial sentence ¬S 1 induces as a counterfactual alternative to the expressed
sentence ¬p the proposition p into the context. This proposition in turn comple-
ments as an implicit antecedent the explicitly given counterfactual consequent.
Thus the conditional is completed and becomes interpretable. In case S 1 is not
negated no such counterfactual alternative is provided to which the counterfactual
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consequent could link up to. The conditional thus remains incomplete and hence
not interpretable. Which would explain the infelicity of the discourse, as attested
by the first set of data.
That the concept of the negation-induced alternatives has empirical substance is
confirmed at hand of data involving the particle otherwise that already Veltman
mentions. Based on this a generalization and extension of the empirical concern
is attempted, and other alternative inducing linguistic phenomena (focus and al-
ternative questions) are briefly discussed as possible contexts for counterfactual
consequents. Although a first set of data seems to support the envisaged account,
with the consideration of more examples the sketch becomes increasingly prob-
lematic. Indeed, when returning to the original type of data that involve sequences
of fact-counterfact(ual conditional) it becomes clear that the account in terms of
the NinAs is ultimately not tenable. The account is contradicted twice. First, by
examples that produce a NinA, but that still turn out to be infelicitous, and next
by examples that do not deliver a NinA, but that nonetheless are felicitous.
However, a shift in attention towards the peculiar discourse relation that charac-
terizes the majority of the examples provides with a promising lead. Prevalent
to the data is the understanding that the discourses express some kind of (loosely
understood) ‘causal’ nexus which is attested by the possibility of a paraphrase
(of most) of the examples in terms of a because-sentence. The question what
conditions have to obtain for the consequent to turn out true yields a significant
insight. The logical structure of the possible premise sets from which the implicit
antecedent derives is either conjunctive or disjunctive. In case of a conjunctive set
all possible ‘causes’ to the consequent would have to be exhausted in the evalua-
tion of the consequent, while in case of a disjunctive set a single witness suffices
to determine whether the consequent is supported or not. Since – at least for the
discussed particular example – the logical character of the premise set switches
with the occurrence of negation in the consequent from being disjunctive to being
conjunctive, it is hypothesized that negation (when occurring in the consequent)
exerts an exhaustivity constraint on the set of possible antecedents. The main idea
regarding the infelicity of the data is that at this point semantics and pragmatics
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clash and can not be reconciled. The semantic constraint put forth by the coun-
terfactual consequent, namely to exhaust in its evaluation the (implicit) set of all
possible antecedents, overstrains a fundamental pragmatic principle connected to





Outline of the chapter
The main part of the chapter is devoted to giving an overview on the concept of
modal subordination and the motivating data. In sections 2.1.1 - 2.1.2 certain
problems regarding anaphora in two-sentence mini-discourses are laid out that
connect to the presence, resp. absence of (intensional) quantifying elements in
the second sentence. These issues resolve, once it is recognized in section 2.1.3
that the discourse-initial first sentence provides with an implicit antecedent to the
second sentence in form of a contextually determined restriction. In the following
two sections the account is extended to data that include intensional predicates
(2.1.4) and presupposition triggers (2.1.6). This leads to a more general formu-
lation with respect to what structures may give rise to modal subordination in
section 2.1.7. After this the concern shifts in the conclusion of the discussion of
modal subordination to more material issues: in 2.2 and its subsections 2.2.1 and
2.2.2 the problem how exactly the context and the involved intensional operator
interact is addressed, the question being whether the link is semantic (in terms
of entailments), or pragmatic (in terms of accommodation). The second half of
the presentation of the empirical vicinity of the Veltman’s puzzle (section 2.3)
consists of a brief discussion of the data and the account presented in Schueler
(2008), who studies a type of implicit counterfactual conditionals that appears to
be complementary to the data I am concerned with.
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2.1 Modal subordination
The link between the data discussed so far and the following presentation of what
has been deemed modal subordination since Roberts (1987) is provided by the ob-
servation that in both cases implicit, contextual information plays a decisive role
in the constitution of felicitous discourse. Indeed, it turns out that for both, the dis-
courses which give rise to Veltman’s puzzle and the classical modal subordination
data, the recourse to readily identifiable parts of the implicit context guarantees
not only discourse coherence – i.e. model consistency –, but also, and arguably
more fundamentally, discourse felicity (in terms of interpretability). While the
phenomena seem to be closely related, the discussion will reveal that the data as
discussed so far add a new, interesting facet to the modal subordination picture. It
allows to identify as of yet unrecognized constraints on the interaction of implicit
and explicit discourse and the constitution of larger linguistic units at the intersec-
tion of semantics and pragmatics.
The account of modal subordination takes an at first sight rather surprising point
of departure that seems quite unrelated to the phenomena encountered so far. It
is problems concerning anaphora and its relation to discourse felicity. However,
the relevance for the actual concern – Veltman’s puzzle – will become clear soon.
The presentation to follow is based on Roberts (1996a).
2.1.1 Preparing the ground: anaphora and discourse felicity
The problems that Roberts takes as her point of departure in Roberts (1996a) are
characterized by an undeniable tension between theoretical account(s) and empir-
ical reality. On the theoretical side we have various analyses of anaphora that help
to identify and formulate rather ‘robust’ constraints on the subject (cf. Roberts
(1996a), p. 216). On the other side however, there are data that clearly challenge
these otherwise well supported and established generalizations on anaphora. The
dilemma is that these data are felicitous where theory would predict them not to
be. So, the question of course is what to do with this? Ignore the data? Or revise
the otherwise rather sound and proven theories? It turns out that a third option ex-
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ists that is theoretically conservative insofar as it maintains the established results,
but that is at the same time empirically accurate by giving a motivated analysis of
what is really going on and how to account for it. The lesson to be learned from
Roberts’ discussion of the topic is to not always take things for what they seem
to be. The starting point however is rather straightforward. It is provided by the
following data given in Roberts (1996a), p. 216:
(1) # Every frog that saw an insect ate it. It was a fly.1
(2) # You should buy a lottery ticket and put it in a safe place. It’s worth a
million dollars.
While intuitively the discourses are clearly infelicitous, the source of this re-
mains unclear at first sight. Although it suggests itself to locate the issue with
the anaphorical relations expressed in the discourses, these relations seem at the
same time unquestionable: the underlined indefinite NP acts as the antecedent to
both occurrences of the pronoun it in the data (which are again underlined). So,
what is going wrong here? The answer is provided by the following “descriptive
generalizations” on anaphoric accessibility (Roberts (1996a), p. 216):2
1The marking follows Roberts’ example. Bold font identifies quantificational expressions,
while intuitive reference relations are highlighted by underlining of the respective constituents.
2An important qualification made by Roberts regarding the generality of the constraints needs
to be mentioned (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 244, endnote 2): definite and indefinite noun phrases
defy in their ‘anaphoric potential’, as Roberts puts it, the given description: “Unlike NPs with
determiners like every or no, definite and indefinite NPs may be anaphorically accessible across
discourse.” While Roberts does not bother to give an illustration of the issue, for indefinites one
may refer to Groenendijk and Stokhof’s classic example (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), p.
41 ff.):
(3) A man walks in the park. He whistles.
Although intuitively the pronoun he in the second sentence is anaphorically linked to the NP a man
in the first sentence, in a translation to classical predicate logic that strictly observes the sentential
scope constraint the pronoun lies outside the scope of the indefinite’s translation as an existential
quantifier. –Which contradicts the scope constraint on anaphoric relations (at least as long as
one considers the indefinite not to be a constituent of the NP itself). For definite descriptions a
similar problem arises. Substituting into the example the definite noun phrase the president of the
United States for the indefinite a man generates a felicitous sequence of sentences in which the
pronoun in the second sentence has access to its antecedent across a sentence boundary, and hence
also violates the scope constraint on anaphoric relations. Thus, the notion of a quantificational
element that plays such a pivotal role in the formulation of the constraints has to be understood
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Scope constraint on anaphoric relations: If NP x is anaphorically
accessible to NP y, then any quantificational elements which have
scope over x have scope over y as well.
Sentential scope constraint: The maximal scope of a quantifica-
tional element is the sentence in which it occurs.
When reconsidering the examples in (1) and (2) with respect to these principles
it becomes clear in how far the examples violate the given constraints. Assuming
that a sentence boundary is determined by the potential of an expression to bear
a truth value, it can indeed be observed in the data that the occurrence of the pro-
noun it in the second sentence lies outside of the scope not just of the indefinite
NP in the first sentence, but also outside of the scope of those quantificational
elements that further occur in the first sentences: every and should. This sets this
occurrence of it apart from its first instantiation in the initial sentence that lies
within the scope of the quantifiers present.
On this ground one may thus argue that although intuitively the pronoun it in the
second sentence refers to the indefinite NP of the first sentence, it is nonethe-
less formally not bound, and thus its interpretation not resolvable. In turn the
discourses are infelicitous, because they are incoherent. Or, in Roberts’ words:
“The NP is anaphorically accessible only to the first of two pronouns, the one
which is also under the scope of the quantificational element, and not to the sec-
ond pronoun, which is outside that scope under the assumption that quantifier
scope is sentence-bounded. Because the second sentence in each discourse con-
tains a pronoun with no potential antecedent, the sentence is uninterpretable and
hence infelicitous, as indicated by the “#” sign.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 216)
with certain reservations and arguably does not include definites and indefinites. More problematic
to Robert’s account are data like
(4) Every frog that saw an insect ate it. It tasted deliciously.
This issue shall however not be pursued any further.
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2.1.2 More data and a problem for the established constraints
The presentation so far gave in a nutshell the theoretical and empirical background
into which the following data ought ideally to be integrated. The new examples
(cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 216) deviate from those already introduced in only a
detail: the second sentence now contains a quantificational element. However,
this amendment has drastic effects regarding acceptability, and thus has repercus-
sions for the account as a whole. Unlike in (1) and (2) (repeated here in (5) and
(7) to highlight the contrast) the data in (6) and (8) represent coherent and felic-
itous discourses. –Although in terms of those structural aspects alluded to in the
accessibility-constraints the discourses in fact have not changed. In both cases
the initial pronoun in the second sentence lies outside the sentence boundary and
quantifier scope given with the first sentence.
(5) # Every frog that saw an insect ate it. It was a fly.
(6) Every frog that saw an insect ate it. It disappeared forever.
(7) # You should buy a lottery ticket and put it in a safe place. It’s worth a
million dollars.
(8) You should buy a lottery ticket and put it in a safe place. It might be worth
a million dollars (if you were lucky).
Based on this observation the conclusion is that apparently the insertion of a quan-
tifier like forever or a modal like might (which, sticking to standard semantic
analysis, will be treated as quantificational just as well) facilitates anaphoric ac-
cessibility across sentences, i.e. cross sentential anaphora. This however runs of
course against the insights underlying the given constraints on anaphoric accessi-
bility –which is rather disturbing for those theories of anaphora that incorporate
the constraints. While they can explain the infelicity of the original data, they
cannot explain the felicity of the quantified resp. modalized variants just given.
Indeed, the prediction is that these examples ought to be infelicitous, too, since
the anaphoric pronoun in the second sentence of the data does not lie within the
scope of the indefinite nominal contained in the first sentence. Or, as Roberts puts
it: “These discourses and many others like them are perfectly acceptable to most
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speakers, despite the apparent anaphoric relation between a pronoun in the second
sentence and an indefinite NP which is under the scope of the [. . . ] quantifica-
tional element in the first.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 217)3
2.1.3 The key to what is going on in the data and its relation to
Veltman’s puzzle
The key to what is happening here is found when contemplating upon what is ac-
tually expressed in the data. While on the surface the data may have only changed
in terms of the presence of a modal or other quantifier, their reading however is
intuitively richer than this. Indeed, the data contain a good amount of implicit
information that is – just as with the discourses of Veltman’s puzzle – provided
by the context, i.e. by the initial sentence. And it is, again similar to the puzzle-
discourses, to this contextually given elements to which the modal or intensional
quantifier eventually links up to. A paraphrase in which the otherwise implicit
information is spelled out makes this clear. Example (9) is the non-elliptic variant
of example (6), while (10) is a fully explicit rendering of (8).
(9) Every frog that saw an insect ate it. The insect that was seen and eaten by
each frog disappeared forever.4
(10) You should buy a lottery ticket and put it in a safe place. The lottery ticket
you should buy and which you should put in a safe place might be worth
a million dollars (if you were lucky).
A rough and schematic translation that captures the structural difference between
e.g. examples (1) and (6) will make the impact that the introduction of an (inten-
sional) operator resp. modal has on the felicity of the data perspicuous. Although
also in (1) it is intuitively clear that the pronoun in the second sentence refers to
the indefinite NP in the first sentence (i.e. to contextually given information), the
semantic structure of the second sentence does not support this link. The second
sentence that follows the first sentence translates in case of example (1) to an open
3The quantificational elements in question are every and should.
4I am solely sticking to a distributive reading here.
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formula:
[sentence 1] [Fly(x)]=sentence2
Contrary to this in case of (6) the second sentence is a closed formula, since the
semantics of the adverb forever changes the logical structure of the second sen-
tence. The decisive point however is not just that forever as an intensional opera-
tor closes the formula, but that it furthermore introduces a slot for a restrictor that
fixes the domain of interpretation for the information given in its scope via the
verb disappear.
[sentence 1] [FOREVER ( . . . restrictor→DISAPPEAR(x))]=sentence2
What is crucial to be noted is that within the context of the first sentence a proper
domain restriction (in form of a complex NP) for the quantificational element in
the second sentence becomes available that is otherwise lacking. Indeed, while
no explicit restrictor is given in sentence 2, the context implicitly delivers the in-
formation about the restriction on the domain. This in turn renders the discourse
felicitous. Thus, in sum it is the different structure and logical form that sets the
felicitous examples apart from the infelicitous examples in (1) and (2).5
On basis of this observation one can then give a straightforward account of the
data in terms of the established constraints on anaphora: the restriction given by
the context figures as the antecedent to the potentially anaphoric pronoun in the
second sentence. Since both, the antecedent NP, and the anaphoric pronoun are
located within the scope of a quantifier within the boundaries of a single sentence,
the accessibility constraints are not violated. This means that what appears at first
sight to be cross sentential anaphora happens to be under this analysis a common
case of anaphora within a single sentence. (With the antecedent of course deriving
5Just note that in case of example (10) the restriction of the might operator is arguably given
only by the first proposition of the first sentence. The second conjunct acts under this reading as a
rhetorical element, as the following paraphrases show: Because it might be worth a million dollars
you should buy a lottery ticket. And hence you should (also) put it in a safe place versus ??Because
it might be worth a million dollars, you should put a lottery ticket in a safe place. And hence you
should (also) buy it. This issue is however not addressed by Roberts.
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from the context.)
The problem is thus not so much how to account for the anaphoricity in the data,
but how to account for the exact relation between the context and the restriction
of the domain of interpretation in the subsequent sentence. This question will
be addressed in section 2.2. However, before doing so the empirical base shall
be extended, and other data that apparently show similar behavior shall first be
introduced.
2.1.4 Extending the empirical base, part 1: intensional con-
texts
In the coming discussion I will continue to follow Roberts (1996a), who argues
with reference to the already introduced data that there is a “closely related phe-
nomenon involving propositional attitude verbs and ‘world-creating’ predicates
more generally.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 217) To support her point she presents (with
reference to Baker (1966), Lakoff (1970), Jackendoff (1972), Montague (1973),
Karttunen (1974), McCawley (1981), and Heim (1992) (cf. (Roberts (1996a),
p. 217)) the following examples (in which the “world-creating” predicates are
printed in bold, while the anaphoric elements are underlined):
(11) Jan expected to get a new puppy soon. She intended to keep it in her
backyard.
(12) John wants to catch a fish. He plans to eat it for supper.
(13) Alice fears there’s a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets. She hopes to trap it
alive and turn it loose outside.
As before the apparent anaphorical relation between the pronoun in the second
sentence and its antecedent in the first sentence clearly violates the constraints
on anaphoric accessibility: pronoun and antecedent do neither occur within the
scope of the same operator, nor do they appear within the same sentence. More-
over, both are located within the scope of different opacifying verbs, like expect
and intend in the first case. Nonetheless, the discourse is unproblematic and the
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anaphorical relation established. Again, it seems that this is a case of cross sen-
tential anaphora that contradicts acknowledged theoretical insight. Yet, again, the
issue resolves: closer contemplation upon the data reveals a striking parallel to the
examples discussed before. Also in the present cases the second sentence comes
with an implicit contextual restriction. This restriction is given by the preceding
sentence and ultimately provides the anaphoric antecedent to which the pronoun
contained in the second sentential projection actually refers to. For the first ex-
ample the worlds that are subject to the agent’s intentions are just those worlds
in which her expectations turned to fact and she actually has already obtained a
new puppy. Only for those worlds in which Jan is in the possession of a new
puppy did she intend to keep it in the backyard. Anything else would intuitively
be untenable. Similar for the other discourses. In the second example the worlds
that the subject considers in his plans are solely those worlds in which the premise
is realized and he in fact managed to catch a fish, while the second sentence of
the third discourse is concerned only with those worlds in which the agent’s fears
have actually come true and there is indeed a squirrel in her kitchen. Only in this
scenario are her hopes of trapping the squirrel and letting it loose founded at all.
Indeed, in both cases the otherwise implicit restriction can be spelled out without
altering the meaning of the discourses as a whole:
(14) John wants to catch a fish. He plans to eat the fish he caught – if he
actually catches one – for supper.
(15) Alice fears there’s a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets. She hopes to trap the
squirrel in her kitchen cabinets – if there indeed is one – alive and turn it
loose outside.
Roberts eventually relates the phenomenon to a single source: “All the felici-
tous examples except (1’) [appearing here as example (6), D. B.] involve either a
modal, an opacifying predicate, or an adverb of quantification in the second sen-
tence.”6 (Roberts (1996a), p. 218 - 219) Taking this perspective one may indeed
6Her example (1’), which is given here as (6) is arguably not so much an exception as Roberts
takes it to be. (In support of her point of view she refers on p. 219 to Roberts (1987), and Roberts
(1989).) Forever may be considered intensional if one assumes that it quantifies over all possible
temporal successors to the actual world.
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subsume the data also under the heading of ‘anaphora in intensional contexts’, as
Roberts puts it in the title of Roberts (1996a).
2.1.5 Preliminary summary
Bringing the phenomena introduced so far into perspective, the main points of the
discussion are, first, the fact that the insertion of a quantificational element or of
an intensional predicate in the second sentence provides with a link to the preced-
ing context, and, second, – on the assumption of the empirical correctness of the
constraints on anaphoric accessibility – the observation that in turn (parts of) the
given context – just as with the discourses of Veltman’s puzzle – actually enter the
logical form of subsequent discourse and, although remaining implicit, play a de-
cisive role there in facilitating discourse felicity. In fact, at least in case of the first
set of examples, the context as given by the initial sentence is of twofold impor-
tance: it not only delivers a restriction to the operator in the second sentence, but
this restriction in turn acts as the antecedent to whatever pronouns in the second
sentence are dependent on an anaphorical interpretation.7
2.1.6 Extending the empirical base, part 2: modal subordina-
tion and presupposition
Following Roberts the same mechanics arguably underlies also another phenomenon
to which she draws a final connection. It is presupposition satisfaction in dis-
course. A brief presentation of this topic will complete the empirical overview.
Considering the examples below the observation is that – just as before – the
7The data presented by Roberts seem to suggest that the presence of an intensional predicate in
the initial context is indispensable. This is not the case, as the following amendment exemplifies.
Dropping the first intensional predicate does not render the discourse infelicitous:
(16) John buys a fish. He plans to eat it for dinner.
But see again my footnote 2 on page 36 for the influence of indefinite (and definite) articles on
anaphoric accessibility. On the other side, as to be expected, dropping the intensional predicate in
subsequent discourse yields an infelicitous discourse:
(17) #John wants to catch a fish. He (will) eat(s) it for dinner.
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second sentences – which contain presupposition triggers – are interpretable or
felicitous only within the context of the initial discourse.
While successful anaphora resolution runs parallel to the next examples in that it
presupposes the accessibility of an appropriate antecedent, Roberts argues that in
the data to follow (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 219, bold font and underlining as in the
original) “the second sentence carries a presupposition which, in the discourses
in question, is only satisfied by material which is under the scope of the quantifi-
cational element or predicate in boldface in the first sentence”. (Roberts (1996a),
p. 219) Indeed, the gist of her argumentation (and the motivation for the term
‘modal subordination’, as introduced in Roberts (1987)) is that these presupposi-
tions are “semantically subordinate to irrealis propositions considered in previous
discourse.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 219) –Which means that the presuppositions are
in this case entailed by the preceding (counterfactual) discourse. The (focus in-
duced) presupposition for (18) below is that there is something else besides coffee
that Fred buys. For (19) and (20) the presupposition is given by the truth of the
complement of the factive verbs discover and regret, which is for (19) that Max-
ine is indeed capable of building things, and in case of (20) that Mary is attending
grad school.8
(18) Usually Fred buys a muffin every morning and eats it at the office. He
buys [a cup of coffee]F , too.
(19) Maxine should become a carpenter. Her friends would discover she could
build things, and she’d be very popular on weekends.
(20) Mary is considering getting her Ph.D. in linguistics. She wouldn’t regret
attending graduate school.
8Note that these presuppositions come with a very important distinction: while the discovery
that Mary could build things may include already the factual world in the sense that one may
assume that having the capacity to build is not necessarily dependent on being a trained carpenter,
no such global validity connects to the second presupposition. In this case the presupposition is
linked exclusively to the irrealis and excludes the factual world: Mary is not yet attending grad
school. Only in case she were to pursue a Ph.D. in linguistics – which she is not yet doing – were
she to attend grad school. This is a case of a local accommodation of a presupposition, in the
sense that the presupposition connects only to some hypothetical scenario that excludes the factual
world.
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What Roberts alludes to in the quote above becomes clearer once it is pointed out
that just as in the case of the anaphorical data, the second sentence in the exam-
ples becomes interpretable only within the context of the given initial sentences.
Without these it will not become clear what presupposition the particle too in (18)
rests on, nor what motivation there is for what is expressed in the second sentences
of (19) and (20). For all these cases a lack of the necessary information results
(my interpretation) in incomprehensibility of what is expressed in the second sen-
tence.9
But note that arguably this incomprehensibility is due to the absence of a condi-
tion that could describe a motivational nexus or context for what is expressed in
the sentences containing would. One may object rather that the would sentences
are consequents without an antecedent. If one follows this argument the whole
point that Roberts tries to make becomes questionable. Especially her remark that
“[t]hese presuppositional parallels with the earlier anaphoric examples support
the analysis of anaphora as essentially presuppositional, as argued e.g. by Heim
(1982). [Footnote omitted, D.B.] Hence, a more appropriate title for this paper
might be “Presupposition satisfaction in intensional contexts”. But for simplic-
ity I will focus on the examples involving anaphora.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 220)
–What these presuppositional parallels actually are is regrettably not explicated
in more detail. More important than this however is at this moment the summary
9Note that at least in case of (19) the second sentence at the same time ‘motivates’ the deontic
necessity expressed in the initial sentence, as Roberts points out. She elaborates on the data:
”Following Heim (1992), in (12) [given here as (18), D.B.] too presupposes that it is known by
the interlocutors that there is some salient entity which could replace the property denoted by
the focused constituent a cup of coffee while preserving truth, i.e. there is something else which
the interlocutors already know that Fred buys. Further, the bare present tense with a non-stative
verb is interpreted as the generic mood, in recent literature often formalized with an adverbial
operator (see Carlson (1977) and Wilkinson (1991)). In (13) [given here as (19), D.B.] discover
presupposes the truth of its complement. But, under the assumption that Maxine isn’t already
skilled as a carpenter, this presupposition is only satisfied in those deontically ideal worlds where
she becomes one, verifying the proposition introduced under the scope of should in the previous
sentence. The modal auxiliary would will have to range over such worlds in which that proposition,
that Maxine is a carpenter, is true, in order to satisfy the factive presupposition of discover. Regret
is similarly factive; in (14) [here: (20), D.B.] it is under the scope of a modal, but (assuming
Mary hasn’t yet gone to graduate school) its presupposition is only satisfied in those worlds which
realize what she is considering, introduced in the previous sentence.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 219 -
220)
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that Roberts gives herself of what she regards to be the common denominator in
the data. This general scheme will be presented next.
2.1.7 Recapitulating and connecting the observations: the gen-
eral scheme
Roberts’ observations are summarized in the following logical forms that she ar-
gues to underlie the data. They follow a single scheme, as she remarks:
The schema in (15) [(21) here, D.B.] captures the general logical form
of examples displaying modal subordination, while that in (16) [my
(22), D.B.] gives the anaphoric sub-type:
(21) operator[S . . .π . . . ]
operatorintensional[S . . . presupposition of π . . . ]
(22) operator[S . . . NPx,[−de f ] . . . ]
operatorintensional[S . . . NPx,[+de f ] . . . ]
In each discourse there are two sentences, each containing a wide
scope operator. In the second sentence, the operator is intensional
– the operator logically associated with a propositional attitude pred-
icate, a modal auxiliary, or an adverb of quantification, ranging over
situations – though this operator is sometimes implicit, as in (1’)
[given here as (6), D.B.] and (12) [= (18), D.B.] In the general case,
some element π under the scope of the operator in the first sentence is
presupposed by an element which has narrow scope under the inten-
sional operator in the second sentence. (Roberts (1996a), p. 220)
With regards to the initial anaphoric data in which an indefinite NP is anaphor-
ically accessible to a (definite) pronoun Roberts continues to elaborates: “In the
sub-case of interest, the presupposition is one of the familiarity of some entity
introduced by an indefinite NPx in the first sentence; i.e. there is an anaphoric re-
lationship to an NP which is inaccessible under the scope constraint on anaphoric
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relations and the sentential scope constraint.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 220)
That the ‘general case’ cannot be considered to be fully general becomes clear
when Roberts notes that “the operator in the first sentence needn’t be intensional,
as we see in (17) [my (23), D.B.], where it is an auxiliary negation” (Roberts
(1996a), p. 220):
(23) John doesn’t have a car. It would be in the garage.
That this datum follows the scheme of Veltman’s puzzle is obvious, and at least the
intuition that the example comes with an implicit antecedent is shared by Roberts.
She writes: “The felicitous reading of the second sentence of (17) [my (23), D.B.]
might be paraphrased ‘if John had a car, it would be in the garage.”’ (Roberts
(1996a), p. 221) However, she fails to elaborate on the issue in more detail. That
this is a deficit is clear, when recalling the discussion of this kind of data that was
given in chapter 1.10 Although negation does play a role in the interpretation of
the data by supplying a negation induced alternative, the discussion has shown that
negation can not (contrary to Roberts’ view quoted above) be held responsible for
triggering modal subordination, if one is to use Roberts’ terminology here. This
understanding is contradicted by examples like
(24) John repairs a car. It would not pass the TÜV approval test.
that lack an auxiliary negation in the initial discourse, but that are nonetheless
felicitous and contain an implicit, contextually determined antecedent. The link
to the context does in these cases arguably not come with an explicit intensional
operator, but it is facilitated by the logical structure of the premise set required by
10An additional problem is that Roberts ignores the possible influence of the subjunctive mood
in the example.
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the subsequent discourse (i.e. the counterfacual consequent).11,12
2.2 Contextually determined restrictions: principles
and constraints
Having discussed the main questions regarding anaphora, an important open ques-
tion that Roberts further addresses in her exposition of the modal and presupposi-
tional data is the question of how to actually account for the peculiar interaction
of context and intensional elements that is characteristic of the data. What is the
relation between the parts of discourse involved? Or, more precisely, how can
one account for the observed contextually restricted interpretation of intensional
elements? Or, as Roberts puts it: “[T]he question which arises is what factors
govern this relativization of the domain of the second intensional operator to a
proposition suggested by the first sentence?” (Roberts (1996a), p. 224) –Which is
of course a question also to be posed in connection with the discourses that yield
Veltman’s puzzle.
Answering this question Roberts elaborates “[t]wo types of accounts appear to
11While (24) underlies a disjunctive premise set (the question under discussion connected to the
counterfactual consequent being When would the car not pass the TÜV approval test?, while the
answer is When already a single precluding condition obtains, the conjunctive (i.e. the positive)
variant to the example is – independent from the occurence of a negation in the initial sentence
and as predicted by the proposal sketched in the preceding chapter – not-felicitous:
(25) #John (does not) repair(s) a car. It would pass the TÜV approval test.
The QUD here is When do you pass the TÜV approval test? and the answer is of course When all
conditions that are required are met at once, i.e. when they conjunctively obtain.
12 Actually, when shifting the perspective a bit, my proposal regarding the analysis of Velt-
man’s puzzle and Roberts’ general account may be reconciled to some degree. Assuming that the
subjunctive mood acts as a form of (a grammaticalized) intensional operator the logical structure
of the premise set does not so much ‘facilitate’ the link to the context – as I just claimed –, but
it in fact just constrains the possibility of modal subordination. That the subjunctive introduces
an intensional semantic element is beyond doubt. Indeed, considering the particular construction
under discussion one might even argue that Roberts’ account of the ‘general case’ in terms of pre-
suppositions that was quoted above might be applicable. Since in the examples that are of concern
here the implicit antecedent of the counterfactual is presupposed to be false, while its complement
has been asserted to be true in the discourse initial sentence, both build an a priori link.
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have the greatest explanatory potential, an entailment based, and hence semantic
account, and one which crucially incorporates pragmatic processes, specifically
accommodation.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 224) Anticipating the result of her dis-
cussion she eventually points out that “a purely semantic account is inadequate.”
((Roberts 1996a), p. 224) Yet, she continues: “[. . . ] the two types of accounts
aren’t really incompatible; assuming that entailment plays a role in licensing the
anaphora in some examples does not preclude the necessity of using accommo-
dation in many others. And in fact both have something to offer to our under-
standing of modal subordination; the lexical entailments of predicates naturally
interact with other, contextual factors that constrain the accommodation that is
possible in a given example.” ((Roberts 1996a), p. 224) In the next section I will
first present the main tenets of Roberts’ discussion of the semantic account and
will then follow up with a summary of her exploration of the pragmatic approach.
2.2.1 The semantic account in terms of entailments
At the heart of the semantic account of the data’s acceptability lies the concept of
entailment. The idea is basically that felicity is due to the embedding of an ex-
pression into an entailing context. Roberts illustrates this via a special set of data.
These examples are peculiar insofar as they – unlike most of the data discussed
so far – do not involve any implicitly given semantic elements. Indeed, they ex-
emplify the general scheme of a contextually given domain restriction that is at
stake in an elementary and rather obvious way, but without any simplification.
The restrictions derive immediately from the semantic relations of the involved
intensional predicates. The pair of examples in (26) and (27) (first discussed in
Lakoff (1970) and McCawley (1981)) demonstrates the point clearly and is further
significant in that it exemplifies how entailments may determine the rift between
felicitous and infelicitous discourses (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 224; bold font and
underlining as in the original):
(26) You are required to find a bear and permitted to take its picture.
(27) #You are permitted to find a bear and required to take its picture.
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Depending on their succession the lexical meanings – more specifically, the differ-
ent deontic forces – of the verbs permit and require determine whether a discourse
is felicitous or not.
Put loosely, the semantic intuition connected to (26) and (27) is that a permission
does not commit the subject of the examples to choose a world in which she takes
the picture of a bear. The picture may or may not be taken. Actually, a permission
does not even presuppose the existence of a bear in any of the worlds accessible.
Contrary with obligations. Being required to take a bear’s picture does not leave
the alternative not to, and indeed seems to presuppose the existence of bears that
could be photographed. Applied to the data, the requirement expressed in the
first example confronts one solely with bear worlds, in which – due to the second
sentence – one may further take or not take a picture of a bear. In the second
example however the domain specified by the initial sentence is (unlike in the first
example) one in which also worlds are allowed in which bears don’t even exist.
Following up in discourse with the demand to take a picture of a bear in such a
world (due to the universal force of the normative predicate) is then contradictory.
For this reason the second example is infelicitous, while the first example is not:
the permission-worlds are a subset of the require-worlds, but not the other way
around.13 Thus, it is clear how entailments may determine discourse felicity.
Another example that nicely demonstrates the impact of lexical meanings and their
relations on discourse felicity is given by the next data. While the infelicity of the
first example (example (28)) is characterized by the same semantic preclusion
as in example (27) above (with the difference that the scenario here is doxastic,
rather than deontic), the simple change of the first predicate in (29) – and thus of
the contextual background of the subsequent intensional predicate! – generates a
felicitous discourse. Unlike in the first example the verbs involved in (29) describe
a compatible semantic relation (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 225 for (28), and p. 223
13 Note that – as also Roberts points out (cf. Roberts (1996a), footnote 8) – there is a second,
felicitous reading of example (27) available in which the normative force of the obligation loses
its universal appeal but is localized and restricted solely to those worlds in which one happens to
find a bear. In this rendering the obligation comes with the qualification that only if one happens
to find a bear, one is required to photograph it. (This point will find elaboration later on.)
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and p. 226 for (29); bold font and underlining again as in the original).
(28) # Alice denies that there’s a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets. She hopes
to trap it alive and turn it loose outside.
(29) Alice fears that there’s a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets. She hopes to
trap it alive and turn it loose outside.
The intuitive rationale that explains the difference in felicity in these examples is
again based on the different modal forces connected to the verbs involved. All
of them have a clear doxastic component: while to deny expresses a believe that
negates the possibility that p, the verb to hope positively asserts the possibility that
p. Thus, in consequence, the hope that p that is expressed in the second sentence
of example (28) is interpreted before a background in which it already had been
excluded that p. The semantic model generated is thus outright contradictory,
which in turn explains again the infelicity of the discourse. Considering example
(29) no such clash in modal forces arises: the fear entertained by the agent is a
believe in a certain (unedifying) possibility. The existential import given by this
finds concord in the existential supposition connected to the believe that translates
from the agent’s hope. (Note that however things are a little bit more complex than
this rough rendering may suggest: the agent’s hope-worlds coincide solely with
those world’s in which her fears are true, not with those in which her fears turn out
to be false. Insofar does the initial sentence deliver a (localized) restriction of the
domain of interpretation of the second sentence. In this the example runs parallel
to the reading of example (27) mentioned in footnote 13. (The difference in the
default readings of the examples in question is highly interesting, but cannot be
pursued further at this point.)
Before turning to Roberts’ critical assessment of the entailment approach, the
perspective on the issue needs to be broadened further: subject to entailments
are not only lexical meanings, but also presuppositions. With reference to Heim
(1992) and Karttunen (1974) the matter is elaborated by Roberts at hand of data
that are – as above – headed by propositional attitude verbs:
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(30) John believes that Mary is coming, and he wants Susan to come too.14
The point here is that the presupposition that is triggered by the particle too and
that connects to the complement of want in the second conjunct, namely that
someone who is not Sue is coming, is entailed by the first conjunct John believes
that Mary is coming, because whenever John believes that Mary is coming, then
in the worlds of concern it is true that someone who is not Sue is coming.
The assumption that “lack of entailment generally leads to infelicity” (Roberts
1996a:p. 227) – which follows from the postulate of a direct relation between
entailments and discourse felicity as proposed in e.g. Lakoff (1970), Karttunen
(1974), McCawley (1981), and Heim (1992), as Roberts points out – finds further
support in example (31) (Roberts’ (21’)) in which the order of the intensional
predicates involved in example (30) is inverted.
(31) #John wants Mary to come, although he believes that Susan is going to
come too.
Again, the presupposition of the second conjunct is that someone else besides Su-
san is coming, however this presupposition is this time not satisfied by the initial
sentence: wanting Mary to come does not guarantee that she will indeed do so.
This lack of entailment hence explains the infelicity of the discourse.15
What these examples illustrate is that entailment relations and compatibilities be-
tween discourse elements resp. sentential constituents with different domains of
interpretation influence felicity. (Indeed, the discourses are infelicitous not be-
cause some anaphoric constraint is violated, but because certain semantic relations
between parts of discourse are incompatible.) Although Roberts does not bother
to discuss elliptic cases, it seems plausible to assume that the same principles that
govern the data just presented apply also here. After all, the mere fact that an el-
14My example (30) is Roberts’ (21), (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 226).
15That Roberts does not address the change of the connective from and in (30) to although
in (31) is problematic. My intuition is that (31) with and is felicitous. Which suggests that en-
tailments (and thus felicity) are not determined solely by linearization, but that things are also
mediated by the chosen connective.
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ement is given explicitly or implicitly arguably does not alter its presuppositions
or domain of discourse. However, it is questionable, whether this account could
be applied fruitfully to the analysis of Veltman’s puzzle, because the entailment
relations are in this case trivial.
2.2.2 Inadequacies of the semantic account – the pragmatic ap-
proach and the notion of accommodation
While there are strong reasons to back the semantic account, Roberts argues that
although it is a sufficient condition, entailment represents nonetheless not a nec-
essary condition for modal subordination. (cf. Roberts 1996a:p. 229). She points
out that there are indeed a number of inadequacies to the entailment approach, all
of which find a competitive solution in the concept of accommodation. In sum it
is three arguments – none of which are independent from each other – that speak
in Roberts’ eyes against the semantic approach. The first argument highlights
mismatches between predictions and actual judgments. Where the strictly logical
perspective allows only for binary and categorial judgments and predicts infelic-
ity due to non-entailment, actual judgments are often less prohibitive and appear
more tolerant regarding felicity. Apparently, interpreters are able to charitably
adjust domains of interpretation. The second argument is based on certain kinds
of data that simply can not be accounted for in terms of entailments. And in the
third argument Roberts brings up the concept of accommodation and its arguably
superior explanatory value as an alternative to the entailment approach. Roberts
puts her arguments as this: “First, many of the examples which an entailment-
based account would predict to be bad seem to be less than fully infelicitous.
Judgments tend to vary from informant to informant, variation which is typical
of accommodation-based felicity (indeed predictable, given its nature), but not of
entailment. Second, there are a number of types of examples which cannot be
accounted for by entailment alone, and must involve the accommodation of the
presuppositions in question; [. . . ] And third, an alternative explanation of the
infelicitous examples can be given within the context of an account involving ac-
commodation.” (Roberts (1996a), p. 227 - 228)
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Before addressing how Roberts substantiates these arguments, it is helpful to re-
call, as Roberts does (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 215), the definition of accommoda-
tion, as given by David Lewis. Lewis writes:
If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be
acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then – ceteris
paribus and within certain limits – presupposition P comes into exis-
tence at t. (Lewis (1979b), p. 340.)
While the formulation of the first argument seems to invoke a criticism of the
strict binary nature of entailment judgments, the point that Roberts wants to make
is actually a different one. She argues that in some cases a secondary reading
is available that supersedes judgments based on entailments and rather relies on
accommodation as the base of interpretation. One such second reading connects
to example (31) that had just been given above. The interpretation under which
the sentence is felicitous can be made explicit as follows:
(32) John wants Mary to come, although he believes that if she does, Susan is
going to come too.
By accommodating to a best case scenario with respect to the want-worlds (inso-
far as the domain of the subjects beliefs is ad hoc restricted solely to those worlds
in which the subject’s wants have become reality) the entailment is rescued, and
hence a felicitous reading is achieved. This is so, because if you just consider the
worlds in which Mary actually shows up, then the presupposition that someone
who is not Sue comes is met. What is important to be noted here is that accom-
modation is strictly local: it does not apply indiscriminately to all of the subject’s
believe-worlds – which would be global accommodation –, but it pertains solely
to the subject’s make believe-worlds. In other words, the believe-worlds are re-
stricted and subordinated to the want-worlds.
Although the possibility of accommodation in examples like the above seems to
affirm the importance of entailment in an indirect way, the picture shifts when
turning to the details of the second argument. While the semantic approach un-
questionably sheds an important light on the data, entailments can not be regarded
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to be the only determinative, as Roberts demonstrates.
The first example (due to Heim (1992)) that Roberts presents in her discussion of
the second argument against an account of discourse felicity exclusively in terms
of entailments appears to be actually quite similar to the ones just discussed. Also
in (33) below (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 229, her example (25)) two intensional
predicates combine:
(33) John wants Fred to come, and he wants Jim to come too.
Checking for entailments is to no avail. John’s want-worlds are such that either
Fred or Jim or (ideally) both show up. But, as before, the semantics of want
does not warrant that any of them actually shows up. Thus, the presupposition
of the second conjunct (that is again triggered by the particle too) that someone
who is not Jim comes is not entailed by the first conjunct. However, and this is
an important difference to the above pair of examples (31) and (32), the exam-
ple is felicitous from the start for any competent interpreter (Roberts does at least
not make a remark to the contrary). Its felicity is arguably not based – as was
the case in (31), resp. (32) – on a secondary reading that some interpreters may
entertain, while others do not. Rather, the domain of the second occurrence of
want is automatically restricted by the first want and its propositional comple-
ment. Which seems actually quite plausible, since both share the same domain.
However, the entailment based approach would have a problem accounting for
the felicity of the example. The problem actually extends, as Roberts continues to
point out (cf. Roberts (1996a), p. 229), also to a plethora of other constructions,
such as (to name just a few of what Roberts lists) adverbs of quantification, cases
of mixed combinations of modal expressions, constructions containing attitude
verbs in the first sentence which are followed by subjunctive propositions, and
Geach’s Hob/Nob-sentences (cf. Geach (1967)). And also, as Roberts mentions,
examples “where the operator in the first sentence is negation”. (Roberts (1996a),
p. 229). –Which brings us back to the actual concern. Clearly, entailments do not
generally play a role here. Just consider cases where a nomological relation be-
tween the discourse elements is not presupposed, as for instance in the discourse
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John did not buy a newspaper. He would have missed the train. However, based
on the discussion of the data, I do not follow Roberts’ claim that negation is the
decisive factor in the examples. In my eyes, it is indeed questionable whether the
phenomenon under discussion really is a case of modal subordination in Roberts’
sense. (But see again my footnote 12 on p. 48 for a brief discussion of this topic.)
However, far more important than the ‘proper’ terminological classification of
the phenomenon is to deliver a satisfactory analysis of the data at issue. A first,
promising approach has briefly been sketched at the end of the preceding chapter.
In the next chapter I will introduce the formal framework in which the analy-
sis will eventually be spelled out. Yet, before doing so Schueler (2008) shall be
briefly reviewed for its close empirical proximity to the data that I am concerned
with.
2.3 Schueler (2008)
The data and concern of Schueler happens to be almost identical to mine: implicit
counterfactual conditionals (which he abbreviates ICs). The question that also he
pursues is “the problem of how to ‘fill in’ the antecedent when we are interpreting
an IC”. (Schueler (2008), p. 2) Schueler illustrates his point of departure by the
following examples (cf. Schueler (2008), p. 12, examples (13a-c)):
(34) John would kick a unicorn.
(35) A yeti would ravage our town.
(36) John would hate a war.
While these examples are tensed differently than mine (Schueler’s data are in the
modal present, while mine are in the modal perfect) the decisive difference to the
data that I am discussing is something else. It is a rather serious disagreement
in the conception and understanding of the data. Schueler insists that the data
above represent felicitous sentences and are interpretable as they stand, i.e. in iso-
lation and outside of any supporting context. Contrary to this I study solely (the
discourse behavior and semantics of) counterfactual consequents within a context.
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The source for the interpretability of examples (34), (35), and (36) lies, so Schueler,
with the (asserted and presuppositional) meaning of the indefinite NP. This sets ex-
amples of this kind apart from the data in (37), (38), and (39) below (= Schueler’s
examples (6a-c), p. 7), that do not contain an indefinite NP. In these cases the “un-
derstood antecedent” (Schueler (2008), p. 2) is not determined by the grammatical
and semantic structure of what is overtly expressed in the consequent clause, but
has to be derived from the context.
(37) John would hate Paris.
(38) Mary would kick John.
(39) Sigmund would water the plant.
The distinction between what he calls “sentence-internal” (exemplified by (34),
(35), and (36)) and “sentence-external” (exemplified by (37), (38), and (39)) im-
plicit conditionals (cf. Schueler (2008), p. 3) yields the following two proposi-
tions which are to account for the implicit antecedent:
Sentence-External Antecedent-Filling: The antecedent in the cor-
rect paraphrase for the IC will be an antecedent which expresses the
most plausible alterations to current contextual knowledge which would
make the content of the IC (interpreted as a consequent in the para-
phrase) relevant to the context of utterance. (Schueler (2008), p. 8)
Sentence-Internal Antecedent-Filling: The most contextually neu-
tral interpretation for an IC containing an indefinite noun phrase is
an interpretation best paraphrased by a full conditional where the in-
definite noun phrase appears in the antecedent, and a corresponding
pronoun appears in the consequent. (Schueler (2008), p. 15)
Focusing in his dissertation on “those [implicit conditionals] for which part of
the understood antecedent is derived from the structure of the sentence” (Schueler
(2008), p. 3), i.e. ‘sentence-internal’ implicit conditionals, the proposal he de-
velops rests mainly on syntactic arguments (resp. arguments involving the inter-
face of syntax and semantics, logical form). As the main tenet of his account
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of where the implicit antecedent comes from Schueler proposes ‘sideward covert
movement’ (i.e. “movement to a non-c-commanding position” (Schueler (2008),
p. 16)), taking its departure from the position of the explicit indefinite NP in the
given consequent. I will not discuss Schueler’s syntactic analysis, since syntax
lies not at the heart of interest of the present work. But some brief and general
remarks about Schueler’s semantic conception shall be formulated, since I take
this aspect of the account to be problematic in some respects.
Although I do not agree with Schueler’s intuition that the data he discusses are
felicitous and interpretable as they stand, the conception can be motivated as fol-
lows. Given that the antecedent that is to complement the consequent expresses
in any case a hypothetical proposition, Schueler’s idea is arguably the following:
whenever the consequent contains hypothetical information (in form of an indef-
inite NP that introduces an actually non-existent, hypothetical referent into the
discourse) this information – which is genuinely new information insofar as it
comes without any presuppositional element, as is the case with e.g. definite NPs
or proper names – may act as a natural filler for the (assumed and hypothetical)
antecedent. –There is so to say a categorial match between part of what is given
and what is to be assumed. Hence, the former stands in for the latter. This is the
gist of the following quote. Schueler argues with respect to the examples (34) -
(36):
These sentences differ from sentence-external ICs, in that ICs with
indefinites can be interpreted with almost no context whatsoever. A
natural interpretation of such sentences puts the indefinite at the heart
of the understood antecedent. In case of (13[a-c]) [my (34) - (36),
D.B.], since we have chosen noun phrases which introduce entities
which don’t exist in our world (unicorns and yetis), it is specifically
the hypothetical existence of something with the properties of the in-
definite which forms the antecedent, with perhaps other properties
attached. (In the case of war, although wars exist, their duration is
limited and so there are many contexts in which the existence of a
relevant war would be counterfactual as well.) That is, natural para-
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phrases of (13) [my (34) - (36), D.B.] are as in (14).
(14)a. If a unicorn existed (and were in John’s vicinity), John would
kick it.
b. If a yeti existed (and were in the vicinity of our town), it would
ravage our town.
c. If a war happened, John would hate it.
(Schueler (2008), p. 12; italics in the original)
While there may be some kind of categorial match between part of what is given
and what is to be assumed, I do not follow Schueler that the former thus strin-
gently stands in for the latter. I consider his understanding of the origin of the
antecedent in case of the examples as too restricted. Contrary to what he suggests,
the antecedent of a conditional is not determined by the grammatical structure or
semantics of the consequent. Rather, one is free in what to assume and to express.
The issue can be brought to the point at hand of his elaboration of the war-example
to which he ascribes a certain counterfactual quality. But strictly speaking, this
counterfactual element is inherent to virtually any possible referent. Not just wars
are limited in their duration, but also for instance parties are so. But this does not
compel one to interpret
(40) John would hate a party.
as
(41) If a party occurred, John would hate it.
rather than
(42) If there were no beer, John would hate a party.
Although in the latter case the lack of an appropriate antecedent would render (un-
like as is the case with (41)) the introduction of an anaphoric pronoun impossible,
this is not essential to making the assumption expressed in the antecedent. Thus,
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why should the consequent John would hate a war determine If a war occurred,
John would hate a war rather than If John were a pacifist, he would hate a war?
Certainly, the name John comes with the presupposition that there is a bearer of
the name, but one might just as well assume that this bearer is a hypothetical,
counterfactual individual, just as unicorns or yetis are.16
Indeed, when leaving the realm of events and entering the realm of objects, a
similar case can be made up for instance for bouquets or sandwiches vs. unicorns
and yetis. Since the existence of the former two is a rather limited existence one
might think of “many contexts in which the existence of a relevant [such entity,
D.B.] would be counterfactual as well” to re-quote Schueler (op. cit.). Following
Schueler the generalization would thus be that
(43) John would buy a bouquet/a sandwich.
is ‘naturally’ understood as
(44) If a bouquet/a sandwich existed, John would buy it.
This however seems rather unintuitive. Of course, one might argue, that if one
were to (be forced to) interpret these examples without any further context this
might indeed be an opportune choice of an antecedent. But this is arguably a mat-
ter of priming, rather than a case of an assumption being determined by grammat-
ical structure. Indeed, the lack of context does in my eyes not yield the “contextu-
ally most neutral” interpretation, as Schueler claims in the proposition concerned
with Sentence-Internal Antecedent Filling quoted above. Rather than it being the
most neutral context it is the most biased and determinate context, since if the
“natural” understanding falls back on what the available context delivers and not
on something else, this seems to just underline the importance of context for the
reconstruction of the implicit antecedent. Apparently, interpreters take whatever
the context delivers in order to accommodate the implicit antecedent.17
16That the indefinite NPs a unicorn and a yeti also have a generic reading is a problem that I
don’t want to get into, but that Schueler does not go into in any mentionable detail either.
17I am using the term accommodation loosely here, not necessarily in the sense of Lewis.
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If this were not the case, and grammatical structure more important than context,
then discourses like
(45) John is not a pacifist. He would hate a war.
were to be understood to contain the antecedent
(46) John is not a pacifist. If a war occurred, he would hate it.
Rather than:
(47) John is not a pacifist. If he were one, he would hate a war.
Finally, it seems that Schueler would have a problem to account for cases like
the following. Given that the consequent John would see a unicorn has as its
implicit antecedent If a unicorn existed, Schueler would arguably have a problem
to account for why (48) is infelicitous, although its explicit counterpart (49) is:
(48) # John does not believe (a) unicorn(s) exist(s). He would see a unicorn.
(49) John does not believe (a) unicorn(s) exist(s). If a unicorn existed, he
would see it.
2.4 Summary
The preceding chapter set out to locate the data under discussion within its empir-
ical vicinity and to thus complete the picture. Most prominent in this vicinity is
the range of data representative of the phenomenon of modal subordination. The
role that contextually given information plays for the interpretation of subsequent
parts of discourse provides with the link between the topic of modal subordination
and Veltman’s puzzle. In both cases intensional operators are given an implicit re-
striction by the preceding linguistic context, the biggest difference arguably being
that in case of the data constituting Veltman’s puzzle the operator connects to the
expressed subjunctive mood, while in the classical modal subordination data the
operator in question is a lexical expression. Thus, it seems plausible to subsume
also the discourses under concern here under the concept of modal subordination,
61
CHAPTER 2. THE EMPIRICAL VICINITY
as for instance Roberts (1996a) does, based on a discourse like John does not
have a car. It would be in the garage (op. cit.), for which she claims the trigger is
provided by the auxiliary negation in the first sentence. The impression however
becomes problematic once the range of examples is extended, and also discourses
as presented in the first chapter are considered. That Roberts’ concept of modal
subordination does not really apply – at least when understood as anaphora in in-
tensional contexts, as Roberts also proposes – is best demonstrated by examples
like # John did not have surgery. He would not have died. This case is infelici-
tous, even though the initial sentence contains a negation and thus provides with
a restriction of the universally quantifying subjunctive conditional (in form of an
implicit antecedent given by what I call a NinA) that would allow to resolve the
reference of the pronoun in the counterfactual consequent.18 Further, none of the
discussed semantic and pragmatic constraints on modal subordination (keywords
are: entailments vs. accommodation) can explain the infelicity of the data. (If
one is to maintain the idea that the data under discussion represent cases of modal
subordination, then a third kind of constraint would have to be formulated.) Thus,
the issues is not as clear as initially suggested.
Similarly for the account developed in Schueler (2008). Although also he dis-
cusses implicit counterfactual conditionals and asks where the implicit antecedent
comes from it turns out upon closer investigation that data and understanding dif-
fer rather drastically from the examples I am discussing. While in the case of
the discourses I am concerned with the antecedent is provided by the a context
that precedes the consequent clause, Schueler restricts the attention of his study to
cases of consequent clauses for which he argues that they are interpretable in iso-
lation, and the antecedent being determined by information (originating from an
indefinite NP) given in the consequent. The restriction is here thus provided by a
semantic element occurring within the scope of the single conditional sentence to
which the explicitly given information is supposed to act as the consequent. This
is arguably also the reason why Schueler mentions modal subordination only in
18While the exact logical form of the counterfactual conditional has as of yet not been discussed,
I take it to be obvious that it will involve in any case some universally quantifying intensional
operator.
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passing in his discussion of the data. This ‘sentence internal’ analysis is orthogo-
nal to the data I am concerned with and the ‘sentence external’ account of it that




Outline of the chapter
While the first chapter introduced Veltman’s puzzle and presented the intricacies
of the data, and the second chapter gave a broad overview of related phenomena
and some of their theoretical aspects, in the next chapter the formal framework
in which the analysis will be formulated is spelled out. The point of reference
for this is provided again by Veltman (2005) After a brief introduction in section
3.1 to Veltman’s actual concern (which differs from the one followed here), the
chapter divides into three main parts. The first one, section 3.2, gives an informal
motivation of the formal concepts to be introduced. The discussion elaborates in
depth on certain arguments formulated in Tichý (1976). The upshot of this section
is the insight that the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals is not simply a
kind of minimal belief revision. Rather, it depends essentially on the recognition
of the facts and laws that provides the frame of reference for the counterfactual.
Ultimately expressing an inference (in the widest sense of the word), the logic and
the premises on which the counterfactual rests are to be considered to determine
the conditional’s soundness. After these preparatory paragraphs the formal defi-
nitions of Veltman’s semantics are introduced and discussed in section 3.3. Each
definition is supported by an exposition of its import and meaning. Finally, to get
practically acquainted with the workings of the technical apparatus and to under-
stand its theoretical prowess, the formalism is implemented in the third main part
of the chapter (section 3.4). It delivers a formal recount of the informal arguments
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discussed earlier in part 3.2.
3.1 Locating Veltman’s concern
3.1.1 How complex is the process of making counterfactual as-
sumptions?
Apparently, the sequence of sentences that constitutes the discourse John did not
drink any wine. (If he had) He would have become sick provokes to conduct
something like a thought experiment: having incorporated the information that
John did not drink given in the initial sentence, the subsequent counterfactual
appeals to forget about this fact and to assume instead that circumstances were
the opposite, i.e. to assume that John drank. The claim connected to this is that
given this hypothetical state of affairs, then – ceteris paribus – it follows that John
would have become sick. Thus, to make a counterfactual assumption pIf ϕ had
been the case, ψ would have been the caseq is a form of a three-step belief revi-
sion resp. deductive process that involves, firstly, the (momentarily) suspension of
some factual information not ϕ in favor of, secondly, some hypothetical – indeed
counterfactual – update of the information state with the proposition that ϕ, and,
third, the claim that a certain consequence ψ logically derives from this change in
premises from factually not ϕ to counterfactually ϕ.
While in principle the contours of this dialectic are rather simple, the question
that Veltman pursues in his paper, namely how complex these steps actually are,
turns out to be anything but simple. In fact the issue of counterfactual condition-
als has generated a vast amount of literature, among the most influential being
the accounts formulated in Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973b). Most prominent
among the problems posed by counterfactuals is the fact that counterfactual con-
ditionals seem to defy a strict definition of their truth conditions. (For a classical
discussion of the issue see for instance Goodman (1947).)
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3.1.2 The answer in a nutshell
Anticipating already the main tenet of Veltman’s analysis the answer is that it does
not suffice to conceive of the process of making a counterfactual assumption pIf it
had been the case that ϕq simply as a form of minimal belief revision that involves
just the suspension of the factual information that not ϕ in favor of the counterfac-
tual assumption that ϕ. Rather, the focus has to be widened, away from bare facts
towards relations between facts, or, put differently, to premises and conclusions,
and not just premises alone. Counterfactuals are rendered acceptable only in case
they cohere with the laws and premises already assumed in the background of the
counterfactual. The context and its logic has to be observed. The more so, since
it delivers formally and conceptually the very backbone for the assessment of the
validity of the counterfactual.
3.2 Understanding counterfactuals: an informal mo-
tivation of their formal interpretation
3.2.1 The Ramsey-test and the shortcomings of a naive belief
revision account
The shortcomings of a simple belief revision analysis are discussed at length by
Veltman. Point of departure for his elaboration is the so-called Ramsey-test (cf.
Ramsey (1929)) that describes a general strategy for the evaluation of conditional
statements. In a formulation due to Stalnaker (that differs slightly from Ram-
sey’s original proposal, as Veltman points out, (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 162)) the
Ramsey-test suggests the following heuristic for assessing (counterfactual) condi-
tionals:
First, add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; sec-
ond, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency
(without modifying the hypothetical belief in the antecedent); finally,
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consider whether or not the consequent is then true.
(Stalnaker (1968), p. 102)
When making a counterfactual assumption pIf ϕ had been the caseq the bare min-
imum required to maintain consistency of information is of course to suspend for
the moment the information that in fact not ϕ. Thus, one might read the passage
“make whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency” as a directive
for minimal change only. However, reducing the process of making a counter-
factual assumption to the substitution of factual information by its counterfactual
complement (while all other information is preserved) has its pitfalls, as we will
see. It is more than the momentary retraction of factual information in favor of
a provisional update with its counterfactual counterpart. Against the idea that to
make a counterfactual assumption is to make only a minimal belief revision Velt-
man brings up a counterexample due to Pavel Tichý (formulated in Tichý (1976)).
3.2.2 An argument against the Ramsey-test: Tichý 1
Tichý’s counterexample is detailed in the following story (quoted from Veltman
(2005), p. 162 - 163). The gist is that in making counterfactual assumptions not
only the mere facts that are to be revised are involved, but – and this is decisive –
also the rules that govern the relations between facts need to be recognized.
Consider a man, call him Jones, who is possessed of the following dis-
positions as regards wearing his hat. Bad weather invariably induces
him to wear his hat. Fine weather, on the other hand, affects him
neither way: on fine days he puts his hat on or leaves it on the peg,
completely at random. Suppose moreover that actually the weather is
bad, so Jones is wearing his hat.
The question that this example brings up is, in Veltman’s words: ”[W]ould you
accept the sentence ‘If the weather had been fine, Jones would have been wearing
his hat’?” (Veltman (2005), p. 163)
While intuitively the answer is no, the account in terms of a simple minimal belief
revision following Ramsey’s heuristic leads to a yes answer. To understand why
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this is so it is helpful to concentrate on the scenario in a bit more detail. Semi-
formally restated, the two rules that determine the possible states of affairs are:
rule 1: weather bad→ hat on
rule 2: weather good→ hat randomly on/off
1
Given these two rules three worlds are available. One in which the weather is bad
and Jones wears his hat. One in which Jones again wears his hat, but this time the
weather is fine. And finally another one in which the weather is fine, but this time
Jones does not wear his hat. The following table collects this information, with
columns giving a world’s attributes, while lines determine actual values2:
weather hat
w0 bad on as defined by rule 1
w1 fine on as defined by rule 2
w2 fine off as defined by rule 2
Since it is assumed that the weather is indeed bad, world w1 is the actual world w@.
If one is to follow the minimal belief revision story for counterfactuals, the only
information that would have to be changed is the weather-parameter from bad to
fine, while consistency considerations do not require a change in the hat-parameter:
the hat remaining on is in accord with the condition specified for fine weather,
since after all in fine weather the agent may chose to wear or not to wear the hat
at random.
1While with rule 1 Jones’s wearing his hat is conditional (i.e. dependent) on the weather being
bad, rule 2 is a comparably twisted conditional: it determines his behaviour regarding head dresses
to be independent of the weather being fine. What is conditioned by the weather being fine is the
randomness of Jones’s behaviour, but not whether the hat is actually worn or not.
2In this table it already becomes clear how information is organized. Each world is determined
by facts and relations between facts. Relations between facts are expressed by the rules that
govern a scenario. Since for any scenario the possible facts happen to be either contingencies,
or are determined by rules, it is useful – as Veltman does – to speak of the collection of basic
information of this kind as the universe US of a state. The universe represents the logical space
available. Alternatively to this I will occasionally use the notion of a ‘horizon’ to describe what
possible worlds are accessible within a given information state.
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But why then tells intuition a different story? Why are we not ready to accept the
counterfactual If the weather had been fine, Jones would have been wearing his
hat as correct? The answer is because the minimal belief revision account ignores
an almost trivial, but crucial factor: the facts that are specified in the scenario are
not independent from the rules that constitute the scenario. While the hat being
on is consistent with the hat being worn at random, it is not consistent with the
background rules in the scenario that determine Jones’s behaviour: in fine weather
his habits concerning head dresses are indeterminate, while the counterfactual de-
scribes it as determinate. Thus, in this respect the counterfactual disagrees with
the given information about the scenario.3 Hence, the minimal belief revision ac-
count leads to a counterintuitive result. (Actually, this is a rather important point.
Information states are quite inert creatures when it comes to counterfactual delib-
eration. At least with respect to the nomological backbone of a scenario. Rules are
persistent and tend to remain valid, thus delivering the frame of reference within
which any revision has to take place.)
3.2.3 Tichý 1 as an argument against Stalnaker/Lewis
The same line of argument applies also to more explicitly minimalistic accounts
of the meaning of (counterfactual) conditionals, such as the Stalnaker/Lewis ap-
proach, as formulated in Stalnaker (1968), and Lewis (1973b). (Which is the
actual aim of Tichý’s criticism, as Veltman points out.4) In these accounts, so
Veltman, the truth condition for counterfactuals is given as follows:
A sentence of the form pIf it had been the case that ϕ, it would have
been the case that ψq is true in the actual world w iff the consequent
ψ is true in every world5 in which the antecedent ϕ is true, and which
3The universal element that becomes clear in this is a rather dominant feature in the semantics
of the counterfactuals that are of concern here. It will remain an important issue throughout the
rest of the discussion.
4Cf. Veltman (2005), p. 163, where he writes: “Tichý’s criticism was not directed directly
against the Ramsey test but against the analysis of counterfactuals developed by Robert Stalnaker
and David Lewis. (Stalnaker (1968), Lewis (1973b))”.
5Veltman notes at this point “[a]ccording to Stalnaker there is at most one such world”, while
“according to Lewis there may be more than one.” (Veltman (2005), p. 163, footnote 9.)
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in other respects differs minimally from w.
(Veltman (2005), p. 163)
However, also the conception of minimal difference that found entrance in the
above truth condition gives rise to non-intuitive results for Tichý’s scenario. (Coun-
terfactually) assuming that the weather is fine, the world resembling the actual
world w0 the most is the one in which Jones is – just as in w0 – wearing his hat.
Thus, w1 is ‘closer’ to w0 than w2, since it differs only in the ‘weather’ value from
w0, while w2 differs in the values given for ‘weather’ and ‘hat’.
3.2.4 Interim conclusion
The rift between theoretical account and intuitive understanding that emerges in
these considerations highlights the importance of at least two points that are cru-
cial in the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals: first, consistency is indeed
pivotal when making counterfactual assumptions, and, second, the domain of con-
sistency spans not only bare facts, but also – and decisively so – the rules and laws
that organize these facts.
Note that also Lewis recognizes the importance of laws when it comes to main-
taining consistency and reconciling counterfact(ual assumption) with fact. Velt-
man quotes Lewis, who remarks: “(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big,
widespread, diverse violations of law. (2) It is of the second importance to maxi-
mize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of particular fact
prevails. (3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple
violations of law.” (Lewis (1979a), p. 472) However, Lewis insists at the same
time that, fourthly, “[i]t is of little or no importance to secure approximate simi-
larity of particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.” (Lewis (1979a),
p. 472) Taking this position, Tichý’s example will of course lose its force, since
within the fine weather worlds – i.e. every world in which the antecedent of the
counterfactual is true – it appears as really nothing more than what Lewis calls
a ‘particular fact’ – a contingency – whether the hat is worn or not. (Recall that
in these worlds Jones decides at random about his headgear!) Hence, following
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Lewis, one is entitled to simply ignore this particular decision. This view, how-
ever, is problematic for more than one reason. When pondering next upon what
might actually designate the concept of a ‘particular fact’ I will deviate from Velt-
man, but we will see, that a more detailed discussion is worthwhile: the notion of
a ‘particular fact’ will turn out to be indeed untenable.
First, while locally, i.e. in the fine weather worlds, the hat wearing facts may
indeed be ‘particular’ in the sense that they occur arbitrarily (i.e. independent
from other facts), the picture changes, when a global perspective is taken and the
set of all possible worlds is considered. It may appear paradoxical, but globally
the (in)dependency of the hat-facts from the weather is actually dependent on the
weather. After all, the rules that govern the scenario have universal appeal: only
in case the weather is fine is Jones’s behaviour random. But in case the weather
is bad, it is not. So, what counts as a ‘particular’ is dependent on the frame
of reference. In the fine weather-worlds wearing a hat is certainly random, but
that does not render it globally a particular. This however is not reflected in the
Stalnaker/Lewis truth condition, and one may furthermore argue that the concept
of a ‘particular fact’ is thus ill defined. Indeed, this is a point in principle, as we
will see next. The following variant of the original example (henceforth referred to
as Tichý 1, and Tichý 2 respectively) drives the point a bit further.6 While in Tichý
1 only consequences appear to be accidental, in Tichý 2 also the premises are
randomized, eventually revealing the full extend of the problem under discussion.7
3.2.5 Tichý 2: more against Lewis’s position
In Tichý 2 Jones’s habits are described by Veltman as follows:
Suppose that Jones always flips a coin before he opens the curtains
6Veltman credits Frank Mulkens, a former student of his, for conceiving the example.
7The issue actually goes deep into the question whether it is feasible to distinguish rules from
facts. Unfortunately this question can not be addressed here in any more detail. Note however
that, while Tichý 2 is more explicit on the issue, the matter is already inherent to Tichý 1: since
the weather being good or bad is a move of nature, Lewis allows one to simply ignore it when
choosing among the counterfactual worlds. Hence, one simply looks at the world that is closest to
the actual world. And that happens to be w2, independent of any condition that motivates the hat
being worn or not.
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to see what the weather is like. Head means he is going to wear his
hat in case the weather is fine, whereas tails means he is not going to
wear his hat in that case. Like above, bad weather invariably makes
him wear his hat. Now suppose that today heads came up when he
flipped the coin, and that it is raining. So, again, Jones is wearing his
hat.
(Veltman (2005), p. 164)
This amounts to the following abbreviation8:
rule 1: head→ (weather bad→ hat on)
rule 2: tails→ (weather bad→ hat on)
rule 3: head→ (weather fine→ hat on)
rule 4: tails→ (weather fine→ hat off )
Some consideration helps to get a clear idea of the intricacies of the scenario.
While the rules are such that in some situations Jones’s behavior is determined
by a single parameter alone, in others the rules enforce that Jones’s behavior is
determined by a certain (inter-)dependency of these factors. The simple cases are
(i) whenever heads comes up, and (ii) whenever the weather is bad. In both these
cases each condition alone suffices to trigger Jones’s choice of wearing a hat or
not. Heads coming up means that Jones will wear his hat, no matter what the
weather conditions are like, while, on the other side, the weather being bad deter-
mines that the outcome of the preceding coin toss is negligible: Jones will in any
case wear his hat whenever the weather turns out to be bad. In case of tails coming
up or the weather being fine, things are a bit more complex. Neither tails nor the
weather being fine alone suffice to infer whether Jones will wear a hat or not. In
these cases only the combination of both parameters determine Jones’s behavior.
The next table summarizes the above information and collects all worlds that are
in compliance with the rules that govern the scenario.
8Bracketing does not play a role here. When it comes later on in section 3.4.2, p. 103 to
providing a proper translation I will use the way more elegant formalization employed by Veltman
(cf. Veltman (2005), p. 170)
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coin weather hat
w0 head bad on = w@
w1 tails bad on
w2 head fine on
w3 tails fine off
Consider next the case given in the scenario above. The actual world is distin-
guished by the coin toss having resulted in heads and the weather being bad.
Hence, in accordance with rule 1, Jones is wearing his hat. Thus, w@ is repre-
sented by w0.
Given this scenario and the rules of Tichý 2 the counterfactual If the weather had
been fine, Jones would have been wearing his hat is intuitively true. What prompts
this intuition shall be contemplated upon again in the following. This will not
only serve to reconstruct the underlying understanding in more detail than Velt-
man bothers to do, but will also shed light on what is problematic about Lewis’s
opinion regarding the irrelevance of ‘particular’ fact. The findings turn out to be
rather instructive.
Three factors play a major role in the line of argument, the first of which is rather
trivial: (i) the semantic content of the counterfactual itself, (ii) the principle of
inertia that underlies the idea of similarity that is employed in the evaluation of
counterfactuals, and (iii) the randomness of the initial condition, i.e. the coin toss.
Points (i) and (ii) go hand in hand and will be instrumental when explicating the
underlying intuition, while point (iii) will – rather unsurprisingly – become cru-
cial in the criticism of Lewis’s position.
Thus prepared consider first the effects of the information conveyed by the coun-
terfactual If the weather had been fine, Jones would have been wearing his hat.
Given that w0 is the actual world, the one parameter that the (antecedent of) the
counterfactual intuitively commits one to change is the weather parameter from
bad to fine. This immediately excludes w1 from the set of counterfactual alterna-
tives to the actual world w0, and leaves only worlds w2 and w3 up for consideration.
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However, since the counterfactual puts forth a ceteris paribus condition on the set
of alternatives to w@ in that it asks to consider only those worlds that differ from
the actual world with respect to the conditional’s antecedent, while everything
else remains equal, only one of the two fine weather-worlds represents a viable
counterpart to w0 for the assessment of the counterfactual’s truth. This world is
w2, since w3 differs (unlike w2) not just in the weather-parameter from w0, but
also in the outcome of the coin toss. For w2 it then has to be checked whether
the claim connected to the counterfactual consequent is true. And indeed, w2 is
a world in which Jones happens to wear a hat. The counterfactual conditional If
the weather had been fine, Jones would have been wearing his hat is thus true in
the given context. It describes a world that is consistent with the rules governing
the scenario. (The most important for this particular case being rule 3 that states
that whenever the coin landed heads and the weather turned out to be fine, Jones
chooses to wear a hat.)
After retracing the intuitive understanding, the next question is whether one can
achieve the same result following Lewis’s recipe? The answer is no. Given
Lewis’s statement that “[i]t is of little or no importance to secure approximate
similarity of particular fact” (op cit.) one may simply ignore the result of the coin
toss and disregard it, since it represents nothing more than a contingent fact in the
scenario. But if particulars of this kind were really negligible, one might just as
well opt for the coin having landed tails. Under these circumstances however by
rule 4 it follows that Jones would not have worn a hat. The counterfactual would
thus have to be regarded to be false. Which is not the intuitive interpretation. What
this shows is that, unlike Lewis suggests, you can not ignore contingent premises
in assessing the truth or falsity of counterfactual conditionals.
Before I will turn in the next section to the formal foundations of the framework
with which Veltman tackles the matter under discussion, first his assessment of
the topic shall be quoted. While it may differ slightly in its perspective from my
discussion of the issue, the theme is nonetheless the same. He summarizes the
problem as follows:
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What really matters is this: In both cases [i.e. Tichý 1 and Tichý 2,
D.B.] Jones is wearing his hat because the weather is bad. In both
cases we have to give up the proposition that the weather is bad – the
very reason why Jones is wearing his hat. So, why should we want
to keep assuming that he has his hat on? In the first case there is no
special reason to do so; hence, we do not. In the second case there is
a special reason. We will keep assuming that Jones is wearing his hat
because we do not want to give up the independent information that
the coin came down heads. And this, together with the counterfactual
assumption that the weather is fine, brings in its train that Jones would
have been wearing his hat. In other words, similarity of particular
fact is important, but only for facts that do not depend on other facts.
Facts stand and fall together. [Footnote omitted, D.B.] In making a
counterfactual assumption, we are prepared to give up everything that
depends on something that we must give up to maintain consistency.
But we want to keep in as many independent facts as we can.
(Veltman (2005), p. 164 - 165; italics in the original)
This concludes the informal discussion of what it means to make counterfactual
assumptions. The technical challenges that come along with this should have
gained some contour by now. Next, the formalism developed by Veltman to tackle
these issues shall be introduced in detail.
3.3 The formalism
3.3.1 Some definitions of elementary concepts: update, support,
and entailment
The framework is an update semantics with a cognitive twist. As characteristic for
all dynamic semantics, meaning is modelled in this framework in terms of con-
text change potential: the meaning of a linguistic expression lies in its capacity
to change the information state entertained by a linguistic agent. However, Velt-
man conceives of this basic idea in more broader, cognitive terms, by identifying
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information states with cognitive states. This is technically emulated as follows:
• The meaning [ϕ] of a sentence ϕ is an operation on cognitive states.
In the following ‘S[ϕ]’ denotes the result of applying the operation
[ϕ] to state S; it is the result of updating S with ϕ.
(Veltman (2005), p. 160)
Next, Veltman determines how cognitive states cohere. The notion of support is
most elementary in this respect:
A cognitive state S supports a sentence ϕ when updating S with ϕ
adds no information over and above what is already in S. Instead of
‘S supports ϕ’, I will often say ‘ϕ is accepted in S’.
• S supports a sentence ϕ, S |= ϕ, iff S[ϕ] = S.
(Veltman (2005) p. 160)9
Since the system can not end up with ‘more’ information than it started out with
the idea that interpretation is a reduction of possibilities (in the available logical
space of a state) seems rather natural. The discussion of Tichý 1 and Tichý 2
already suggested this. It also suggested to think of the procedural side of the
problem of interpretation in terms of a derivational process. However, since none
of these issues are elaborated by Veltman in detail, I will not speculate any further
in this direction. But note that these considerations would eventually take over to
Veltman’s definition of logical validity that follows next. It is defined in terms of
the concept of support:
9With this the conceptual and formal landscape of Veltman’s framework is decisively con-
strained. Apparently, it is not possible to incorporate genuinely new information. Rather, any
update is already inherent to the agent’s cognitive state. This seems to commit one to a rather
holistic idea of meaning and information: You can only understand what you can actually grasp,
given the knowledge that you have. Premises thus arguably play a rather important role when it
comes to interpretation. This will find some reverberation later on in Definition 5, where Veltman
defines counterfactuals as tests, and comments: “Given this definition, sentences of the form pif
had been ϕ, would have been ψq do not convey new information – not directly at least.” (Veltman
(2005), p. 171)
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[A] sequence of premises ϕ1, . . . , ϕn entails a conclusion ψ if updating
a state with that sequence invariably leads to a state that supports the
conclusion. (Veltman (2005), p. 161)
Formally this is rendered as follows:
• ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |= ψ iff for any state S, S[ϕ1] . . . [ϕn] |= ψ.
(Veltman (2005), p. 161)10
In the following definitions Veltman specifies the technical machinery necessary
to provide an account for counterfactual updates that avoids the pitfalls addressed
in the introductory section.
3.3.2 The system’s ontology
Presupposing, as already Veltman does, basic knowledge of the concepts of pos-
sible world semantics, I will address next with Definition 1 the first cornerstone
of his framework. It defines the system’s ontology.
Definition 1 (Worlds and states)
Fix a finite setA of atomic sentences.
(i) A world is a function with domain A and range {0, 1}; a situa-
tion is a partial such function; a proposition is a set of worlds.
(ii) Let W be the set of possible worlds. A cognitive state S is a pair
〈US , FS 〉, where either (a) ∅ , FS ⊆ US ⊆W; or (b) FS = US =
∅.
(Veltman (2005), p. 165)
10Following this conception it would be interesting to endow Veltman’s system with a cor-
responding deduction theorem. A dynamic semantic framework in which model-theoretic and
proof-theoretic ideas go hand in hand is formulated in van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005). The
formulation of a hybrid between Veltman’s theory and van Lambalgen and Hamm’s system seems
not too far off.
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Before elaborating on clause (ii) and Veltman’s two-dimensional notion of the
concept of a cognitive state I will first briefly review clause (i). Note that while
Veltman states that “[i]n this definition a possible world is identified with the valu-
ation that assigns the value 1 to the atomic sentences true in it, and 0 to the atomic
sentences false in it.” (Veltman (2005), p. 165), it might be added that – assum-
ing that the set of sentences A is just large enough – worlds can be considered
to be full descriptions of the states of affairs. Any fragment of this description
consequently defines a situation. The short hand Veltman uses to designate the
proposition ϕ is the usual ~ϕ. I will adopt this convention throughout the discus-
sion.
For the basic inventory of propositional logic a standard set-theoretical interpreta-
tion is assumed. The following definitions apply (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 165):11
~p = {w ∈ W | w(p) = 1}
~¬ϕ = W ∼ ~ϕ
~ϕ ∧ ψ = ~ϕ ∩ ~ψ
~ϕ ∨ ψ = ~ϕ ∪ ~ψ
~ϕ→ ψ = (W ∼ ~ϕ) ∪ ~ψ
More interesting than these necessary provisions is Veltman’s definition of a cog-
nitive state as an ordered pair as given in clause (ii) of Definition 1. Veltman
separates here what might be called rule base and data base: while US deter-
mines the universe of a state by collecting not only the facts, but also the rules
that define relations between facts (the meta-facts so to say), in FS only the facts
are collected, but not the rules. Thus the intuitive distinction made in the Tichý-
examples finds a reflex in the very foundation of Veltman’s framework. Indeed,
this idea to separate rules and facts (or, more precisely, the (nomologically) pos-
sible and the factual) lies at the heart of his proposal. Note the use of the empty
11While the first line makes up for the missing condition on set comprehension in the mentioning
of the notion of a proposition in Definition 1, the conception of a proposition here unfortunately
defies a straightforward translation into a type-driven semantics. This is one major drawback of
Veltman’s theory. One advantage however is that it allows for the definition of the notion of a
situation (as given in Definition 1(i)) that will be decisive later on. (For another approach to
counterfactuals that also employs situations (in a more canonical situations-theoretic semantics)
see Kratzer (1989).)
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set in clause (ii b) of Definition 1. It represents the absurd (state): there simply
is no world that could model this state. Veltman comments on this: “Agents will
avoid getting into this state.” (Veltman (2005), p. 166) To keep things simple
he allows for only one absurd state (given as 0 = 〈∅, ∅〉) by identifying all such
states (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 166). Orthogonal to the absurd state is the so called
minimal state in which no world is excluded. The minimal state represents a state
of total ignorance, being ‘minimal’ in the sense that no information whatsoever
(be that nomological, or factual) about the world is given, and hence nothing can
be precluded. Consequently, it is represented by 1 = 〈W,W〉. Finally, a state is
regarded to be coherent, whenever it is not contradictory, i.e. not absurd: FS , ∅.
(cf. Veltman (2005), p. 166)
3.3.3 The kernel of Veltman’s update semantics
The effect that the meaning of an expression ϕ has on a state, when the state is
updated with ϕ is modeled in Definition 2 below. Updates are differentiated by
the two basic types of information that are distinguished in this framework: mere
factual statements versus law-like expressions. Each of these effectuate change in
the respective domains of a cognitive state.12
Law-like propositions are prefixed by a box operator ‘’. The box operator indi-
cates their nomological status and designates the expression to be read as ‘it is a
law that . . . ’, with the dots “to be filled by a formula of propositional logic”, as
Veltman remarks (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 166 - 167). Clause (ii) of Definition 2
takes care of this, while clause (i) deals with factual updates.
Definition 2 (Interpretation)
Let ϕ be a formula of propositional logic.
(i) (a) S[ϕ] = 〈US , FS ∩ ~ϕ〉 if FS ∩ ~ϕ , ∅;
(b) S[ϕ] = 0, otherwise.
(ii) (a) S[ϕ] = 〈US ∩ ~ϕ, FS ∩ ~ϕ〉 if FS ∩ ~ϕ , ∅;
12To be more precise, since FS ⊆ US , updates of US trivially affect also FS .
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(b) S[ϕ] = 0, otherwise.
(Veltman (2005), p. 167)
Incorporating new (factual) information in form of some non-boxed proposition ϕ
is determined as the result of updating the state S with the information that ϕ. The
result of an update with the proposition ϕ is eliminative in the sense that with the
update that ϕ the ¬ϕ worlds are discarded. This is modeled by intersecting FS and
ϕ (Provided, that, of course, the intersection of FS and ϕ is not empty. In case the
intersection is empty, the worlds described by ϕ are not FS worlds, i.e. ϕ is not a
statement about anything possible with regards to the given facts FS . Hence one
reaches the absurd state.)
Nomological updates inevitably relate to US since a new rule is to be incorporated
into the universe. Again, the update is deemed absurd, if the rule does not comply
with the factual information, i.e. if the intersection of FS and ϕ is empty.
Veltman summarizes this as follows:
Updating with a propositional formula ϕ eliminates from FS all pos-
sible worlds in which ϕ is false. Hence, only worlds in which ϕ is true
are left as worlds that might be the actual world. If there are no such
worlds left, one gets into the absurd state. Similarly, an update with
ϕ eliminates from US all worlds in which ϕ is false. So, only worlds
in which ϕ is true are left as worlds that might have been the actual
world. The other ones are so outlandish, you do not have to reckon
with them, not even in making the wildest counterfactual assumption.
(Veltman (2005), p. 167)
(In a footnote to this he remarks: “Note that this definition would not work if
we had allowed stacking of ’s etc.” (Veltman (2005), p. 167, footnote 14), the
reason being that in the two-dimensional definition of cognitive states laws about
laws can not be represented.)
To illustrate the workings of the definitions introduced so far consider a language
Ap,q,r with just three atoms p, q, and r. The world(s) describable by this fragment
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could obtain eight different constellations of facts in form of w0 – w7. Assume next
a (with respect to Ap,q,r) linguistically fully competent agent, who does not know
anything about the world she is in. In other words, the agent is in the minimal
state 1, and anything expressible by Ap,q,r could (still) be the case. According to
Definition 1 ff. the agent’s cognitive state S is thus:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
Assume that the first bit of linguistic information about the world witnessed by the
agent is given by the law that whenever q, then r, i.e. (q→ r). This nomological
update is prohibitive in the sense that it stipulates that it can not be the case that q
is true, while at the same time r is false. In effect the law excludes certain worlds
from ever having to be considered as possible, and determines not just what is
or is not the case, but what can not be the case.13 As such nomological updates
affect not just the ontic dimension of the state, i.e. FS , but also the ontological
dimension in form of the universe US , or, in Veltman’s words: “[T]he general
laws set a limit to the factual information one can have.” (Veltman (2005), p. 166)
Definition 2, clause (ii) captures the domain-transcending, universal character of
the box-operator and gives a precise formulation of the point. Instantiated to the
present example the following picture emerges:
Since the minimal state 1 is defined as 〈W,W〉, and the meaning of the conditional
If q, then r (= ~q → r) is rendered classically to be (W ∼ ~q) ∪ ~r, the
13This is of course a highly problematic simplification. Although an interesting point, I will
however not attempt a more subtle differentiation of the semantics of laws and law-like expressions
in relation to the different modal domains.
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nomological update of the minimal state 1 with the information that (q → r)
yields the following altered state (in which it still holds that US = FS ):
1[(q→ r)] = 〈US ∩ ~(q→ r), FS ∩ ~(q→ r)〉
Further computation shows that the update is not absurd, since FS ∩ ~(q → r)
, ∅. (Propositions are presented in due course by the set of worlds in which the
respective sentence is true. Since in the state under discussion US ∩~(q→ r) =
FS ∩ ~(q→ r) I will for reasons of readability just compute the first coordinate
of the ordered pair in detail. In the last line the result will eventually be copied to
the second coordinate, too.)
US ∩ ~(q→ r)
= US ∩ ((W ∼ ~q) ∪ ~r)
= US ∩ ((W ∼ {w2,w3,w6,w7}) ∪ {w1,w3,w5,w7}
= US ∩ (({w0,w1,w4,w5}) ∪ {w1,w3,w5,w7})
= US ∩ (({w0,w1,w3,w4,w5,w7})
= {w0,w1,w3,w4,w5,w7}




The pair of tables below gives the state 1[(q → r)] in a more accessible presen-
tation. The worlds w2, and w6 violate the given law and are thus discarded:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
///w6 ///1 ///1 ///0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
///w6 ///1 ///1 ///0
w7 1 1 1
〉
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Next consider a factual update of the state 1[(q → r)] that was just achieved.
Assume that the agent subsequently learns that in the world she is facing the fact
that p and the fact that q are true. Incorporating this information into the cognitive
state S is achieved by an update of S with the proposition expressed by the formula
p ∧ q. The state to be reached is S = 1[(q → r)][p ∧ q]. Since the update is not
a nomological update, just the factual dimension of S is affected. The meaning of
p ∧ q being given by the intersection of the sets of worlds in which p resp. q is
true, the update yields according to Definition 2 clause (i) the following state (if
FS ∩ ~p ∧ q , ∅):
1[(q→ r)][p ∧ q]
= 〈US , FS ∩ ~p ∧ q〉
= 〈US , FS ∩ ~p ∩ ~q〉
= 〈US , FS ∩ {w ∈ W | w(p) = 1} ∩ {w ∈ W | w(q) = 1}〉
That FS ∩ ~p ∧ q , ∅ can be seen directly: since ~p = {w4,w5,w6,w7} and
~q = {w2,w3,w6,w7} and FS = {w0,w1,w3,w4,w5,w7} it follows that FS ∩ ~p ∧
q = {w7}.
This means that – as it turns out – the only world that is law-abiding and in
which the conjunction of the facts p and q is true is world w7. All other worlds
are discarded (or, better, de-actualized) in the factual dimension FS of the state
1[(q→ r)][p ∧ q]:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
///w6 ///1 ///1 ///0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
///w0 ///0 ///0 ///0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
///w3 ///0 ///1 ///1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
///w6 ///1 ///1 ///0
w7 1 1 1
〉
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What happens if one tries to contradict the information that is constitutive of the
state can be seen by trying to update the state 1[(q → r)][p ∧ q] with the infor-
mation that r is false, although the state designates it to be true. (This follows by
Modus Ponens from the law (q → r) and the fact that q having been established
during the course of updates.) Since the worlds in which r is in fact not the case
are {w0,w2,w4,w6}, while the state 1[(q→ r)][p ∧ q] is represented by {w7}, the
update 1[(q → r)][p ∧ q][¬r] results in the empty set, ∅. It is not representable
in the logical space: being told that not r, while knowing that r just does not make
any sense in terms of information transfer. Hence, as Veltman puts it, agents try
to avoid reaching this state.14
3.3.4 What it means to make counterfactual assumptions: pre-
liminaries
Before spelling out the formal account of what it means to make a counterfactual
assumption, first some more groundwork needs to be laid. The preceding discus-
sion of the Tichý-examples highlighted the importance of rules for counterfactual
deliberation: any counterfactual update occurs within a context of premises in
form of rules and laws. In Definition 3 below Veltman identifies certain properties
pertaining to this domain that will become relevant later on. I will first present the
definition and will then comment in loose prose upon its parts and the concepts
introduced therein.
Definition 3 (Basis)
Let S = 〈US , FS 〉 be a state.
(i) The situation s forces the proposition P within US iff for every
w ∈ US such that s ⊆ w it holds that w ∈ P.15
14While the absurd state is not a goal in itself, ending up in it certainly does more good than
harm, and is not necessarily to be avoided. At least if one perceives of updates as tests for the
robustness and consistency of the established information. In case the test fails and one reaches
the absurd state this just indicates that either the preceding state has to be revised, or that the as-
sumed shared communicative background is deficient and has to be re-assessed in communication.
Insofar does the absurd state play an essential role.
15In footnote 15, p. 168 Veltman adds at this point: “If there is no world w ∈ US such that s ⊆
w, then, according to this definition, the situation s forces every proposition.”
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(ii) The situation s determines the world w iff s forces {w} within
US .
(iii) The situation s is a basis for the world w iff s is a minimal situ-
ation determining w within US .
(Veltman (2005), p. 167 - 168)
With the main part of clause (i) determining that some fragment s of the governing
body of laws (and facts) can be considered to force a proposition P when given s
also P is valid (i.e. s and P coincide) the notion of forcing characterizes a peculiar
relation between premises. Put somewhat hyperbolically forcing reflects a possi-
ble dependency between premises in US , in the form of one premise coming in
the wake of another premise (or set of premises), stating that every s-world is also
a P-world. (Which thus arguably allows to recognize derivative facts, or, alter-
natively, premises for premises, and possible structure within US .) In clauses (ii)
and (iii) the idea underlying the notion of forcing is escalated further. In (ii) the
proposition forced by s is valid in only one world, namely the world of s. In other
words, given the situation s there is no alternative left to the world of which s is
a part of. Thus, the situation s indeed uniquely determines the world it is a part
of. Finally, a basis as introduced in clause (iii) is the least amount of information
necessary and sufficient to exactly identify a world in US . Or, in Veltman’s words:
A basis for a world w ∈ US is a part of w consisting of mutually
independent facts which, given the general laws, bring the other facts
constituting w in their train. (Veltman (2005), p. 168)
When discussing the formal analysis of the Tichý-examples later in more detail
than Veltman does, the full scope of the introduced notions will become clearer.
However, already now it shall be pointed out that the antecedent of a conditional
rule that is element of US will force the consequent as soon as the antecedent is
given as a fact. While I will later also discuss how bases are determined, note al-
ready now that when a conditional rule and the facticity of its antecedent are given,
the antecedent acts as a basis of the rule’s consequent. However, before further
elaborating on these points I will first focus on the most important definition of
Veltman’s theory.
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3.3.5 What it means to make counterfactual assumptions: the
formal account
In the next definition, the core of Veltman’s proposal is reached. Definition 4 be-
low seeks to emulate what is involved when making a counterfactual assumption.
In a nutshell the idea is to suspend the factual counterpart to whatever assump-
tion the counterfactual introduces, while to simultaneously preserve and pay heed
to whatever laws and facts remain constitutive of the situation. This eventually
provides the ground for the counterfactual update without it falling subject to the
shortcomings of the simple belief revision story. As exercised before I will first
present the definition and will then follow up with an informal recount of the
matter.
Definition 4 (Retraction)
Let S = 〈US , FS 〉 be a state.
(i) Suppose w ∈ US , and P ⊆ W. The set w↓P is determined as
follows: s ∈ w↓P iff s ⊆ w and there is a basis s′ for w such that
s is a maximal subset of s′ not forcing P.




(a) w ∈ US ↓P iff w ∈ US ;
(b) w ∈ FS ↓P iff w ∈ US and there are w′ ∈ FS and s ∈ w′↓P such
that s ⊆ w.
(iii) The state S[if it had been the case that ϕ] is given by
(S ↓ ~¬ϕ)[ϕ].
(Veltman (2005), p. 168)
Contemplating upon the import of this definition the first point to notice is that
while clause (ii) directly elaborates on the effects the suspension of information
brings about to a cognitive state, the core of the issue is already delivered in clause
(i). Its concern lies with the objects constitutive of any state: possible worlds.
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Clause (i) elaborates on how to model the necessary change that a retraction of in-
formation evokes on each of these cognitive atoms. –After all, any global change
of a cognitive state is due to local change in its underlying.
The first concern of clause (i) is to constrain the set of worlds available in the
logical space. The worlds to consider are solely those that comply with the rele-
vant information, i.e. only worlds within the universe US of the given state. With
respect to (each of) these worlds some fact is to be suspended. This fact is given
by the truth assignment for some proposition P at the particular world w, and the
goal is to define w minus the fact that P. (The thus altered world – i.e. set of truth
assignments – is given by w↓P.) Now, the lesson to be learned from the Tichý-
examples was that the world(s) to be achieved by retracting P must be such that
they still comply with the premises of the situation. Recall that for instance in the
case of Tichý 1 the problem was that following the simple belief revision account
the resulting world(s) were determinate with respect to Jones’s behavior, while the
scenario did not allow for this to be the case, but contained a rule that declared
his behavior to be random. –Which in turn explained the unintuitiveness of the
naive account. In order to prevent this and to get a more accurate result Veltman
falls back on his concept of a basis. (Recall that a basis is the minimal amount of
information that determines a world that complies with the laws and facts.) The
idea formulated in the main part of clause (i) is to modify the bases of the worlds
under consideration such that they do not force P anymore.16 This way it is guar-
anteed that the worlds defined are no longer P-worlds, but are still observant of
the laws relevant in the scenario. The recipe that captures the essence of clause
(i) is thus to take any world w ∈ US , to look at its basis s’, and to determine a
maximal subset s of this basis such that this situation s does not force P anymore.
This way a situation is determined that lies at the heart of those worlds that are no
16The subset s is to be maximal in order to guarantee maximal similarity of the counterfactual
worlds to the actual world.
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longer P-worlds.17,18
Building on this idea clause (ii) of Definition 4 elaborates the consequences of
what has been formulated in clause (i) for the global concept of a cognitive state:
Veltman defines here the change in the cognitive state that the suspension of infor-
mation will yield. In the first half of clause (ii) – condition (a), that is concerned
with the first coordinate of the ordered pair that represents a cognitive state –
Veltman builds on the intuition that in any case the laws that had already been
established will remain valid. Hence Veltman stipulates that any world constitu-
tive of the universe of the altered state US ↓P will be such that it is part of US , the
universe of the state ex ante.19
Next follows condition (b) which elaborates on the second coordinate of the state:
FS ↓P resp. its source FS . What is detailed here is that in any case the altered facts
(the worlds w ∈ FS ↓P) have to comply with US and that they are different from
17 While I rather sloppily referred to the situation s as a basis for the not P-worlds, note that
strictly speaking s is not a basis in the technical sense, since s might not determine just a single not
P-world, but might be part of multiple not P-worlds. Note also that while Veltman appears to use
the subset relation ‘⊆’ it actually is a shorthand designating a partial function. Recall Definition 1,
clause (i): “A world is a function with domain A [A being a finite set of atomic sentences, D.B.]
and range {0, 1}; a situation is a partial such function [my emphasis, D.B.]; a proposition is a set
of worlds.”
18Note that by considering a maximal subset of the basis Veltman incorporates into the definition
of retraction a similarity measure for counterfactual worlds with respect to the actual world(s).
How intricate the issue is is brought to the point by David Lewis when discussing his famous
example If kangaross had no tails, they would topple over (cf. Lewis (1973b), p. 1). Lewis writes:
“We might think it best to confine our attention to worlds where kangaroos have no tails and
everything else is as it actually is; but there are no such worlds. Are we to suppose that kangaroos
have no tails but that their tracks in the sand are as they actually are? Then we shall have to suppose
that these tracks are produced in a way quite different from the actual way. Are we to suppose that
kangaroos have no tails but that their genetic makeup is as it actualls is? Then we shall have to
suppose that genes control growth in a way quite different from the actual way (or else that there
is something, unlike anything there actually is, that removes the tails). And so it goes; respects of
similarity and difference trade off. If we try too hard for exact similarity to the actual world in one
respect, we will get excessive differences in some other respect.” (Lewis (1973b), p. 9; italics in
the original.)
19Thus conceived laws are made exempt from counterfactual deliberation. This represents a
strong restriction of the analytic powers of Veltman’s theory. While one would like to be able to
treat laws, i.e. stipulated relations between facts, similar to the treatment of ‘simple’ facts when
making counterfactual assumptions, the issue defies a clear solution in Veltman’s theory. The point
will prove to be problematic on several more occasions.
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the actually established facts FS only insofar as one is no longer committed to as-
sume that P. Or, sticking closer to the original formulation, he defines the worlds
of the altered state FS ↓P to be such that they share some situation s with the factual
worlds FS that however does not commit one to the proposition P.
20
Finally, in clause (iii) a notational convention is fixed that determines how to refer
to counterfactually updated states.
3.4 Excursion: putting theory to practice – comput-
ing Tichý’s examples in Veltman’s system
Having given a so far mostly abstract synopsis of the core of Veltman’s proposal
I will next demonstrate its practical implementation by applying the formalism
to the analysis of first Tichý 1, and then Tichý 2. The goal of this step-by-step
exercise is to consolidate and to deepen the understanding of Veltman’s theory of
counterfactuals.
However, first two minor remarks about how semantic intuitions and some of the
discussed theoretical concepts relate shall be made. Since the points to be made
will play a role in the following, I will address them beforehand.
The first of these remarks is concerned with the universal appeal of counterfactu-
als and the question whether a single witness suffices to establish a counterfactual
truth. The intuition is that counterfactuals are universal in the sense that in all
worlds described by the counterfactual it has to be true. (That is, the domain of
the counterfactual needs to be exhausted in this respect.) In fact – and this relates
intuition and Veltman’s theory – whatever the counterfactual worlds are, they have
to have a basis such that the claim put forward by the counterfactual determines
the worlds w under consideration within US .
Next, it shall be brought to mind again that this basis needs to be different from the
20Again, this implies some similarity measure for the worlds to be considered.
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basis of those worlds that stand for the actual world w@ only insofar as in these
counterfactual worlds w the (factual) antecedent is assumed to be not true. Or,
more precisely, it must not be forced by the circumstances. Everything else about
these worlds ought to remain the same.
How-to determine a basis
Being already concerned with the concept of a basis, another major key to Frank
Veltman’s proposal is to understand how to determine a basis for a world. Recall
that the only hint that Veltman gives is provided by the following quote: “A basis
for a world w ∈ US is a part of w consisting of mutually independent facts which,
given the general laws, bring the other facts constituting w in their train.” (Velt-
man (2005), p. 168) While I will not give a general algorithm for how to compute
the basis of a given world, I will nonetheless sketch a general line of reasoning
one might pursue. Having an idea of how to approach the matter should provide
with helpful insight for solving the matter when actually facing the problem.21
To keep things simple assume that the language under consideration has only two
atoms p and q, and that laws are always of the conditional form (φ→ ψ).






When pursuing the question of how to determine a basis, the task at hand seems
at first to be rather complex. This is, however, not the case. Pivotal for a so-
21Talking of ‘the’ basis is a slight misnomer. We will see later, when discussing Tichý 2 (cf.
page 107), that, as Veltman observes, a world might have not just a single basis: “[. . . ] generally
speaking, it may very well be that a world has more than one basis”. (Veltman (2005), p. 168)
22In order to make things no more complex than necessary I will give a state as a one dimen-
sional matrix instead of an ordered pair of 〈US , FS 〉. The point to be made will not suffer from this
simplification.
90
CHAPTER 3. THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK
lution of the problem are the two notions of general laws and independent facts
that Veltman alludes to in his informal rendering of the concept of a basis already
cited above. With regards to the concept of an independent fact it is (at least for
expository reasons23) helpful to distinguish two types of facts: for one, those facts
that figure as premises (axioms) in the derivation of other facts, and, second, those
factual elements that do not stand in any relation to any other facts, but may be
considered to be fully independent. While both kinds of facts are obviously im-
portant in the identification of a world, the former play a special role in the process
of reasoning to other facts. This process will, in any case, involve whatever gen-
eral laws have been established besides the facts. –Which brings the two notions
of facts and laws that lie at the very center of the concept of a basis into the proper
relation.
As long as no laws have been fixed, all given facts are independent from each
other, and no fact suffices to determine or establish any other fact. Hence, for
the minimal state 1 every world acts as its own base, i.e. the bases are given by
the worlds themselves. The situation changes however once laws that determine
relations between facts have been introduced. Assume for illustration that the
minimal state 1 has been updated with a conditional law of the form (p → q).
Since this excludes all worlds in which the antecedent is true but the consequent
is false, the set of worlds W is reduced to the universe US of this nomologically
updated state. Hence, US (= the state 1[(p → q)]) consequently contains only
those worlds in compliance with the law introduced in the state.24 These worlds







23The distinction to be made is ultimately not tenable.
24To mention it again, this is a problematic point. It ultimately might give rise to a position that
assumes that what must not be the case, can not be the case.
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Next, assume that the fact p is indeed true.25 From this it follows immediately that
also q has to be true, since under the premises (p→ q) and p the conclusion that
q can not be false (at least if one assumes (i) the validity of Modus Ponens as a
universal rule of inference and (ii) one interprets the conditional as material im-
plication). Conversely, from (p → q) being true and q being false it follows by
Modus Tollens that p must also be false, since q being false, but p being true would
contradict what had been established as valid, namely the law that (p→ q) with
which the minimal state had been updated.
Taking stock at this point, it follows from these considerations that in state 1[(p→
q)] the basis for w0 is provided by the fact that p (abbreviated 〈p, 1〉), while the
basis of w3 is given by 〈q, 0〉: in combination with the law constitutive of US both
facts entail so much information in terms of other facts that they eventually allow
to determine their respective worlds as a whole. While in the cases of w0 and w3
the matter is rather straightforward, things are a bit more complicated than this
with respect to world w2. In case of w2 no single fact alone is sufficient enough
to deduce the other fact. This is so because the premises (p → q) and 〈p, 1〉
are insofar indeterminate with respect to the world they entail, as they permit the
possibility of 〈q, 0〉 or 〈q, 1〉. –Which leaves not just one possible world, but two
possible worlds (namely w2 and w3) compatible with the given information. Alter-
natively assuming 〈q, 1〉 in combination with the law (p → q) yields a similarly
inconclusive result. In this case again two possibilities arise that are in compliance
with the law: 〈p, 1〉 and 〈p, 0〉, which ultimately leaves the worlds w0 and w2 as
possible extensions. In light of this it turns out that the only information set that
allows to uniquely determine w2 is the conjunction of the given factual informa-
tion. Hence, the basis for w2 is provided by the set {〈p, 0〉 , 〈q, 1〉}.
When summarizing the above, two rules of thumb give its gist: facing a condi-
tional law and a true possible instantiation of the law’s antecedent, one can deduce
by Modus Ponens the value of the consequent, since it must not be false. Hence,
25While any such factual update will of course primarily alter FS , recall that in Definition 3
bases are determined with respect to US . Hence, for the moment it suffices again to focus solely
on US , and to ignore FS completely.
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the antecedent acts as the basis. On the other hand, when facing a conditional law
and a false possible instantiation of the law’s consequent, by Modus Tollens one
can derive that the antecedent must not be true, but false. Hence, in this case the
consequent figures as the basis.
While Veltman does not bother to elaborate on this, note at least in an aside that
of course the underlying logic and the rules of inference applied are decisive for
the determination of a basis. Note further that each basis will also depend upon
what general laws are in effect. Assuming for instance (p → ¬q) instead of
(p→ q) the basis for each world will be different from the ones just determined
(though of course the line of reasoning effective will be basically the same): while
in this case the law eliminates w0 from US (since 〈p, 1〉 and 〈q, 1〉, which means
〈¬q, 0〉), the basis for w1 is 〈p, 1〉, the basis for w2 is 〈q, 1〉, and the basis for w3 is
{〈p, 0〉 , 〈q, 1〉}. Note next that a basis is also relative to the domain under consid-
eration: Shifting from the minimal state to for instance a nomologically updated
state will change the basis for any world, since the updated domain is ‘smaller’
than that of the minimal state itself. Finally, another observation that is intimately
related to the last remark is that bases are dynamic. They evolve during the suc-
cession of updates. The basis that determines w0 at the minimal state 1 is different
from the basis of w0 at state 1 [(p → q)], the former being given by the assign-
ments 〈p, 1〉, 〈q, 1〉, the latter being 〈p, 1〉.
After these preliminaries I will turn now to the long overdue step-by-step analysis
of Tichý 1. First, the story line of Tichý 1 will receive a formal translation. Next,
departing from the minimal state, the succession of the nomological and factual
updates is formally executed. And finally, the attention will rest upon the practical
details and intricacies connected to the assumed counterfactual update.
3.4.1 Tichý 1
The initial set-up: the rules, the facts, and the minimal state
Recollecting the material body of Tichý 1, the scenario is comprised of the follow-
ing givens: on the one hand the general rules that characterize Jones’s behavior,
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and on the other hand the facts that specify the particular situation we will look
at. While the facts alone determine FS , i.e. what is actually the case, the laws (in
combination with the facts) define what could potentially be the case, i.e. US , the
universe of the situation. Rendered to a quasi-formal presentation the rules are:
rule 1: weather bad→ hat on
rule 2: weather good→ hat randomly on/off
26
The facts divide into those that are explicitly mentioned in the scenario, and those
that are deducible from the given information. Directly given is:
fact 1: weather bad
Indirectly given (following from Fact 1 and Rule 1) is:
fact 2: hat on
Assuming a strong complementary relation between the meaning of the sentences
The weather is bad and The weather is fine the translation into a propositional
language (that is endowed with the usual connectives) is straightforward. In the
following the atom p translates the proposition The weather is bad, while the
proposition The weather is fine is translated by ¬p. Finally, the proposition Jones
is wearing his hat converts to q.
The minimal state 1 will thus consist of at least two atoms p and q. However, in
order to achieve greater generality and to avoid being unduly restricted solely to
the particular I will follow Veltman and enrich the space of possibilities by a third
proposition r (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 169). While this extension is (at least at
the moment27) not really decisive, one avoids having to stipulate a certain tech-
nical patch in the case one faces empty intersections when determining the bases
of counterfactual worlds. For more details on this see my footnote 35 on p. 100,
26The use of the adverbial randomly is rather sloppy here. While the semantics of randomly
allows for a translation using a bi-conditional, rule 2 is actually not compatible with this. The final
formalization will pay heed to this point.
27Later on, when turning to the analysis of the data that provides the actual starting point of this
study, the introduction of the third propositional variable will turn out to be of great explanatory
value.
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though.
Thus, the three propositions p, q, r delineate the logical space that defines the
minimal state given by the ordered pair 〈US , FS 〉:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
This shall provide the starting point for the exercise to follow. In due course the
matrix will be updated with the information that determines the scenario of Tichý
1.
The rules and the corresponding nomological updates
The first update is due to rule 1, i.e. the information that If the weather is bad,
Jones will wear his hat being communicated. The translation of this general law
is: (p→ q). This eliminates worlds w4 and w5 from the domain of consideration,
since these worlds defy the validity of the law.28 The state yielded by updating the
minimal state 1 with (p→ q) is 1[(p→ q)]:
28It is worth to note again that nomological updates pertain to both coordinates of a state.
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〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
Next follows an update with rule 2 which states that If the weather is fine Jones
will or will not wear a hat. Since its propositional translation (¬p → q ∨ ¬q)
is a tautology, the preceding state 1[(p → q)] and the resulting state 1[(p →
q)][(¬p→ q ∨ ¬q)] are equivalent:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
(Note that, since by now all the rules that govern the scenario of Tichý 1 have been
successfully updated, the universe US of Tichý 1 has been fixed in this state.)
The facts and the factual updates
Next come the updates with factual information. Strictly following Tichý’s story
the only update concerns the information that the weather is indeed bad. Hence,
the state 1[(p → q)][(¬p → q ∨ ¬q)] is updated by the fact that p. This
distinguishes the actual from the non-factual worlds, and is commonly considered
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to lead to the elimination of the not p-worlds.29 (This assumption will however
be suppressed in the table. Rather the not p-worlds are immediately designated as
counterfactual worlds (indicated by the triple lines in the table).30 Note that the
division between the factual and the counterfactual applies only to the dimension
of the actual, i.e. FS , not to the dimension of the potential, i.e. US . The resulting
state is 1[(p→ q)][(¬p→ q ∨ ¬q)][p]:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
Note that I will not conceive of derivative information such as the fact that q (since
p and rule 1 are given) to be generated in a separate update. Rather the notion of
support covers such acts of implicit information transfer/generation. The question
whether the order of updates is important (factual information before nomological
information, or, as presented here, nomological information before factual infor-
mation) shall not be pursued. In either case the state reached would be the same as
the one depicted. What shall be emphasized however at this point of the presenta-
tion is that one can identify a basis for each of the worlds given in the state under
discussion.31 The bases are listed below. For each of these bases it is spelled out
29cf. for instance Veltman (2005), p. 167, where Veltman remarks: “Updating with a proposi-
tional formula ϕ eliminates from FS all possible worlds in which ϕ is false. Hence, only worlds in
which ϕ is true are left as worlds that might be the actual world.”
30Actually, as I will take it, the notion of ‘elimination’ here is a misnomer. The not p worlds
are not discarded. They do not simply disappear from the logical space resp. the agent’s cognitive
state. Rather than to eliminate worlds in the strict sense negation evokes a division of the set of
worlds. It distinguishes the factual from the counterfactual dimension. Thus, it would be more
appropriate to speak of a de-actualization, rather than an elimination.
31Actually, bases can be determined at any point of the update process. The choice to do so
now is due to expository reasons: the bases will become relevant in a moment when reaching the
counterfactual update.
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how it determines its respective world by providing a derivation that exemplifies
how the combination of factual and nomological premises allows to derive the
‘missing’ facts. This way each basis is indirectly proven to be sound. In addition
to this also the utility of the concept of a basis and its interaction with the un-
derlying logic is demonstrated. This provides more insight into the workings of
Veltman’s framework than a mechanical recount of how the bases are identified
could deliver.
The basis for w6 is {〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 0〉}. The ‘missing’ information about the world
derives as follows:
Modus Ponens
〈(p→ q), 1〉 〈p, 1〉 〈r, 0〉
〈q, 1〉
The basis for w7 is {〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 1〉}. Its world is fully determined by:
Modus Ponens
〈(p→ q), 1〉 〈p, 1〉 〈r, 1〉
〈q, 1〉
The basis for the counterfacual worlds w0 and w1 is justifiable by Modus Tollens,
using the specific combination of values for q and r:
The basis for w0 is {〈q, 0〉 , 〈r, 0〉}. It derives:
Modus Tollens
〈(p→ q), 1〉 〈q, 0〉 〈r, 0〉
〈p, 0〉
The basis for w1 is {〈q, 0〉 , 〈r, 1〉}. It allows to infer the value of the rule’s an-
tecedent as the last bit of information to be known about the world.
Modus Tollens
〈(p→ q), 1〉 〈q, 0〉 〈r, 1〉
〈p, 0〉
For worlds w2 and w3 the combinatorics of truth values for p and q is such that
they are mutually indeterminable given a classical logic. Hence, the bases of these
worlds are given only by the full information available in these worlds: The basis
for w2 is {〈p, 0〉 , 〈q, 1〉 , 〈r, 0〉}. The basis for w3 is {〈p, 0〉 , 〈q, 1〉 , 〈r, 1〉}.
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The counterfactual update(s)
While so far the nomological and the factual updates have been discussed, what
remains to be examined is how the system accounts for counterfactual updates.
This, of course, is the most interesting issue now, the question being whether the
counterfactual If the weather had been fine, Jones would have been wearing his
hat turns out to be true or not in the account. Recall that intuitively it is false. In
the following I will go over how in Veltman’s framework the issue is solved.
Some preparatory remarks: a rough reconstruction of how things work
Recapitulating the main insights of the discussion so far will help to get a clear
idea of what will have to be done.
Whatever the counterfactual fine weather worlds-worlds are they have to have a
basis such that
• the basis is informed by the laws in effect for the scenario
• the basis needs to be different from the basis of w@ only insofar in these
worlds the (factual) antecedent is assumed to be not true, or, more precisely,
must not be forced by the circumstances
But how is p not forced? The answer to this immediate question will provide with
the next step in the consideration. So, recall Definition 3, clause (i):
The situation s forces the proposition P within US iff for every w ∈ US
such that s ⊆ w it holds that w ∈ P.
By this definition any basis s will (trivially) force p, if p is contained in the basis.
Hence, deleting p from the basis will guarantee that p is no longer forced. So,
the task is to reduce the basis s of w@
32 such that it no longer contains p, while
to simultaneously conserve the rest of the w@-basis in order to ensure maximal
similarity to w@. After all, you want to maintain as much information about the
actual state as possible when making a counterfactual assumption. This reduced
32For simplicity I will refer to the set of possibly actual worlds as ‘the’ actual world w@.
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basis (or, ‘pseudo basis’ as I will call it occasionally33) of w@ will then act as
the kernel of the basis of any counterfactual world.34 Updating state 1[(p →
q)][(¬p → q ∨ ¬q)][p] with the counterfactual assumption that [¬p] will hence
involve three steps: in the first step the fact that p is eliminated from the basis of
w@. In the second step the counterfactual worlds are checked. More specifically,
one has to identify the bases that maximally agree with the reduced basis of w@
(or, to be more precise, of w@ ↓ p for that matter). And in the third step it remains
to be checked whether for all these counterfactual worlds the claim put forward
by the counterfactual is actually true. (For the particular example of Tichý 1 recall
that the bases of w@ are the sets {〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 0〉} for w6 and {〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 1〉} for w7.
From these the information that 〈p, 1〉 will have to be retracted. Hence in the case
under consideration the bases of the counterfactual worlds have to contain either
〈r, 0〉 or 〈r, 1〉. Having established this it is then easy to verify (when consulting
the above given list of bases) that indeed all counterfactual worlds are at least
partially based on either 〈r, 0〉 or 〈r, 1〉.)35
The real deal: how things actually work
Sticking closer to Veltman’s account we will see that the three steps just described
– though yielding the proper result – deliver only a rough heuristics. In Veltman’s
theory the issue is solved with greater formal rigor, and it is necessary to elaborate
more on the complexities of his account. The main difference between the above
simplifying solution and Veltman’s principled account is that – unlike pretended
above in the second step – the shift from the factual to the counterfactual is not
33See footnote 17, p. 88 again for why the notion of a basis does not really apply here.
34The point just made rests on the assumption that p figures as an independent premise. In case
p derives from another premise p’, this other premise needs to be discarded from the basis in order
to guarantee that p is not forced. In this case things become arguably more involved. Besides the
nature of the nomological relation between p’ and p that may play a role here also the underlying
logic may play a decisive role.
35 Note again that r is merely stipulated for technical reasons. In the given scenario the propo-
sition r is actually irrelevant. The process of reasoning from the bases is however facilitated by
the assumption of an independent premise r. Otherwise the retraction of p would have resulted in
the empty set ∅. While in principle feasible, this complicates things unnecessarily: it would have
necessitated to consider all worlds in the further computation. This is alluded to in footnote 15 in
Veltman [2005], p. 167, where Veltman remarks: “If there is no world w ∈ US such that s ⊆ w,
then, according to this definition [Definition 3 (i), D.B.], the situation s forces every proposition.”
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simply a magical shift in attention, but the effect of an update.
Since clause (i) of Definition 3 determines to consider a subset of the bases of w@,
the retraction of p in Tichý 1 includes not just – as suggested in the heuristics –
the counterfactual worlds w0, w1, w2, w3, but also those worlds that designate w@,
namely w6 and w7. The corresponding retraction-state (1[(p → q)][(¬p →
q ∨ ¬q)][p]) ↓ ~p is thus:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
(Trivially, the worlds constituting this state are all nomologically sound and to a
certain degree similar to the actual world w@.)
The difference to the formulated heuristics is that only after an update with ¬p
(i.e. the assumption that the weather had not been bad, but fine ) are the bad
weather-worlds w6 and w7 eliminated. (And only then is a distinction between the
factual and the counterfactual worlds achieved!) The state ((1[(p→ q)][(¬p→
q ∨ ¬q)][p]) ↓ ~p) [¬p] that is thus reached is the counterfactually updated state
S[If it had been the case that the weather was fine]:
101
CHAPTER 3. THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
///w6 ///1 ///1 ///0
///w7 ///1 ///1 ///1
〉
Having reached this state a position is gained that allows to finally assess the truth
value of the counterfactual conditional. In order to do so it remains to be seen if
the counterfactual’s claim is legit and the state indeed supports the consequent of
the counterfactual. In other words, one has to check whether q is accepted in the
state, as Veltman puts it (cf. Veltman [2005], p. 160). Or, more formally:
((1[(p→ q)][(¬p→ q ∨ ¬q)][p]) ↓ ~p)[¬p] |= q
Recall that for the scenario of Tichý 1 the counterfactual If the weather had been
nice, Jones would have been wearing his hat is intuitively unacceptable. It is not
true. And, looking at the state depicted above, we see that indeed, unlike advanced
by the counterfactual, not all of the worlds one has to consider are Jones is wear-
ing his hat-worlds. While in worlds w2 and w3 the sentence is true, q turns out to
be false in worlds w0 and w1. Hence, the counterfactual’s universal claim – its de-
terminacy with respect to the scenario it describes – fails. It does not cohere with
what we know about the scenario. This in turn means that Veltman’s account is
capable to correctly reconstruct the initial intuition connected to Tichý’s original
example and the meaning of the counterfactual in question.
The idea of acceptance that is so crucial for the assessment of counterfactuals
finds a different rendering when Veltman proposes to conceive of counterfactuals
as tests. This is elaborated in Definition 5 ff.:
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Definition 5 (Counterfactuals as tests)
S[if had been ϕ, would have been ψ] = S, if S[if had been ϕ] |= ψ
S[if had been ϕ, would have been ψ] = 0, otherwise.
(Veltman (2005), p. 170)
3.4.2 Tichý 2
Before I will ultimately turn to the formal analysis of the data of Veltman’s puz-
zle that provided the very starting point of this inquiry I will first complete the
discussion of how Veltman’s semantics works by applying it, as promised, also
to Tichý 2. Again, I will proceed step-by-step, but this time I will not comment
on every detail as extensively as in the case of Tichý 1. The major concerns will
become clearly recognizable nonetheless. I will proceed as before: after giving
a translation of the scenario of Tichý 2 into a propositional language I will run
through the succession of updates and the computation of the bases. Finally the
outcome of the enterprise is assessed. We will see that also in this case – which
is more complex than Tichý 1 – the system is able to successfully reconstruct the
intuitive valuation.
Translating the scenario
The main tenets of the story line of Tichý 2 translate to the below propositional
atoms:
It is raining = p
Jones is wearing his hat = q
The coin comes up heads = r
Adhering to Veltman’s formalization (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 170), the nomologi-
cal core of the scenario is captured in one boxed formula :
Jones is wearing his hat if and only if the weather is bad or the coin
comes up heads = (q↔ (p ∨ r))
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The immediately given facts particular to the scenario are:
The coin comes up heads = 〈r, 1〉
It is raining = 〈p, 1〉
Given the nomological and factual premises, the following information is deriv-
able for the present situation:
Jones is wearing his hat = 〈q, 1〉
The successsion of nomological and factual updates
As before, the update process shall depart from the minimal state 1:36
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
w1 0 0 1
w2 0 1 0
w3 0 1 1
w4 1 0 0
w5 1 0 1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
Updating the minimal state with the rule that Jones is wearing his hat if and only
if the weather is bad or the coin comes up heads yields state 1[ (q ↔ (p ∨ r))].
Those worlds that violate the law are discarded from the logical space:
36I will refrain from assuming (as has been done before) an additional, independent fact, since
the ‘danger’ of having to deal with empty pseudo-bases will not arise, as we will see in a moment.
Things would become unnecessarily complicated without adding any further insight.
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〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
Providing the information that indeed heads came up (= 〈r, 1〉) results in a change
in the factual dimension of the state: it is narrowed down to worlds w3 and w7
(highlighted with bold font) while worlds w0 and w6 turn out to be counterfactual
(underlined and in red). The result 1[ (q↔ (p ∨ r))][r] is as follows:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
The next update is due to the information that It is raining being communicated.
This further reduces the set of the possibly actual worlds from {w3,w7} to {w7},
since w3 is a world in which the statement It is raining is false. Hence the state 1[
(q↔ (p ∨ r))][r][p] is generated:
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〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
〉
Computing the bases
Again, before finally addressing the counterfactual update first the bases of the
factual and counterfactual worlds that have been established so far shall be speci-
fied. We will see that the line of reasoning instrumental in the identification of the
bases crucially involves the interplay of the bi-conditional and of the disjunction
that occur in the law (q↔ (p ∨ r)) that governs the scenario’s horizon.
The basis of w7 is {〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 1〉}. From this it is deducible – by the rule (q ↔
(p ∨ r)) being true and the definitions of ‘∨’ and ‘↔’ – that 〈q, 1〉.37 The line of
reasoning is as follows:
0. 〈r, 1〉
1. 〈p, 1〉
2. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
3. 〈(p ∨ r), 1〉 by 0. (and 1.) and definition of ‘∨’
4. 〈q, 1〉 by 3. and 2. and definition of ‘↔’
The basis of w6 is {〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 0〉}. The world w6 is determined by and large as
above, with the only difference being the value given for r:38
37Actually, since p and r are given, each of both facts alone suffices to derive the value of q.
Note however that, since neither fact alone allows to determine the other facts value, p and r are
not fully independent. The basis of the world is thus arguably given only by both, p and r.
38Again the atoms p and r are not mutually independent.
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0. 〈r, 0〉
1. 〈p, 1〉
2. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
3. 〈(p ∨ r), 1〉 by 1. (and 0.) and definition of ‘∨’
4. 〈q, 1〉 by 3. and 2. and definition of ‘↔’
Or, alternatively, {〈q, 1〉 , 〈r, 0〉}:
0. 〈r, 0〉
1. 〈q, 1〉
2. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
3. 〈(p ∨ r), 1〉 by 1. and 2. and definition of ‘↔’
4. 〈p, 1〉 by 3. and 0. and definition of ‘∨’
Depending on the ‘direction’ of the possible derivations w0 has two bases: when
departing from the right side of (q ↔ (p ∨ r)) the basis is {〈p, 0〉 , 〈r, 0〉}; when




2. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
3. 〈q, 0〉 by 0. and 1. and definition of ‘∨’, and
2. and definition of ‘↔’
The alternative basis {〈q, 0〉} derives the values of p and r as follows:
0. 〈q, 0〉
1. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
2 . 〈(p ∨ r), 0〉 by 0. and 1. and definition of ‘↔’
3. 〈p, 0〉 and 〈r, 0〉 by 2. and definition of ‘∨’
Two bases for w3 are {〈p, 0〉 , 〈q, 1〉} and {〈p, 0〉 , 〈r, 1〉}. The former derives the
value of p:
39In case more than one basis exists the question weather one is to be favored over another arises
of course. This point however can not be addressed here.
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0. 〈p, 0〉
1. 〈q, 1〉
2. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
3. 〈p ∨ r), 1〉 by 1. and 2. and definition of ‘↔’
3. 〈r, 1〉 by 3. and 0. and definition of ‘∨’
The second basis of w3 allows to determine the truth of q:
0. 〈p, 0〉
1. 〈r, 1〉
2. 〈(q↔ (p ∨ r)), 1〉
3. 〈p ∨ r), 1〉 by 0. and 2. and definition of ‘∨’
4. 〈q, 1〉 by 2. and 3. and definition of ‘↔’
The counterfactual update
Returning to the update process after the digression concerned with the specifi-
cation of the bases, the counterfactual update takes center stage. Recall that after
completing the nomological and factual updates in w@ it is the case that Jones is
wearing his hat, because the coin came up heads and it is raining.
Since the counterfactual If the weather had been fine, Jones would have been
wearing his hat demands to consider those worlds in which the weather is fine,
the counterfactual worlds to look at are those in which 〈p, 0〉 holds, instead of
the actual fact 〈p, 1〉. (Again, one has to assume a strong antonymous relation
between the weather being fine and the weather being bad in the sense that the
sentence It is raining being false implies The weather is fine, or, even better yet,
The sun is shining.)
When implementing Veltman’s proposal to the analysis of the scenario that the
counterfactual demands to consider the first step involved is to retract 〈p, 1〉 from
the basis of w@. Since w7 is the only world left in the set of the possibly ac-
tual worlds, its basis is thus to be altered accordingly. Hence, departing from
{〈p, 1〉 , 〈r, 1〉} the kernel of the counterfactual worlds to consider is given by the
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assignment 〈r, 1〉.
The retraction-state (1[ (q ↔ (p ∨ r))][r][p])↓ ~p thus collects every world in
which 〈r, 1〉 is contained in a maximal subset of its basis that does not force p to
be true. The only worlds that satisfy this condition are w3 and w7. Hence, the
retraction-state is:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
///w0 ///0 ///0 //0 /
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
///w6 ///1 ///1 //0 /
w7 1 1 1
〉
Next, the counterfactual assumption that not p has to be added to this state.
–Which in turn leads to the suspension of the actual world w7. Doing so one
hence achieves state ((1[ (q↔ (p ∨ r))][r][p])↓ ~p)[¬p]:
〈
US p q r
w0 0 0 0
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
w6 1 1 0
w7 1 1 1
,
FS p q r
///w0 ///0 ///0 //0 /
///w1 ///0 ///0 ///1
///w2 ///0 ///1 ///0
w3 0 1 1
///w4 ///1 ///0 ///0
///w5 ///1 ///0 ///1
///w6 ///1 ///1 //0 /
///w7 ///1 ///1 //1 /
〉
While this completes what it means – according to Veltman – to make a counter-
factual assumption, it remains to be checked whether this assumption also sup-
ports 〈q, 1〉. Only if this is the case for w3 will the counterfactual be acceptable.
Since it is indeed the case that in w3 it holds that Jones is wearing his hat, the
counterfactual may be considered to be true. Hence:
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((1[ (q↔ (p ∨ r))][r][p])↓ ~p)[¬p] |= q
And this exactly coincides with the intuitive interpretation of the counterfactual
in the given scenario. Veltman’s theory is thus also in this case able to correctly
reconstruct the intuition connected to the example.
3.5 Summary
Having completed the introduction of the formal framework in which the pending
analysis is to be formulated, those ideas and concepts of Veltman’s theory that
will be of particular importance for the account to be developed shall be summa-
rized now. The actual concern and result of Veltman, namely his theory of what it
means to make counterfactual assumptions, will be only of secondary importance
in this. At least insofar as nothing will be added or revised in this account. The
semantics of the implicit antecedents that occurs in the discourses of Veltman’s
puzzle will be accounted for – strictly adhering to Veltman – in terms of how
he conceives what it means to make counterfactual assumptions, namely involv-
ing the achievement of the retraction state and the execution of the counterfactual
update. The motivation and concepts that underlie these steps shall however be
quickly recalled.
First to be mentioned is the idea to conceive of counterfactual conditionals as sup-
port tests which emulates the simple intuition that a counterfactual is true when-
ever in the state reached by making the counterfactual assumption also the con-
clusion expressed in the consequent is true. What is actually tested is whether the
assumption represents a tenable hypothesis. It is so, whenever the conclusion that
it derives is consistent with the informational background of the assumption. The
notion of the support test may however also be considered to be relevant with re-
spect to the peculiar role that counterfactuals play in conversation. Agreeing upon
the truth of a counterfactual indicates not only the consistency of an assumption
with a state, but that moreover the individual information states of the participants
of communication are indeed aligned. Hence, one may indeed assume that coun-
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terfactuals serve to test the common ground.
The second point to be mentioned is already inherent to the first point and actually
motivates the technicalities of Veltman’s theory. (Foremost the definition of the re-
traction state and the concept of the base.) The discussion of the Tichý-examples
highlighted that making a counterfactual assumption involves not only the revi-
sion of bare facts, but that it is decisive for the truth of the counterfactual that in
the assumption also relations between facts are recognized. As already mentioned
above, in the formulation and assessment of a counterfactual the (nomological)
background is of utmost importance. We will see later on in the analysis that in
cases that completely lack such a nomological backbone a heavy dose of prag-
matic reasoning is necessary in order to be able to consider in such a case the
communication of a counterfactual to be rational at all. At this point the analysis
will indeed go beyond giving an account of the felicity conditions of the elliptic
discourses of Veltman’s puzzle that acted as the original starting point. In addi-
tion it will also provide with a deeper look at certain issues in the pragmatics and
semantics of counterfactuals that goes beyond what is laid out by Veltman (and,




Turning now to the analysis the groundwork that has been laid down in the pre-
ceding three chapters shall quickly be recalled. The data under concern and the
problems they pose were introduced in the first chapter. The basis gained there
was then located within its wider empirical context in the second chapter. And
in the third chapter the formalism was expounded which will now be employed
in the analysis of the issues formulated in chapter 1. The starting point for the
pending formal account will be provided by one of the very first examples drawn
from Veltman (2005). It is the familiar discourse
(1) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
While in due course also its infelicitous counterpart
(2) # John drank too much wine. He would not have become sick.
will be accounted for, the chapter has more to offer than just an analysis of these
two examples. Its structure is summarized in the following outline.
Outline of the chapter
First, the procedural details of the interpretation of the felicitous example (1) will
be spelled out in depth in section 4.1 by computing the sequence of updates re-
quired. The example represents a paradigmatic case for the successful processing
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of a felicitous discourse. Next, I will turn in section 4.2 to the actual semantic
analysis. Here I will not just consider example (1), but will also attend to its infe-
licitous counterpart, example (2), and a number of variants of both. These include
for instance the felicitous version of (2) with an explicit antecedent, and a version
of (1) in which the presuppositions of the scenario are canceled. The discussion
of both of these cases will provide with important insights regarding the semantic
and pragmatic resources exploited in the interpretation of counterfactuals in gen-
eral. The next major point of attention is addressed in section 4.3 in which the
semantic analysis of example (2) is complemented with a clarification of the role
that a conjunctive vs. a disjunctive premise set plays in general for the felicity
of the discourses. This continues the discussion of the idea that an exhaustivity
constraint might be crucial for the analysis of the data with which the very first
chapter of this thesis was completed. Finally, at the end of the analysis, in section
4.4 the availability of a because-paraphrase for most of the examples is studied in
detail.
4.1 The procedural side of discourse computation
As already mentioned at the start of the analysis I will return to the original exam-
ple John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.1
From what has been discussed so far in the preceding chapters, it ought to be clear
that things are not as simple, as the surface structure of the discourse suggests.
Speaking more formally, this sequence of two sentences (or, when acknowledg-
ing the special nature of the would have + Past Participle-complex, the sequence
of a sentence and a sentence-like expression), can not be understood as a sequence
of two simple updates, with the initial sentence acting as the first update, and the
subsequent counterfactual relict-clause as the second update.
Not only is the example empirically more complex than it appears at first sight in
that it is elliptic and involves a negation-induced alternative that acts as a contextu-
1For reasons of brevity I will in the following reduce the discourse to John did not drink. He
would have become sick.
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ally determined implicit antecedent which completes a counterfactual conditional,
but also theoretically is it rather demanding and necessitates the application of the
full update machinery for counterfactuals.
Indeed, following Veltman’s account, the discourse comprises a whole sequence
of updates that eventually cumulates in a support test. This history of semantic
composition and processing is neatly summarized in the formal representation of
the state designating the support test to be achieved. This state gives the terminal
point of the interpretation process. It can be given as:
discourse context[John did not drink] ↓[John did not drink] [Jahn drank]=NinA
|= John would have become sick
The procedural steps that lead up to this state will now be discussed in detail.
The starting point is provided by the assumption that the cognitive agent is in the
minimal state.
4.1.1 The communicative environment of the discourse in the
initial state
The computation of the discourse’s meaning shall depart from the minimal state:
1 = 〈W,W〉
Nomological updates transform the minimal state to a state 1+:
1+ = 〈US , FS 〉
This state 1+ is distinguished from the minimal state by the assumption that the
state’s cognitive bearer established at least some laws. The exact nature of this
horizon shall however remain irrelevant. (With the exception of the question
whether the content of the counterfactual that is implicit in the discourse under
discussion, i.e. the empirical truth that Drinking too much alcohol will result in
sickness, can be presupposed or not. This point will be addressed separately later
on in the section on radical interpretation of counterfactuals on page 123 ff.) What
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is noteworthy with respect to 1+ is that at this stage FS is still identical to US (FS
= US ), since so far no other facts than laws have been established.
Although it is redundant (and admittedly not quite realistic) I will assume that
factual updates separately follow the nomological updates. These factual updates
yield a state 1⊕:
1⊕ = 〈US , FS 〉
Unlike in state 1+ in state 1⊕ the set of facts FS represents now a proper subset of
US : FS ⊂ US . This state provides the nomological and factual environment into
which the discourse under discussion will have to be incorporated.
4.1.2 Updating with a NinA-trigger: the discourse initial sen-
tence John did not drink
Having thus defined the communicative context in which the discourse is to be
embedded, next the update of state 1⊕ with the discourse initial sentence shall be
considered. The concrete situation is thus that of some agent A engaging in com-
munication with another individual B by uttering John did not drink. Sticking to
Definition 1 (i) in Veltman (2005) on p. 165 and Veltman’s subsequent elaboration
the basic meanings involved are:
~John drank = {w ∈ W | w(John drank) = 1}2
~not ϕ =W \ ~ ϕ 3
Based on this, Veltman’s notion of interpretation (as specified in Veltman (2005),
p. 167, Definition 2) accounts for the actual effect of updating state 1⊕ with the
proposition John did not drink. The resulting state is:
1⊕[John did not drink] = 〈US , FS ∩ ~John did not drink〉
2The more standard alternative is of course: ~John drank = {w ∈ W | John drank(w) = 1}. As
has already been mentioned in my footnote 11 in section 3.3.2 on page 78 this definition impedes
a straightforward translation into a standard type-theoretical semantics.
3Note that as long as only factual information is negated (and not nomological propositions!)
one might restrict the domain of negation to FS , and not W as a whole.
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As with any update also this update ultimately results in a partition of FS that
differentiates the factual from the counterfactual dimension. The counterfactual
half of FS is complementary to the factual dimension and trivially consists of all
worlds within US that are – just like the NinA-worlds – not factual. Shifting the
perspective to what is (known to be) not the case (indicated by the superscript ⊖),
the counterfactual dimension of the cognitive state of the agent can be given as
follows:
1⊖[John did not drink]= 〈US ,US \ (FS ∩ ~John did not drink)〉
Considering the dichotomous nature of any update, strictly speaking both, 1⊕[John
did not drink] and 1⊖[John did not drink], simultaneously represent the cognitive
state that some individual B achieves after another individual A communicates the
sentence John did not drink to B and B successfully interprets this information.4
4.1.3 Communicating He would have become sick
Next to the statement John did not drink follows A commenting to B He would
have become sick.5 The complex of would have + Past Participle marks two
things: first, that He would have become sick does not represent a factual up-
date, and second – following Veltman’s conception and his terminology –, that it
rather acts as a support test (cf. Veltman (2005), p. 170ff.) on the counterfac-
tual domain (understanding that the complex figures as the overt consequent of an
implicit counterfactual conditional). The claim that A connects to this part of the
discourse can be understood as A ascertaining that when s/he adds the counterfac-
tual assumption that John had drunk something to what s/he already knows about
the world, then it logically follows from this that John would have become sick.
I.e. A’s state of information supports the conclusion that John would have become
sick, if it is assumed that John drank.
4The question whether the minimal state is also of a dichotomous nature seems to be rather
intriguing, but shall not be addressed here.
5In the following I assume that the anaphoric pronoun he has been successfully resolved for its
antecedent John.
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Elaborating on the communicative function of the discourse allows to give the no-
tion of support additional intuitive appeal. The function is either – in case B agrees
on the validity of the support test – the mutual reassurance of a shared common
ground of the participants of communication, or – in case B disagrees on the test’s
validity, e.g. by disputing the truth of the consequent – to establish the defective-
ness of the presupposed common ground in order to facilitate the construction of
a more congruent notion of a shared background by discussing the point further.6
In order for B to successfully execute the support test implicitly proposed by A,
the following prerequisites are necessary:
• A suitable context is required that facilitates the interpretation of the coun-
terfactual consequent He would have become sick. This context is the agent’s
cognitive state S.
and
• For this context it must hold that it supports He (= John) would have become
sick:
S |= ~He(=John) would have become sick
Or, more accurately, merely recognizing the propositional content of the would
have + Past Participle complex:
S |= ~He(=John) is sick
(Although the distinction is debatable, one might argue that the first point exploits
the formal-grammatical properties of the would have + Past Participle construc-
tion in terms of its specific mood, while the second point takes into account the
6Veltman comments on this issue: “By asserting pif had been ϕ, would have been ψq, a speaker
makes a kind of a comment: ‘Given the general laws and the facts I am acquainted with, the
sentence ψ is supported by the state I get in when I assume that ϕ had been the case’. The addressee
is supposed to determine whether the same holds on account of his or her own information. If not,
a discussion will arise, and in the course of this discussion both the speaker and the hearer may
learn some new laws and facts, which could affect the outcome of the test.” (Veltman (2005), p.
171)
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peculiar semantics deriving from the complex.)
The question is thus whether there is (with respect to B) a context (read: cognitive
state) that is accessible and suitable for the interpretation of the counterfactual
consequent HeJohn would have become sick?
4.1.4 Interpreting He would have become sick – a naive first
attempt
The answer to this question is provided by the discourse itself. The complemen-
tary correlate to state 1⊕[John did not drink], i.e. the state’s counterfactual dimen-
sion given with 1⊖[John did not drink represents a context that formally meets the
requirements specified. It is a grammatically suitable context because it is counter-
factual, thus satisfying the constraint set forth by mood, and it is logically suitable
because it is specific enough to actually conduct the support test in a non-fuzzy
way (since it is distinguished by the saliency of the NinA producing udpate). It
thus provides the basis for solid inference.
Put tentatively and very naively (from the discussion in the preceding chapter it
should be clear that the perspective to be taken is not completely accurate) the
discourse puts forth that the following support relation is to be entertained by the
interpreter:
〈US ,US \ (FS ∩ ~John did not drink)〉 |= He became sick
Slightly shifting the perspective, this sums up to the expectation (of A) that af-
ter updating the irreal background with the counterfactual assumption that John
drank, B agrees on the truth of the proposition John would have become sick:
backgroundirreal ∩ John drankirreal |= He became sickirreal
Note that if one highlights the role and the origin of the implicit antecedent, this
is equivalent to:
backgroundirreal ∩ NinA(discourse initial sentence) |=He became sickirreal
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Based on this, it suggests itself to represent the meaning of the subjunctive in form
of the would have + Past Participle complex very roughly as follows:7
~would have + PastParticiple = λpλH.H |= p
In this the variable p stands for a proposition, while H gives a context (or back-
ground, or cognitive state) in terms of a set of propositions. This crude ‘semantics’
for the subjunctive seeks to postulate that whatever context it is that the proposi-
tion p (that is marked by the subjunctive) is asserted in, it is such that it stands in
the support relation to p. What is important to note is that the involved context or
background is required to be counterfactual, i.e. it holds H = S = 〈US ,US \ FS 〉
(or, more generally, W \ FS 8). (Note that this conception of a context as a set of
propositions is in full accordance with the definitions of the notions of support
resp. logical validity given in Veltman (2005), p. 160.)
4.1.5 The revised full account
Conceived like this, the general constraints set forth above on the meaning and
interpretation of the counterfactual consequent and its admissible contexts are re-
flected. However, the account is still far too crude to deliver satisfactory results.
As already mentioned, it needs to be refined. In order to validate the support re-
lation that is emulated in backgroundirreal ∩ NinA(discourse initial sentence) |=
He became sickirreal above, it does not suffice to simply consult ‘the counterfac-
tual half of discourse’, as suggested by specifying the supporting context to be
〈US ,US \ (FS ∩ ~John did not drink)〉. Indeed, the subjunctive does not refer in-
discriminately to the counterfactual dimension. It is semantically way more sub-
tle, selective and differentiate than this. Recall what the discussion of the Tichý-
examples highlighted: also in case of counterfactual deliberation the premises of
a scenario have to be acknowledged, if one is to reach valid, i.e. truth preserv-
ing conclusions. This means that not any counterfactual world will do, but only
7The aim is to give a provisional illustration of the idea. The representation actually is formally
inaccurate and the λ-term undefined, since the use of ‘|=’ in the λ-term is a blatant mix of formal
and meta-theoretical vernacular. In case Veltman’s logic had been supplied with a deduction the-
orem, a suitable formulation would be ~would have + PastParticiple = λpλH.H → p.
8Since (most of the time) one needs to be concerned with law-abiding worlds solely, US \ FS
sufficiently designates the counterfactual dimension.
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those counterfactual worlds must be considered that are nomologically sound and
cohere not just with the laws and rules, but also the bare facts constitutive of the
situation. In other words, within the counterfactual dimension only those worlds
are to be regarded that are maximally similar to the actual world. –Which is after
all the world that acts as the point of reference for the counterfactual to begin with.
This means for the approach within Veltman’s framework that after having reached
state 1⊕[John did not drink] and facing the subsequent comment He would have
become sick one first has to compute the retraction state (i.e. the state that mod-
els those worlds that share the same maximal set of essential and indispensable
premises as the actual world minus the fact to be countered):
1⊕[John did not drink] ↓[John did not drink]
Following this, the retraction state next has to be updated with the counterfactual
assumption that John drank, i.e. with the NinA that is generated by the discourse
initial negative sentence John did not drink. The state reached is thus:
1⊕[John did not drink] ↓[John did not drink] [John drank]
Only after this update is completed is the state achieved for which it is supposed
to hold that it supports the counterfactual consequent He would have become sick
to the effect that it is accepted to be true in this context:
1⊕[John did not drink] ↓[John did not drink] [John drank] |=He would
have become sick
Paying heed to the intricacies of the semantics of counterfactuals, it becomes clear
that the background before which the counterfactual consequent is interpreted is
a grammatically required manipulated context, and not the crude counterfactual
context as proposed above. It is the result of retraction and counterfactual update
at the underlying bases.
However, the meaning given for would have + Past Participle above is in principle
tenable, provided it is taken into account that the irreal background H specified
therein is the result of proper counterfactual deliberation.
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4.2 The Semantic account
4.2.1 The first case: elliptic discourse with nomological pre-
supposition
To complete the picture it remains to be seen in detail what semantic effects the
procedural steps described so far evoke on the logical space. This will be fleshed
out now. First the example John did not drink (any wine). He would have become
sick will be computed.
Unlike as before I will not present states and their updates in form of (a sequence
of) ordered pairs. Instead I will merge the nomological and factual dimension
of the state in a single table that also captures the succession of updates. The
presentation in a single matrix is more compact, and avoids certain redundancies
inherent to the account used so far while keeping tabs of everything. In its infor-
mational content it is equivalent to the notation using ordered pairs.
The table below models the computation of the discourse. Each column gives the
result of the update of the preceding column to the left with the proposition given
in the header (with the exception of the column headed basis, which specifies the
basis of every world). The minimal state is provided by the truth value assign-
ments for the propositions p, q, and r, with p translating the proposition John
drinks, while q formalizes John is sick. The third variable r translates an arbitrary
proposition that completes the scenario. I will assume that the law that If you drink
too much, you will become sick is already established, i.e. can be presupposed as
empirically confirmed. Hence, the minimal state 1 has already been updated with
the information (p → q). This allows to immediately discard worlds w4 and w5
from any further consideration. Hence, these worlds are marked ‘—’ in the table.
Those worlds that remain within the logical space of the scenario are checked in
the table. The resulting state 1[(p → q)] represents the context into which the
discourse initial sentence John did not drink will have to be embedded.
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p q r (p→ q) ¬p basis ↓ ~¬p p |= q
w0 0 0 0
√
fact 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
— —
w1 0 0 1
√
fact 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
— —
w2 0 1 0
√
fact 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
— —
w3 0 1 1
√
fact 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
— —
w4 1 0 0 — — — — — —
w5 1 0 1 — — — — — —
w6 1 1 0
√
ctfct. 〈p, 1〉 〈r, 0〉
√
1 1
w7 1 1 1
√
ctfct. 〈p, 1〉 〈r, 1〉
√
1 1
Updating with the proposition John did not drink expressed by the discourse ini-
tial sentence distinguishes the factual from the counterfactual worlds (in the table
abbreviated fact and ctfct. respectively). For each of these worlds is the basis
specified in the next column. In the retraction state (given in the column ↓ ~¬p)
those premises that force the information that John did not drink are abandoned
from the basis of the possibly actual worlds. Those worlds within US that share the
remaining premises define the retraction state, i.e. the state to be updated with the
counterfactual assumption. This state includes (trivially) the factual worlds, but
also every counterfactual world that contains the identified ‘innocuous’ premises.
These are all worlds except w4 and w5, which, since they are impossible worlds,
do not have to be considered anyway.
Next, the update with the negation induced alternative, i.e. the irreal proposition
John drank (wine) is executed. Being effectively equivalent to making a counter-
factual assumption, it allows to cancel the factual worlds and thus re-establishes
the distinction between factual and counterfactual worlds. (The worlds that are
canceled – this time the factual worlds – are again marked ‘—’ in the table.)
Having achieved this state what is left to be seen is whether the remaining coun-
terfactual worlds indeed support the counterfactual consequent HeJohn would have
become sick. When consulting the remaining worlds w6 and w7 for the truth value
assignments for p (i.e. John drank) and q (i.e. John is sick) (which are for immedi-
acy repeated in the respective cells), it turns out that both are true in these worlds.
Hence, the former in fact supports the latter (which should not come as a surprise,
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since given the law (p → q) and the assumption that p, it follows by Modus
Ponens that q). Updating the described state S with the counterfactual thus even-
tually only confirms the given state: S[If John had drunk any wine, he would have
become sick] = S. For the counterfactual conditional If John had drunk any wine,
he would have become sick this in turn means that under the given circumstances
it is indeed true.
4.2.2 The second case: radical interpretation of counterfactu-
als – non-elliptic discourse without nomological presup-
positions
Before analyzing the infelicitous discourse, first a variant of the felicitous example
shall be considered that will shed some light on some very basic interpretive prin-
ciples connected to counterfactuals. In this variant no law that relates drinking and
sickness is presupposed and interpretation of the conditional If John had drunk, he
would have become sick will become radical insofar the logical space into which
the counterfactual is to be embedded is virtually unrestricted. The question how
counterfactuals are interpreted in such an unmediated context is not addressed by
Veltman, but the answer will be highly instructive.
As before, I will pursue the answer step by step. Considering the succession of
updates note that being ignorant with respect to any background laws means that
no nomological updates will occur. Rather, in this scenario, the discourse initial
factual update will operate directly on the minimal state. Hence, communicating
John did not drink (= ¬p) will lead to a fully symmetric partition of the available
logical space into a factual and a counterfactual domain (again distinguished in
the table below by the labels fact resp. ctfct.). Since in this case there are no
laws that could define relations between facts, all (atomic) sentences are fully in-
dependent. The bases of the worlds in this context are thus generalized and given
by the truth value assignments for p, q, and r, i.e. the worlds themselves. When
confronting the counterfactual If John had drunk, he would have become sick the
retraction state 1[¬p]↓ ~¬p is thus defined by the values of q and r, essentially
leaving all worlds (be that factual or counterfactual) up for consideration. Making
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the counterfactual assumption by updating the retraction state with p again re-
establishes the distinction between factual and counterfactual worlds. (The state
is thus 1[¬p]↓ ~¬p[p].) Now, what is different to the original example is that
in this nomologically unrestricted case the support test 1[¬p]↓ ~¬p[p]|= q obvi-
ously fails:
p q r ¬p basis ↓ ~¬p p |= q
w0 0 0 0 fact 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
— —
w1 0 0 1 fact 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
— —
w2 0 1 0 fact 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
— —
w3 0 1 1 fact 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
— —
w4 1 0 0 ctfct. 〈p, 1〉, 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
1 0
w5 1 0 1 ctfct. 〈p, 1〉, 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
1 0
w6 1 1 0 ctfct. 〈p, 1〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
1 1
w7 1 1 1 ctfct. 〈p, 1〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
1 1
Besides worlds w6 and w7 for which both p and q are true, now also worlds w4 and
w5 (which were in the previous example excluded on grounds of the presupposi-
tion of the law (p→ q)) have to be considered. And for these worlds it holds that
although they are worlds in which John drinks is true, the proposition that John
is sick is false. (For simplicity’s sake the truth values are again restated directly
in the respective lines.) Thus, the failure of the support test. This however raises
a serious question: how is the addressee B supposed to deal with the speaker A’s
utterance of a counterfactual that is so obviously failing its function? How could
B even consider A to be rational in this situation? And, turning away from these
empirical questions, what does this case mean for Veltman’s theory?
The assumption of rationality actually provides with a first solution to this. (Later
on, when discussing as a fourth example the discourse John drank too much. If he
had not drunk too much, he would not have become sick (cf. section 4.2.4, p. 129
ff.) another, competing solution will be formulated.) B can explain A’s behavior
to be rational by assuming that A entertains some nomological information so far
unbeknownst to B in light of which the support test is rendered successful. I.e.
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in order to make sense of A’s utterance, B has to assume that A knows some law
from which derives – when making the respective counterfactual assumption – the
counterfactual’s consequent as a valid conclusion.
In order to achieve this and to reach a congruent information state between A and
B, B has at least two options. The first is direct inquiry in form of B challenging
the counterfactual and asking A to provide the missing nomological information.
The other option is less expensive, in that it saves the communicative effort con-
nected to the first strategy. Here B simply accommodates the presupposed rule
from the given counterfactual, taking its indicative correlate as a nomological up-
date.9 I.e. B abstracts from the counterfactual If John had drunk any wine, he
would have become sick the rule If you drink, you will become sick and updates
his or her information state with this nomological proposition. After having done
so the support test connected to the counterfactual will no longer fail, but be suc-
cessful as has been argued for in detail when discussing the first example above.
(By accommodating the law (p → q) the worlds w4 and w5 will be excluded
from having to be considered, and by making the counterfactual assumption that
p it then follows by Modus Ponens that q: if you presuppose that drinking will re-
sult in sickness and assume that John drank, it derives that John is sick.)10 On this
account this strategy is doubly informative: first, the counterfactual turns out to be
informative, because B gets to learn a new rule by accommodating new nomolog-
ical information, and second, because by doing so B can maintain (or confirm) the
assumption that A is a rational partner in communication since his or her utterance
appears informationally motivated. Thus, in combination both these steps yield a
definite profit at minimal costs. (By this also the apparent pragmatic perversity of
the discourses is explained away, for, after all, the question is why should anyone
9Recall Lewis rule of accommodation for presupposition: “If at time t something is said that
requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then – ceteris
paribus and within certain limits – presupposition P comes into existence at t.” (Lewis (1979b),
p. 340) While the notion of accommodation remains rather vague and resembles some kind of
emanatio intellectualis the issue shall not be pursued any further. Rather I follow Lewis’s lead
here, who remarks following his statement of the rule of accommodation: “This rule has not yet
been very well stated, nor is it the only rule governing the kinematics of presupposition. But let us
bear it in mind nevertheless, and move on to other things.” (Lewis (1979b), p. 340)
10Actually, the table that summarizes the initial example represents also the effect of accommo-
dation discussed here.
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first give some factual information only to immediately follow up with an exposi-
tion of what would have been the case if the just communicated fact had not been
the case? Since the communicated fact and its counterfact are mutually exclusive
either of these bits of information seems irrelevant and not worth the effort of
mentioning.)
4.2.3 The third case: the infelicitous # John drank. He would
not have become sick
Having discussed the case of the felicitous discourse John did not drink (any
wine). He would have become sick, it suggests itself to contrast this example
with its infelicitous counterpart # John drank (too much wine). He would not have
become sick.
While it was already suggested in the course of the discussion of the because-
paraphrase of the data (cf. section 1.6, p. 21 ff.) that for the felicity of a discourse
the availability of a NinA is not the crucial factor, I will nonetheless discuss in
detail what the absence of a NinA (meaning really the (practically pretty much
impossible) failure to accommodate a suitable antecedent) would mean for the
semantic computation of the counterfactual. The goal is to understand in detail
what repercussions would arise from this for Veltman’s approach. First I will
recapitulate the argument that motivates the introduction of the concept of the
negation induced alternative. Then I will discuss the example in question also
formally.
An informal recount of the NinA-story
Turning to the concept of the negation induced alternative the starting point was
provided by Veltman’s observation that certain counterfactuals are not paraphras-
able while others are. Recall the initial examples, that are restated here in their
simplified form as (3) and (4):
(3) If John had drunk, he would have become sick.
(4) If John had not drunk, he would not have become sick.
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While the former can be paraphrased in terms of the discourse given in (5), trying
to do so for the latter yields an infelicitous sequence, as attested by (6), although
the exact same principles of reformulation underlie this rendering.
(5) John did not drink. He would have become sick.
(6) # John drank. He would not have become sick.
The thesis that in the former case a contextually given element – the negation in-
duced alternative – acts as an implicit antecedent to the counterfactual consequent,
while in the latter case no such link to the counterfactual domain is provided by
the context (and hence the counterfactual remains incomplete and the discourse
thus infelicitous) finds strong empirical support when turning to another obser-
vation made by Veltman in connection with the data. The point is twofold and
centres around the insertion of the particle otherwise in the discourses (cf. Velt-
man (2005), p. 160). When inserted into (5) the semantics of the discourse does
not change.
(7) John did not drink. Otherwise he would have become sick.
Since (7) is completely synonymous to (5), the particle otherwise is either seman-
tically vacuous, or its semantic contribution to (7) must already be implicit also
in its counterpart in (5). Intuitively the case is clear: otherwise is certainly not
empty. Rather it mirrors the meaning of the preceding initial sentence:
John did not drink. Otherwise . . .
= John did not drink. Otherwise = If he had drunk . . .
Hence, for the simple examples under discussion in which the initial sentence is
a negated or non-negated atomic proposition p that is followed by an otherwise-
sentence, the meaning of otherwise can very roughly be given as:
~otherwise = If it had not been the case that p . . .
Ascribing this meaning to otherwise also explains why its insertion into the infe-
licitous example (6) actually renders the resulting discourse all of a sudden felic-
itous (which eventually provides with factual empirical support for the cognitive
reality of the NinA) :
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(8) John drank. Otherwise he would not have become sick.
If otherwise were indeed semantically empty, one would expect the felicity of the
example not to change. However, when assuming that otherwise acts as an oper-
ator that mirrors the semantic content provided by the discourse initial sentence
things fall into place: qua its capacity to mirror information given in the preced-
ing context the particle otherwise provides with an antecedent to the counterfac-
tual consequent and thus completes the counterfactual conditional. Felicity is thus
guaranteed. As the examples in (7) and (8) show, the polarity of the discourse ini-
tial context is irrelevant in this. Polarity however is an issue in the cases in which
otherwise is not inserted into the discourses. Since in the infelicitous example
(6) the discourse initial sentence is affirmative, lacking a (sentential) negation, no
negation induced alternative is made available that could act as the implicit an-
tecedent to the counterfactual consequent. The context is simply not rich enough
to complete the counterfactual. Since it remains defective, the discourse is hence
rendered infelicitous. –Without a proper premise the asserted conclusion can not
be assessed, and thus does not find ‘support’, to stick with Veltman’s terminology.
The formal repercussions of the absence of a NinA
Point of departure for the formal recount of the infelicitous discourse is a scenario
in which the nomological relation between drinking (translated in the following
again as p) and sickness (translated as q) is presupposed. Hence, the universe
US of the state is restricted by the rule If you drink too much, you will become
sick: (p → q), after the minimal state 1 has been updated accordingly. This
state 1[(p → q)] is next updated with the factual proposition John drank (as
an instantiation of p) expressed by the discourse initial sentence. The state thus
reached is 1[(p→ q)][p] When following up with the counterfactual consequent
He would not have become sick things become interesting. Trying to embed the
consequent (represented by ‘. . . |= ¬q’ for its demand of a supporting context) into
the context built up so far yields the following situation: 1[(p→ q)][p] . . . |= ¬q.
Prerequisite for the evaluation of the support test put forth by ‘. . . |= ¬q’ is the
availability of a suitable counterfactual context. Since 1[(p → q)][p] designates
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the factual dimension of the discourse it will not do, because the irrealis of the
counterfactual consequent requires a counterfactual support.
Also, as has already been discussed at length, the counterfactual complement to
the factual dimension of discourse (which is given by 1[(p→ q)]\[p] (i.e. the set
of the (law-abiding) worlds in which John does not drink) does not represent the
proper set of premises that could fill in the dots in ‘. . . |= ¬q’. It is too indiscrimi-
nate with respect to the worlds it makes available to fill in the ‘. . .’ in ‘. . . |= ¬q’,
containing also worlds that differ from w@ more than admissible.
Trying to construct a proper context by applying Veltman’s algorithm however
also fails, because it simply can not be executed. Neither the counterfactual update
nor even the retraction state 1[(p → q)][p]↓ ~p can be achieved: since there is
no salient antecedent available – as if were the case had a NinA been generated
by the context – it is for one impossible to determine what proposition is to be
retracted from the bases of the factual worlds, and for another it further is not clear
what proposition acts as the counterfactual update. This effectively sabotages the
whole process of making a counterfactual assumption: the support test put forth
by the counterfactual consequent fails, because the ‘. . .’ in ‘. . . |= ¬q’ can not
be filled in and the premise of the support test remains undetermined. (Note that
strictly speaking, it can be filled in, but with an improper set of premises. The
premise set actually consists of the whole universe US that does not differentiate
between factual and counterfactual worlds. Which means that in the absence of a
NinA the required domain of the support test is not available.)
4.2.4 The fourth case: John drank. If he had not drunk, he
would not have become sick
Having discussed the infelicitous # John drank too much. He would not have be-
come sick, I will next concentrate on its non-elliptic, and hence felicitous counter-
part John drank. If he had not drunk, he would not have become sick. It will turn
out that also this discourse is highly interesting. To understand the significance of
the example the discussion up to this point shall first be briefly summarized.
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The first example to be semantically analyzed was the original discourse John did
not drink any wine. He would have become sick containing an implicit antecedent
and the presupposition of the law that Drinking too much alcohol will cause sick-
ness. The second point of discussion was provided by the same discourse but this
time its interpretation was radicalized insofar it was not aided by the assumption of
the nomological presupposition. We saw that whereas in the first, presuppositional
case the counterfactual was trivially true, in the second case (that lacks the pre-
supposition) the counterfactual was trivially false. In explaining how interpreters
nonetheless could – and, more often than not, do – accept the counterfactual con-
ditional as true, a general assumption of rationality in communication was pivotal.
While in both these cases the discourses are elliptic, a consideration of their non-
elliptic analogue in which the antecedent appears explicitly is not necessary, since
the implicit antecedent of a discourse is actually identical to the antecedent in an
explicit discourse. Both variants contain the same semantic object in the if -clause
of the counterfactual conditional.
In the third variant # John drank too much wine. He would not have become
sick that was next attended, the discourse initial sentence of the discourse does
not contain a negation, but is affirmative, and is thus lacking the potential to in-
duce a NinA as an antecedent to the counterfactual consequent. Hypothetically it
was then discussed what the absence of an antecedent of the counterfactual would
mean for the evaluation of the consequent.
Next, I will finally concentrate on the variant of the third example in which the
antecedent is explicitly given and the discourse thus felicitous: John drank (too
much wine). If he had not drunk (too much wine), he would not have become sick.
For this fourth case I will additionally assume that the discourse is embedded in
a presuppositional scenario: it has been established as a law that Drinking will
cause sickness. With this the example seems to be built by and large analogously
to the first example, and thus may appear to be equally trivial. But we will see that
this is not the case. Ultimately the presupposition and the information given by
the discourse are mutually logically independent. Thus, the example does not run
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parallel to the first example, but rather runs parallel to the second example that was
concerned with the radical interpretation of counterfactuals. In both these cases
the counterfactual is to be interpreted without a relevant nomological backbone
that could deliver the axiomatic foundation for an assessment of the soundness
of the counterfactual. This means that also for the example to be discussed now
the question arises why interpreters do not take this kind of counterfactual to be
a priori false.11 As for the other example Veltman does not deliver an answer
also for this case. Some contemplation will however reveal that there is more than
one solution to this problem. While one solution has already been formulated at
the end of the first chapter (cf. p. 28 ff.) some further consideration will help
to formulate at least one more answer to this question. This (competing) answer
will again be based on pragmatic strategies. Taken together both these proposals
eventually confirm a point about counterfactuals that Veltman puts as follows:
It has often12 been noted that general laws play a special role in the
interpretation of counterfactuals. [. . . ] In making a counterfactual
assumption we are not prepared to give up propositions we consider
to be general laws. (Veltman (2005), p. 166)
We will see that in case the context of interpretation is nomologically vacuous,
rational agents may device strategies for an ad hoc, but principled construction of
the necessary information. Keeping this in mind, I will turn now to the discussion
of the fourth example.
As before I will initially assume for the scenario that the law If you drink too
much, you will become sick can be presupposed (although we will see that this
presupposition is ultimately irrelevant, as has already been mentioned). This in
turn means that the bases of the worlds under consideration are the same as in
the first example. It is only the factual updates in which this fourth example is
11Assuming that the proposition If you do not drink too much alcohol, you will not become sick
has the status of a law would of course alter the picture. But this would stretch the understanding
of what characterizes a ‘law’ rather far, since there are more causes to becoming sick imaginable
than just drinking.
12Veltman refers at this place in a footnote to Pollock by remarking: “A prominent example
is John Pollock, who has stressed the point in all his writings on counterfactuals since Pollock
(1976).” (Veltman (2005), p. 166, footnote 13)
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different from the first one. Indeed, the situation is reversed: what had previously
been designated as fact now turns to counterfact and the other way around.
Point of departure now is the update with the proposition p, i.e. the discourse
initial non-negative sentence John drank being communicated. The respective
column in the table below represents this first factual update. Next, the explic-
itly given if -clause of the counterfactual conditional is uttered. This triggers the
construction of the retraction state and the counterfactual update. The former is
given in the column headed by ↓ ~p. As before, all nomologically sound worlds
are available in this state, while those worlds that do not comply with the rule
remain exempt from any consideration. The counterfactual assumption that ¬p
(standing for John did not drink) introduced by the corresponding update with the
if -clause of the counterfactual is established in the following column. Again this
differentiates the counterfactual worlds from the factual worlds. The latter (w6
and w7) may be ignored and are thus marked ‘—’ at this stage in the table. Up for
consideration remain only the counterfactual worlds w0, w1, w2, and w3. In these
worlds the proposition John did not drink is true. The conception of counterfac-
tual conditionals as support tests requires that in these worlds the counterfactual
consequent HeJohn would not have become sick must be true, if the counterfac-
tual If John had not drunk, he would not have become sick as a whole is to be
true. For most people the first intuition regarding the truth or falsity of the coun-
terfactual in the given scenario is probably (at least when assuming the truth of
the discourse initial sentence) that it is indeed true. However, when consulting
the table to validate the success of the support test, it turns out that it fails, since,
as specified again directly in the table, while ¬p is true in all worlds under con-
sideration, ¬q is not true in all these worlds. In fact, in worlds w2 and w3 it is false:
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p q r (p→ q) p basis ↓ ~p ¬p |= ¬q
w0 0 0 0
√
ctfct. 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
1 1
w1 0 0 1
√
ctfct. 〈q, 0〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
1 1
w2 0 1 0
√
ctfct. 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 0〉
√
1 0
w3 0 1 1
√
ctfct. 〈p, 0〉, 〈q, 1〉, 〈r, 1〉
√
1 0
w4 1 0 0 — — — — — —
w5 1 0 1 — — — — — —
w6 1 1 0
√
fact 〈p, 1〉 〈r, 0〉
√
— —
w7 1 1 1
√
fact 〈p, 1〉 〈r, 1〉
√
— —
While this outcome is (as before with the case discussed in section 4.2.2 above)
of course rather puzzling, I will however not take it as evidence against the cor-
rectness of Veltman’s theory. Rather I will take it to shed light on certain pe-
culiarities connected to the semantics of counterfactual conditionals and certain
cornerstones of the reasoning employed in the example that go unmentioned by
Veltman. Actually, it might be argued that in Veltman’s system basic intuitions
are indeed captured: although interpreters at first might naively tend to agree with
the counterfactual, a second consideration may lead to dispute the consequent and
may raise concern about the validity of the counterfactual. How this might come
about, can be explained when considering the crucial worlds w2 and w3 in detail.
Recall that in these worlds it is true that John did not drink, but false that He did
not become sick, i.e. these are worlds in which John did become sick. Imagining
counterfactual circumstances that facilitate such a scenario is easy. Just think for
instance of a situation such as a party that John attended, and at which he did not
drink, but got sick due to food poisoning, because the chicken sandwiches he ate
were spoiled.13 In this case the counterfactual conditional If he had not drunk,
he would not have become sick is indeed false. This clearly contradicts the initial
naive intuition of the counterfactual being true (i.e. the case in which the worlds
w2 and w3 are for some reason ignored in the assessment of the counterfactual).
But then the question is, how could this understanding come about to begin with?
How could it be explained that the first interpretation proceeds selectively with
13Considerations like this finally justify the presence of the third proposition r in the table: r
captures possibilities like the one mentioned. The point actually directly relates to the problem of
counterfactual conditionals, as formulated for instance in Goodman (1947).
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respect to the logical space? –After all, the counterfactual is at first arguably not
disputed by most interpreters, although it fails in terms of the support test.
Rationality delivered the key to the first answer to this question as formulated in
section 4.2.2. Briefly summarized the argument was that when presuming that
the speaker is rational in his or her utterance of the counterfactual If John had not
drunk any wine, he would not have become sick the speaker has good reason to ac-
commodate the corresponding nomological proposition (¬p → ¬q). This leads
to the exclusion of worlds w2 and w3 that initially led to the failure of the support
test. –Which in turn renders the support test successful and the counterfactual
true.14 But there is more to be said about this point. Hence, I will discuss this
issue further. Also in the discussion to follow pragmatic reasoning will motivate
the case. But this time in a more elaborate manner.
More on radical interpretation of counterfactuals: conditional strengthening
Central to the line of reasoning that summarizes an argument given by von Fintel
(2001) is a quantity implicature15 that plays upon the locutionary relations and
informativeness of the possible antecedents of the counterfactual.
Starting point is the following general assumption about the pragmatics of utter-
ing an antecedent in conditional sentences.16 Whenever an antecedent q is more
informative than an alternative antecedent p (meaning that q entails p), then one
14This requires of course a rather strong commitment on the interpreter’s side with respect to
the speaker’s reliability. A more skeptical mind would probably not follow this strategy.
15The following quote from von Fintel (2001), p. 11 explains the notion ‘quantity implicature’
as follows: “It is usually assumed that quantity implicatures are based on so-called Horn-scales,
scales made up of progressively stronger statements. If a statement below the top of the scale
is asserted, there will (if everything else works right) be a quantity implicature that the speaker
is not in a position to assert any of the stronger elements on the scale.” Since the implicature
under discussion here is concerned with the first Gricean Maxim of Quantity that reads Make your
contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange) (as opposed
to the second Maxim of Quantity that states Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required (cf. Grice (1975), p. 45 ), it might also be called (as Matsumoto for instance does, cf.
Matsumoto (1995), p. 21) a Quantitiy-1 implicature.
16I adopt here a formulation given in von Fintel (2001), p. 1 regarding the pragmatics of as-
sertion. Since a conditional’s antecedent is assumed rather than asserted with its utterance the
formulation is adjusted accordingly, using the notion ‘utter/assume’ instead of ‘assert’.
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may assume that:
(1) If q were the case, p would not have been uttered/assumed.17
Applying this to the present example is straightforward: while p designates the ac-
tually uttered/assumed antecedent John did not drink18, the propositional variable
q stands for the conjunction of all possible ‘reasons’ that derive the consequence
John would not have become sick. I.e. the (exhaustive) set of possible answers to
the question When would John not have become sick? Namely, (If ) John had not
drunk AND (if ) he had not eaten the spoiled chicken sandwich AND (if ) he had
not caught the Noro-virus AND (if ) he had lived healthily AND (if ) . . . etc. (For
this reason I will from now on refer to the set of possible answers (i.e. possible
antecedents) by pAND, instead of q that was used so far.19) Since however, p has
been uttered/assumed, it follows (as von Fintel points out20) from (1) and the as-
sumption of the truth of the uttered antecedent p (the proposition that John did not
drink) by Modus Tollens that pAND is not true. I.e. none of the alternatives pn to p
occurring in pAND obtains.
17While von Fintel’s take here differs in its formulation from the UTTER/ASSUME-operator
that was adapted from Krifka and employed in the discussion earlier (cf. section 1.7.1, page 29),
the outcome of both approaches is ultimately very similar in that in the end the conditional is
strengthened to a bi-conditional.
18A proper translation of the uttered/assumed antecedent would have to observe the expressed
negation. For simplicity’s sake I take p (and the pn to be introduced in a moment) however to
designate any premise, disregarding its specific polarity. The truth values I am referring to in the
argument are thus to be understood independent from the specific form of a premise.
19In my emphasis of pAND I take conjunction to have at this point of the discussion intuitive
precedence over the equivalent formalization using negation and disjunction. The matter is how-
ever not essential, since a transformation into an equivalent (disjunctive, resp. conjunctive) normal
form is always possible. In either case the idea is that it holds that none of the possible alternative
antecedents must obtain.
20cf. von Fintel[2001], p. 12 - 13, where he writes: “The hearer is not reasoning about a
long (or infinite) list of possible antecedents. The hearer is simply reasoning that if there were an
antecedent r (other than p) such that if r, q were true [besides if p, q, D.B.], the speaker would
have added this conditional to the assertion. But we can appeal to quantity at this point: the
reason why the speaker would have added such a conditional to the one actually asserted is that
the conjunction would have been a statement that should have been asserted (because it gives
more of the required information).” (Underlining in the original, D.B.) Since von Fintel discusses
alternative conditionals if r, q and if p, q , where I discuss alternative antecedents to the consequent
he may employ the notion of assertion, where I have to use utter/assume.
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Seeing that pAND entails p and is hence more informative (and builds a Horn-scale)
is easy: since p acts as a conjunct in pAND, it holds by the definition of conjunction
that whenever pAND is true, also p must be true. The question how one can guar-
antee that indeed all other premises pn besides p are false appears to be less trivial,
since pAND is possibly infinite. The answer that is developed in von Fintel (2001)
(with reference to Cornulier (1983) and Matsumoto (1995)) refers to quantity as
the crucial element and plays upon exhaustivity in an peculiar manner: given that
for any single conjunct pn occurring in p
AND such that pn , p the conjunction
p ∧ pn is more informative than p alone, by asserting p it follows from (1) that
pn must be false. Hence one can conclude that for no premise pn it holds that
it presents a true alternative to p –which essentially exhausts the set of possible
antecedents.21
As a result of the reasoning so far this means that – since all other possible alterna-
tives pn are to be excluded – p acts as the only valid premise to the counterfactual
consequent. But then it follows that if p were not the case, the consequent would
not derive. Both points brought together however yield conditional strengthening,
i.e. the interpretation of the conditional as a bi-conditional.22 From
21 At this point one has to be cautious. The following problem arises that goes unnoticed in
von Fintel (2001) (and the literature referred to therein): since it is concluded that any pn is false
(as for instance the (counterfactual) premise that John did not catch the Noro-virus) it seems to
follow immediately that John caught the Noro-virus is true. This however is an unwelcome over-
determination of the actual situation. The only ‘reason’ for John’s being sick (presupposing the
truth of the counterfactual consequent’s complement) mentioned is that John drank –and nothing
else. Hence, all other possible ‘causes’ for John’s sickness are to be excluded. And although
this kind of selective understanding arguably happens, the question how this can be accounted
for is not quite clear to me, though. While one might think of some form of the closed world
assumption as one possible key to an explanation, the main problem is in any case that not just
all other hypothetical premises, but also their negations have to be false. –Which is impossible
in a bivalent account. (In Reiter (1978) the closed world assumption is informally paraphrased as
follows: “[. . . ] it is natural to explicitly represent only positive knowledge and to assume the truth
of negative facts by default. For example, in an airline data base, all flights and the cities which
they connect will be explicitly represented. Failure to find an entry indicating that Air Canada
flight 103 connects Vancouver with Toulouse permits one to conclude that it does not.” (Reiter
(1978), p. 56) A later informal elaboration in Reiter (1988) states: “The idea is that the knowledge
base is viewed as completely representing all the positive information about some world. Any
ground atomic fact not so represented is taken to be false.” (Reiter (1988), p. 102)
22As von Fintel points out this observation is due to Geis and Zwicky (1971), who use the
term conditional perfection, instead of the notion of conditional strengthening that is used here
following von Fintel. The objection that besides pAND and p also iff and if build a Horn-scale,
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since the following equivalence is a propositional tautology:
((P→ Q) ∧ (¬ P→ ¬ Q))⇔ (P↔ Q)
On ground of this line of reasoning worlds w2 and w3 are eventually excluded
from the states’ logical space, since in these worlds the truth value assignments of
antecedent and consequent differ. Conditional strengthening thus formally guar-
antees that the support test succeeds, because in the remaining worlds w1 and w2
both antecedent and consequent turn out to be true. But it has also welcome cor-
responding conceptual repercussions. Recall w2 and w3 are worlds in which John
does not drink, but still becomes sick. Thus excluding these worlds by conditional
strengthening actually means to exclude all other possible explanations of John’s
physical condition besides the one asserted in the antecedent.
since iff entails if – which would sabotage the whole argument, since an implicature based on
this observation would derive anything but conditional perfection – is countered by von Fintel
with reference to Matsumoto (1995) (cf. von Fintel (2001), p. 14). Matsumoto argues that the
decisive criterion for a Horn-scale is that the items building the scale share the same monotonicity
properties, and that this is not the case for iff and if : “If and only if clauses display a phenomenon
parallel to non-monotone NPs: this clause does not allow its consequent clause to be strengthened
or weakened salva veritate [. . . ]. This contrasts with if clauses, which exhibit a phenomenon
parallel to monotone increasing NPs [. . . ]. An if clause allows its consequent to be weakened but
not strengthened salva veritate [. . . ]. These tests show that if and only if clauses are not scalar in
nature, while if clauses are scalar (on a positive scale). Therefore these two clauses do not form
a Horn scale.” (Matsumoto (1995), p. 47 - 48) In contrast to this pAND and p share the same
monotonicity properties, since the connective and does not alter the monotonicity properties of its
(atomic) conjuncts.
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4.2.5 Generalizing the point
Note that the discussion is of general importance and describes a major point about
the semantics of counterfactuals. In its result it clarifies certain rescue mechanisms
regarding the (radical) interpretation of counterfactuals in case they do not have a
nomological background against which they could be assessed.
The described strategy of strengthening applies also to discourses like John did not
have surgery. If he had had surgery, he would not have died which was brought to
attention at the end of the first chapter. Also for this example is the nomological
background empty: world knowledge tells us that the interpretation of the coun-
terfacual in John did not have surgery. If he had had surgery, he would not have
died can not take recourse to background laws. Having surgery simply does not
guarantee the well being of the patient. This means for the counterfactual that it
does not describe a traceable inference, but rather simply stipulates a certain rela-
tion between propositions. Hence, in principle also this counterfactual is trivially
false. That interpreters do nonetheless not universally reject the conditional may
be motivated by lines of pragmatic reasoning as described in 4.2.2 and 4.2.4.
4.3 The solution to Veltman’s puzzle: felicity condi-
tions for elliptic counterfactuals
What remains finally to be answered are the questions connected to the origin and
role that exhaustivity plays in the felicity of the examples. As with John drank. If
he had not drunk, he would not have become sick also in case of John did not have
surgery. If he had had surgery, he would not have died exhaustivity was assigned
a decisive role in the discussion. In case of the former – just above – with respect
to its semantic acceptability (when conceiving the meaning of a conditional as a
support test, cf. section 4.2.4, p. 134 ff.), and in case of the latter already in the
first chapter (cf. section 1.7, p. 25 - 28) in terms of its pragmatic felicity.
In the first chapter it was initially assumed that it is negation in the consequent
that is responsible for the introduction of an exhaustivity constraint on the set of
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possible premises to the counterfactual consequent. And while exhaustivity in-
deed figures as a decisive factor in the account of the data, the felicitous examples
introduced in footnote 26 on page 26 that are repeated here in (9), (10), and (11)
cast a very strong doubt about the role and responsibility of negation in this matter.
(9) John did not drink any alcohol. He would not have passed the impending
drug test.
(10) The pilot took the compass with him. He would not have found his way
home.
(11) John won the race. He would not have celebrated.
All these examples do contain a negation in the consequent, but none of them are
infelicitous. Hence, a better lead to the solution has to be followed.23
The solution is to consider what renders felicitous examples like (9), (10), and
(11) different from those that are infelicitous. So, reconsider an example already
discussed in the first chapter:
(12) # John did not have surgery. He would not have died.
The key to the problem is actually provided by the procedure that allowed to iden-
tify the exhaustivity constraint to begin with: the question which conditions would
have to obtain in order to render the consequent true. This is the underlying ques-
tion under discussion (that also is pivotal in von Fintel’s account of conditional
strengthening24).
In case of # John did not have surgery. He would not have died the possible
answers built a conjunctive array of propositions. In case of the examples (9) -
23Also the fact that the substitution of a negative consequent by a non-negative paraphrase does
not always yield a change in acceptability causes doubt about the role of negation. The following
example illustrates the point. Not just the discourse # John did not have surgery. He would not
have died is infelicitous, but also a near synonymous non-negative counterpart is infelicitous:
# John did not have surgery. His condition would have remained unchanged.
24Cf. von Fintel (2001), p. 17, where he remarks: “The idea that we can now explore is that
perfection will be triggered if the conditional is asserted as an answer to a question eliciting an
exhaustive list of sufficient conditions for the consequent.”
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(11) the respective answers however turn out to be combined disjunctively:25
(9)’: When does one not pass an impending drug test?
In case one drinks alcohol before the test, or smokes pot, or takes cocaine, or . . .
(10)’: When do you not find your way home?
If you do not have a compass, or if you have the wrong map, or if it is dark, or . . .
(11)’: When does one not celebrate?
If X happens, or Y happens, or Z takes place, or . . .
Whenever the antecedent of a counterfactual remains implicit, a conjunctive pre-
mise set – as opposed to a disjunctive premise set – can not be exhausted, hence
the discourse is rendered infelicitous. The semantic demands for the evaluation of
the consequent (namely to exhaust the set of all possible premises) clash in case
of a conjunctive premise set with the meaning of the subjunctive, resp. the con-
cept of assumption and the pragmatics of assuming which demand that anything
is possible.
The impact and importance of the distinction between conjunctive versus disjunc-
tive premises is highlighted also in the explanation of another phenomenon that
otherwise would figure as a permanent thorn in the side of the initially formulated
NinA-proposal: why is it that also discourses without a NinA in the context may
be acceptable, while others which are equipped with a NinA are not? Examples
were:
25Translating these properties into more classical terms, the latter set of answers characterizes
a set of sufficient conditions, while the former designates necessary conditions for the truth of the
consequent. The logic that underlies the relation between disjunctive and conjunctive premise sets
and the occurrence of negation is given by the following equivalence:
(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3 ∨ . . . pn)↔ q ⇔ (¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p3 ∧ . . . pn)↔ ¬q
The intuition that corresponds to this tautology is twofold: First, not only follows from the truth
of at least one of the (sufficient) premises the truth of the consequent, but also from the truth of
the consequent follows the truth of at least one of the premises. And second, whenever one of the
premises that is sufficient for the truth of the consequent is indeed met, then it it can not be the
case that also one of the premises sufficient for the negation of the consequent obtains. (And vice
versa.)
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(13) John had surgery. He would have died.
vs.
(14) # John did not have surgery. He would not have died.
Turning to the QUD delivers the answer to this question. The logical structure
of the premise set of (14) is that of a conjunction –which, as has been argued
at length, can not be exhausted by an implicit antecedent (even though a NinA
is available). On the other hand, the answer to the QUD of (13) determines the
premise set of the counterfactual to be disjunctive. Hence, it is already sufficient
that a single premise is instantiated for the inference described by the (then com-
pleted) counterfactual to go through. And although the context is not enriched by
a NinA, the discourse initial proposition is arguably salient enough to facilitate the
task: its negation (which is procedurally made available due to the dichotomous
nature of the update) may act as an implicit antecedent.
While this does not contradict the empirical reality of the concept of the negation-
induced alternative, its importance for the account of the data’s felicity is of course
relativized. But considered the gain in theoretical integrity and completeness for
the analysis this can be gotten over.
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4.4 On the semantic equivalence of counterfactual
discourse and its because-paraphrase
What finally shall be addressed is a point that was already highlighted in chapter 1
(and that proved instrumental in the identification of the exhaustivity constraint).
It was the observation that the discourses that give rise to Veltman’s puzzle have
a because-sentence paraphrase. The availability of this paraphrase will now lie at
the center of attention.
Although the concern is (in a narrow sense) ultimately trivial, since whenever one
expression is synonymous to the other the involved meanings have to be identical,
the discussion will nonetheless prove to be fruitful. It not only completes the pic-
ture and allows to generalize the account, but will give raise to a refinement of the
semantics of the connective because that was sketched in Lewis (1973a).
The point of departure for the following considerations is delivered by Veltman’s
original discourse as introduced in the first chapter on page 5 as example (2) (re-
peated here as (15)) and the corresponding because-paraphrase which is repeated
here as (16).
(15) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick
(16) Because he would have become sick, John did not drink any wine
Although the synonymity of the data is entirely intuitive – and thus the semantic
relation between (15) and (16) absolutely elementary – it is not so clear how this
actually comes about. This will be clarified first.
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4.4.1 First observations regarding the synonymity of the data
The overtly given semantic objects
When reconsidering the data a first observation is that the sentence-like26 con-
stituents in both examples are identical. The sentence John did not drink not only
acts as the initial sentence of the discourse, but also figures as the main clause of
the because-paraphrase. This holds also for the other discourse constituent resp.
sentential element: the counterfactual consequent He would have become sick
appears as the subordinate clause of the because-sentence as well as the second
sentence of the discourse. A slight change in linear order highlights this coinci-
dence:
(17) John did not drink any wine. He would have become sick.
(18) John did not drink any wine, because he would have become sick.
The implicit semantic elements
Considering the obvious identity of the involved overt constituents, an explana-
tion of the near synonymity of the data is immanent. Since the meaning of the
proposition John did not drink is in either example completely unproblematic,
only the semantics of the subordinate clause of the because-sentence seems to re-
quire some more attention. After all, it can not be interpreted out of context, but
its meaning can only be determined once a proper context is provided. It stands
to reason to assume that – just as is the case for the counterfactual discourse –
also in the case of the because-sentence the required context is provided by an
implicit antecedent, and that also the because-sentence is in fact elliptic. Indeed,
this intuition finds support in the following paraphrases of the because-clause. In
these the otherwise implicit element is made explicit:
(19) Because he would have become sick if he had drunk any wine, John did
not drink any wine.
26Since the subordinate clause (= the counterfactual consequent) is a propositional element, I
will refer to it as a ‘sentence-like’ or ‘sentential’ constitutent.
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(20) John did not drink any wine, because if he had drunk any wine he would
have become sick.
What these variants further suggest is to assume that the implicit antecedent (If )
John had drunk any wine has its origin in the main clause John did not drink any
wine, or, more specifically, in its potential to induce a salient implicit contextual
element. –For which the NinA-account would in turn readily provide an explana-
tion.
More evidence for the context-dependency of the subordinate clause in be-
cause-sentences: discourse behavior and acceptability
That the NinA-account may indeed be of relevance to the because-data is implied
by a number of parallels in discourse behavior and acceptability between the be-
cause-paraphrase and the original counterfactual discourse. Recall that examples
like (21) below gave rise to the initial naive NinA-account that predicted the un-
acceptability of a discourse in case the initial sentence lacks a sentential negation
(thus failing to provide with a negation induced alternative):
(21) # John drank. He would not have become sick.
Constructing the analogue because-sentence yields the same result regarding the
acceptability of the clause:
(22) # John drank, because he would not have become sick.27
As has already been observed in connection with the elliptic discourses, the in-
sertion of a discourse mirror like otherwise will however render an infelicitous
because-sentence acceptable:
(23) John drank, because otherwise he would not have become sick.
27Note that there is a secondary interpretation under which the example is felicitous. It is the
reading that John drank in order to become sick that is available also for the counterfactual dis-
course.
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Indeed, as with the counterfactual discourse, the insertion of otherwise is feasible
also in the complementary because-sentence that contains a negation in the main
clause but no negation in the subordinate clause:
(24) John did not drink, because otherwise he would have become sick.
Sentences like this provide again strong evidence for the empirical reality of a
contextually given implicit negation induced alternative being factually present
in the data. The argument is just as with the discourses. It shall nonetheless be
rephrased here. Contrast example (24) above with example (25) below:
(25) John did not drink, because he would have become sick.
Intuitively both examples are complete synonyms. This however means that ei-
ther the expression otherwise is semantically vacuous, or, alternatively, that the
semantic content distributed by the discourse mirror otherwise is implicitly given
as a hidden antecedent in example (25). Not only firm semantic intuitions, but also
theoretical considerations suggest to conclude to the latter: if one were to assume
that otherwise is meaningless one would run into considerable trouble explaining
the remedying effect that the insertion of the expression into examples like (22)
has with regards to its felicity. When assuming instead that otherwise figures as
a semantic connector that operates on the preceding context these difficulties are
however avoided. Moreover, this conception would indeed give a straightforward
account of the phenomenon.
Summary
Summarizing these considerations it turns out that counterfactual discourse and
because-sentence differ in only one (overt, lexical) element. This is the connector
because itself. All other material is identical. –Be that the sentential constituents
on the surface, or the implicitly given semantic unit in form of the negation in-
duced alternative that acts as the hidden antecedent to the would have + Past Par-
ticiple clause. Hence, the pivotal element in order to complete the picture is the
meaning of the expression because itself. It is the key to understanding the source
of the synonymity of the data. Focusing next on the semantics of because provides
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not only further, independent, support of the idea of an implicit, contextually in-
duced element, but moreover helps to finally account for the special semantic rela-
tionship between the elliptic counterfactual discourse and its because-paraphrase.
4.4.2 The semantics of because
Turning to the semantics of because the following truth condition captures the
most basic intuitions.28 It comprises a factual and a counterfactual element: An
(indicative) sentence p, because of q is true, whenever both the propositional ar-
guments p and q are true and it is further presupposed that if q had not been the
case, then p would not have obtained. Or, somewhat more formally29
~because (qsubordinate clause) (pmain clause) = 1
iff
(i) p = 1 and q = 1
and it is presupposed that
(ii) ¬q ¬p
Subsequently I will elaborate on each component of the given truth condition sep-
arately. Doing so, it will turn out that part (i) is instrumental when it comes to
further motivating the claim that the main clause provides with an implicit con-
textual filler for the subordinate clause and that the because-sentences of concern
here are on the surface elliptical. Part (ii) on the other side will be essential for
the final clarification of the semantic relation between counterfactual discourse
and because-paraphrase. In preparation of these points first however some basic
semantic intuitions that underlie (i) shall be retraced.
28The formulation is similar to that given in Hsieh (2009), who attributes his rendering to Lewis
(1973a) and Dowty (1979) (who in turn refer to (among others) Hume (1999) (Lewis) and von
Wright (1963) and von Wright (1968) (Dowty)). Following Hsieh (2009) I will occasionally refer
to the given truth condition as a ‘Lewis-style semantics of because’ (cf. Hsieh (2009), p. 66) .
29To facilitate orientation I annotate the propositional constituents with subscripts designating
their syntactic status.
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A brief reflection on the meaning of because: the assertive elements as given
in part (i) of the truth condition
In how far the meanings of its sentential constituents contribute to the truth con-
ditional semantics of a because-sentence as a whole as specified in part (i) of the
condition above shall be highlighted next. As already indicated, these considera-
tions will be rather basal. Yet, they help to get acquainted with the data and they
also help to sharpen the most elementary intuitions. The first point of attention
will lie with the semantic contribution of the main clause. In order to see the
import that the main clause has on the meaning of the complex clause consider
a scenario in which the main clause is false. It turns out that the sentence John
did not drink because he would have become sick is false already when the clause
John did not drink happens to be false. Next consider a scenario in which the
subordinate clause is false. Things behave similarly here: the because-sentence as
a whole is false if it turns out that the ‘reason’ provided by the subordinate clause
does not match the facts. E.g. in case the fact that John did not drink is due to
him having to drive, rather than him fearing to become sick. Also in this case the
sentence John did not drink, because he would have become sick is rendered false.
Although these meditations are intuitively compelling and provide firm confirma-
tion for the first part of the semantics of because, one question however arises.
The question connects to the last point regarding the semantic contribution of the
subordinate clause. Speaking of truth conditions, the problem is how one could
ascribe at all a truth value to the subordinate clause? After all, as has already been
emphasized a number of times, the sequence He/John would have become sick is
not interpretable out of context: it lacks a truth value in isolation. Only in the con-
text of an appropriate (i.e. irreal) antecedent can the meaning of the counterfactual
consequent be evaluated.
Sketching an alternative formalization for the semantics of because
In the account given by Veltman this can be rendered more precisely as follows:
the would have + Past Participle-complex He would have become sick may be
considered to be true, whenever there is a contextually given set of premises ac-
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cessible that supports the consequence that He would have become sick. Put more
formally (along Veltmanian lines) the consequent is true whenever it is embedded
in a cognitive state S such that it holds that the proposition He would have become
sick is accepted in S, as Veltman would put it:
S |= ~He would have become sick
Although the exact nature of the informational context of the cognitive state is
totally undetermined, at least one fact is distinctly given. This is the content of
the because-sentence’s main clause John did not drink30 that acts as an individual,
factual update to the state S. Since for the because-sentence to be true neither
sentential constituent must be false, it suggests itself to assume hence that the
following must hold:
S [John did not drink] |= ~He would have become sick
Yet, the specific constellation of sentence moods requires to modify the formaliza-
tion of the supposed support-relation. The indicative main clause (that qua being
in the indicative acts as a factual update) can only indirectly ‘support’ the would
have + Past Participle subordinate clause. Indeed, the counterfactual consequent
has to find a counterfactual support. In case of the update with the proposition
John did not drink this is provided by the negation induced alternative to the given
update. The NinA is indeed the most salient counterfactual proposition available.
Hence, for the cognitive state in question it ought to hold:
S [NinA(John did not drink)] |= ~He would have become sick31
Put like this, the first outline of an alternative formalization of the meaning of the
expression because gains contour. But in addition also the thesis that it is the main
30For simplicity and brevity I continue to leave the complement phrase any wine implicit.
31This is a simplification. Under the provision that maximal similarity to the actual world is to
be maintained the full machinery of Veltman’s system is to be applied. The eventual update with
the NinA of the main clause John did not drink – which completes the counterfactual conditional
implicit to the because-sentence – involves generating the retraction state. Hence the actual state
that ought to support the proposition He would have become sick is S[John did not drink] ↓[John
did not drink] [John drank].
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clause of the because-sentence that provides the contextual filler for the counter-
factual consequent is fleshed out a bit more. The assumption of an extreme sce-
nario clarifies the point. For this assume that the cognitive agent is linguistically
fully competent, but in a state of total ignorance, i.e. the minimal state. When
this agent faces the sentence John did not drink, because he would have become
sick, the update with the main clause is the only resource that allows to differenti-
ate between the factual and the counterfactual dimension of discourse. The main
clause thus provides with the only contextually salient counterfactual alternative
that could act as an antecedent to the counterfactual consequent. Indeed, it is this
context that guarantees the interpretability of the subordinate clause.
Summary
Summarizing the discussion so far it provided with a number of informal argu-
ments regarding the synonymity of an elliptic counterfactual discourse and its
because-paraphrase. It was pointed out that both kind of data are elliptic on the
surface and involve identical semantic objects. Trivially, this contributes to the
semantic equivalence. However, important questions still remain open if one is to
fully account for the availability of the because-paraphrase. The most important
question is to address the semantic contribution of the presupposition given in the
second half of the Lewis-style postulate of the meaning of because in relation to
the semantics of the counterfactual discourse. After all, it is rather intriguing that
this – as it turned out actually genuine – part of the meaning of because seems to
be semantically rather non-essential in the relation between the discourse and its
rendering as a because-sentence. –At least when considering the other semantic
objects involved in the data. How could it be that this apparent semantic surplus
of the because-sentence does not contrast with the semantics of the discourse?
Does the discourse perhaps contain the same presupposition? But if so, what is
its trigger? Or is the presupposition otherwise entailed by the discourse? When
next these questions are answered the source and the possibility of the peculiar
semantic relation between the different kind of data will finally be clarified.
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4.4.3 On the presupposition of because and the semantic re-
lation between elliptic counterfactual discourse and the
because-paraphrase.
The point of departure for the discussion to follow is provided by a property of
the presupposition that is apparently dependent on grammatical mood. This prop-
erty manifests an intuitive difference between indicative and subjunctive because-
sentences. Based on this observation a modification of the Lewis-style formula-
tion of the presupposition is provided for the case of counterfactual because.
With regards to indicative because-sentences the Lewisian formulation of part (ii)
in the truth condition stated above in section 4.4.2 on page 146 is completely
intuitive. Two examples shall serve as a reminder of what is at issue:
(26) John got sick, because he drank too much alcohol.
(27) John embarrassed everyone at the party, because he drank too much al-
cohol.
In both cases it is presupposed to be a fact that neither would have John become
sick, nor would have everyone else been embarrassed by John, had he not drunk
too much alcohol. Thus, when translating (26) and (27) as because q, p the pre-
supposition can be given as ¬q ¬p.
However, in the case of counterfactual because the Lewis-style formalization is
too weak. It does not comprehensively capture the intuition connected to its fac-
ticity presupposition. Returning to the original example will help to clarify the
point. Thus, consider once more:
(28) Because he would have become sick, John did not drink any alcohol.
In this case the intuitive facticity presupposition is not simply:
(29) If John would not (have) become sick, he would have drunk alcohol.
Rather – and more adequately –, the facticity presupposition gives a more elabo-
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rate account of the peculiar circumstances of the scenario. The presupposition is
in fact:
(30) If John would not have become sick, if he had drunk alcohol, he would
have drunk alcohol.
In this the embedded if -clause If he had drunk alcohol intuitively serves two func-
tions at once. For one it provides (as has already been observed multiple times)
the necessary contextual support for the interpretation of the would have + Past
Participle-complex given in the sentence initial if -clause. For the other, and inti-
mately related to the former, the embedded if -clause figures as a semantic modifi-
cation of the initial if -clause: it expresses a restriction to the given premise. And it
suggests itself to conceive of the iteration of antecedents as a form of conjunction.
The following paraphrase of the example underlines this intuition:
(31) If John (could have) had drunk alcohol and not become sick, he would
have drunk alcohol.32
Pondering further upon the logical structure of this complex premise set, it is com-
pelling to assume that when you can drink and not become sick, it holds that it is
indeed not the case that if you drink you will become sick. (In this the premise ac-
tually coheres with the following tautology that clarifies the relation between ‘∧’
and ‘→’: (P∧¬Q)⇔ ¬(P→ Q).33) –Which brings us to the core of the semantic
relation between because-sentence and the elliptic counterfactual discourse, since
what is negated here is the law-like connection played upon by the counterfactual
32Since presuppositions are genuine semantic objects I will not bother about the peculiar syntac-
tic structure exhibited in examples (30) and (31) and their formal semantic translation. However, it
shall be mentioned that the kind of iterated conditional under discussion here differs significantly
from those with which Huitink (2008) is concerned. While in the present example the iteration
occurs in the antecedent of the (matrix)conditional (the formal structure being ((p → q) → r)),
Huitink discusses cases in which iteration pertains to the consequent of the matrix clause, the
bracketing being here (p → (q → r)). Only the latter kind of iteration has an analogue in the
exportation law of propositional logic: ((P → (Q → r) ⇔ (P ∧ Q) → R)). The equivalence to
(p ∧ q)→ r)) does not hold for ((p→ q)→ r).
33At least if one considers only ‘normal’ scenarios and absconds from the assumption of some
extraordinary eventualities to obtain that present restraining conditions to the relation between
drinking and sickness (like e.g. the pre-emptive consumption of Aspirin or another remedy against
hang-overs before one starts drinking).
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conditional implicit in the because-sentence John did not drink, because (if he
had) he would have become sick, i.e. the assumption that If you drink too much,
you will become sick.
Brought to the point, the presupposition of the because-sentence in question is
hence that had it not been the case that drinking and being sick were (nomologi-
cally) related (as given by (p → q), with p translating someone is drinking, and
q translating someone being sick), then it would have been the case that John had
drunk something. In other words, the presupposition is that had the law (p→ q)
not been established, then John would have drunk. Formally restated the modified
presupposition of the because-paraphrase of the discourse is thus:
¬(p→ q) p
Resp. in terms of a support test:
¬(p→ q) |= p
This is an important finding, because it completes the account of the synonymity
of the because-data and the discourse: not only are the asserted semantic objects
identical in both data, but also the presupposition of the because-sentence coin-
cides trivially with the semantics of the discourse. Since for the particular example
the antecedent of the presupposition is identical to the already presupposed law
concerning the relation of drinking and sickness, the presupposition of the be-
cause-sentence involves just the information already presupposed in the discourse
that it paraphrases. –Which is the last step in the account of the synonymity of the
data.
4.4.4 Aside: why we all are counterfactual drunkards – the
tenability of the presupposition of because
Although the analysis of the synonymity of the discourses and the because-paraphrase
has been completed, one last question shall be pursued in this connection. The an-
swer to this will turn out to be of general interest for the discussion.
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When pondering further upon the presupposition of the because-sentence doubts
about its validity may arise: it is rather easy to imagine scenarios in which the
subject in question will not drink even though one assumes that drinking does not
result in sickness. The counterfactual expressed in the presupposition thus seems
for principal reasons rather dubious. Why is the counterfactual – resp. the as-
serted because-sentence – still intuitively acceptable? What scheme of inference
underlies the counterfactual?
Taking a slightly different perspective what is at issue is as follows. Given the
premise that Drinking too much alcohol results in sickness one faces two mu-
tually exclusive alternatives: either one drinks, or one does not drink, with the
consequence of the latter (which is to not become sick) being preferred over the
consequence of the former (i.e. to become sick). Hence, most people will choose
not to drink. But why is it that whenever the premise that postulates the relation
between sickness and drinking is let go one seems to be compelled to drinking?
What logic underlies the counterfactual expressed in the presupposition?
The answer turns out to be rather natural if one conceives of the preference re-
lation between the consequences of drinking respectively not drinking in more
elementary terms. Instead of thinking about it in relational terms (‘not becoming
sick is preferable over becoming sick’) it is more appropriate to assume that to not
become sick figures as a first premise. Given this, and given the law that Drinking
will result in sickness it then follows by Modus Tollens that one better does not
drink, if one does not want to end up sick.
Assuming next counterfactually that the law that Drinking results in sickness is no
longer valid, or, in other words, it is not the case that drinking (below translated
by p) and sickness (translated by q) are nomologically related:
¬(p→ q)34
34Negation here is actually meta-linguistic negation. It has narrow scope, reading If had not
been the case that ¬(p → q), rather than wide scope, reading If had not been the case that
(p→ q).
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then – ceteris paribus – this does not mean that one also is inclined to give up
the premise that expresses the preference to not become sick. The proposition
to not become sick, i.e. ¬q, remains a reasonable goal to be pursued. After all,
when making a counterfactual assumption as much as possible of the already es-
tablished information is to be preserved.




Since (i) is equivalent to the assumption that you can drink and not become sick
(¬(P→ Q)⇔ (P∧¬Q) is a propositional tautology) it follows from the definition
of ‘∧’ and the assumed validity of (i) and (ii) that p (= drinking) must also be true.
This however explains how it could be that whenever one assumes that the law
that Drinking too much alcohol leads to sickness were false, one automatically is
led to assume that people would drink. Which of course renders the counterfactual





This concluding section will combine two things: for one I will deliver a brief
summary of what has been discussed and achieved in this thesis, and for the sec-
ond, an outlook on what topics could (or should) further be studied shall be given.
Being generally concerned with the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactual
conditionals, the initial point of departure for the discussion was given by an
asymmetry in discourse felicity of a certain kind of elliptic counterfactual dis-
course. These discourses consist of a first sentence which gives some factual
information which is next followed by the statement of what would have been
the case if this initially mentioned (positive or negative) fact had not obtained.
Or, more precisely, the discourse initial sentence π(ϕ) (= sentence S1) explicitly
expresses the presupposition π connected to the implicit antecedent ϕ of the fol-
lowing elliptic counterfactual conditional ϕ ψ (= sentence S2):
[π(ϕ)]S 1 . [ϕ ψ]S 2
The observation connected to this kind of data was that it is not always felicitous
to leave the antecedent of the counterfactual implicit in such a sequence. Indeed,
the phenomenon seems to be systematic: the opposite of an acceptable sequence
appears to be invariantly infelicitous. I.e. whenever you are able to give a fact p
and felicitously continue with what would have been the case if this fact had not
obtained, the variant of this discourse which is concerned with the counterfactual
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consequence of the opposite scenario (which ultimately states that since ¬p, the
consequence of p could not have been) turns out to be not an acceptable discourse.
This strange behavior of the data – which I dubbed Veltman’s puzzle due to it being
observed first in Veltman (2005) – pressed for answers to the following questions:
What are the felicity conditions for elliptic counterfactuals of this kind? When
may the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional be left implicit in discourse?
And, intimately related to this, why do we understand such elliptic discourses in
the way we do understand them? What determines the implicit antecedent?
Since the initial set of data suggested that negation might be a – if not the – cru-
cial factor for the felicity of the discourses (in the first set of examples examined
the felicitous discourse opens with a negated sentence, while the first sentence of
the infelicitous discourse does not contain a negation) the analysis focussed on
the role and contribution of negation to phenomenon. This eventually lead to the
identification of what I call negation-induced alternatives (NinAs). NinAs repre-
sent implicit, contextual (indeed counterfactual) elements. Confirming the factual
availability of the NinAs by observing the synonymity of discourses like John did
not drink. He would have become sick and John did not drink. Otherwise he would
have become sick in which the particle otherwise figures as a semantic discourse
mirror seemed to support the initial idea that discourse felicity is determined by
the availability of a NinA (which could act as an implicit filler for the hidden an-
tecedent). However, the fact that there were examples that did not fit the picture,
but contradicted the account was rather disturbing.
Being thus forced to reconsider the problem, a turn of attention to the because-
sentence paraphrase of the discourses under consideration opens up the chance to
get a new perspective on the issue. This change in perspective eventually provides
with a solution to Veltman’s puzzle that is compact, general, and in accordance
with the semantic essence of conditional statements, which after all relate conclu-
sions with their premises. It takes its departure with the following observation:
Whenever intuition is followed and (counterfactual) conditionals are understood
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to relate conditions with the consequences deriving from them, then in order for
the consequent to be true at least one of the conditions sufficient for the consequent
has to be true. Somewhat more formally this can be captured as follows:
p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3 . . . q
Or, put somewhat differently, at least one of the possible premises must support
the conclusion:
p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3 . . . |= q
In this case the premises thus can be conceived to build a disjunctive array of pos-
sible antecedents.
Turning to the opposite it holds that for the consequent not to be true, it is neces-
sary that not a single of the conditions entailing (resp. supporting) it is true. This
yields accordingly a conjunctive premise (set):
¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p3 . . . |= ¬q
The logic that characterizes the relation between disjunctive and conjunctive premise
sets is given by the following equivalence:
(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3 ∨ . . . pn)↔ q ⇔ (¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p3 ∧ . . . pn)↔ ¬q
Applying these rather general considerations to the case of elliptic counterfactuals
the account of the infelicity of an unacceptable discourse is actually a matter of
semantic evaluation rendered impossible. With the antecedent remaining implicit,
the space of what could possibly be assumed remains open. (It arguably is in-
deed infinite, since assumptions are essentially free.) This however means that if
it is necessary for the consequent to be true that all sufficient conditions are to be
excluded – i.e. whenever the set of premises takes the form of a conjunction –
the validity of the consequent can not be evaluated: while in case an explicit
antecedent had been given, one could have concluded by way of a quantity im-
plicature that all other possible antecedents than the one mentioned are false and
thus need not be checked, no such conclusion is possible in case of an elliptic
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conditional with implicit antecedent. Here in principle all possible antecedents
would have to be considered in order to determine whether the consequent is true
or not. This however is not possible, because – as has already been noted – the
set of possible premises is unrestricted and indeterminate. Hence, the discourse
becomes infelicitous. The elliptic sequence is not interpretable, because there is
no way to evaluate the counterfactual consequent.1
This summarizes in a nutshell the solution to Veltman’s puzzle. This solution
is the first main result of the thesis. Another result that has been formulated is
concerned with what I dubbed the ‘radical interpretation’ of counterfactual con-
ditionals. It is connected to conditionals like If John had not drunk, he would
not have become sick that lack any sound empirical or nomological support, and
that are – as we have seen – actually semantically false. Nonetheless unsupported
conditionals of this kind are usually still accepted as true in conversation. How
this could be justified is a point that to my knowledge has not been addressed in
the literature. Pursuing this issue, two lines of arguments are discussed. The more
elaborate line of reasoning involves the concept of conditional strengthening, for
which two accounts are given: the first one involves the adaptation of an illocu-
tionary operator that was formulated in Krifka (1999) (cf. section 1.7.1), while
the other (which is more problematic2, but in its gist closer to some of the ideas
that gave rise to the solution of Veltman’s puzzle) employs von Fintel’s [2001]
account of conditional strengthening (cf. section 4.2.4, p. 134 ff.). Simpler in
its dialectic and an alternative to the conditional strengthening-approaches is the
line of reasoning elaborated in section 4.2.2. While also in this account a quantity
implicature plays a crucial role, its argumentative force rests on more general as-
sumptions about rationality than the competing accounts in terms of conditional
strengthening. What is common to all these approaches is however that they allow
for a more fine grained account and deeper understanding of the interplay between
background knowledge and the semantic and pragmatic resources involved in the
interpretation of counterfactual conditionals.
1The reason why indicative conditionals do not behave in the same way is that only in the
subjunctive case can a consequent of a conditional actually be identified as such. There are no
elliptic conditional discourses in the indicative.
2A major drawback of this account is the problem pointed out in footnote 21, on page 136.
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While also in connection with the because-paraphrase of the discourses under
discussion a number of results have been achieved, at least some other points that
have so far not been addressed in detail shall now also be mentioned. The first
of these points concerns a tacit assumption on which the analysis is based. The
account presupposes that the interpreter of an elliptic counterfactual has material
knowledge about event structure and possible relations between events. Language
alone does not determine what premises might figure as sufficient conditions for
which consequent. Knowledge of this kind however is crucial to differentiate a
disjunctive from a conjunctive premise set, which in turn decides discourse fe-
licity.3 Once this material aspect underlying interpretation is realized a bunch of
further intricacies of the solution become apparent. The following data exemplify
at least some of these. The first one to be mentioned highlights an issue intimately
related to the question whether negation in the consequent invariably determines
the premise set to be conjunctive, resp. whether the logical structure of the premise
set can reliably be determined via the question under discussion. That this is not
always clear is demonstrated for instance by the verb to fall asleep.4 Pondering
the question
When do you fall asleep?
the answer may be disjunctively given:
If you are tired, OR if the movie is boring, OR if you took sleeping pills, OR if . . .
Considering the negation to this case one might expect – as has been just ex-
pounded – that the answer delivers a conjunctive set of possible antecedents. And
although the absence of all the premises just given describes a necessary condi-
tion for not to fall asleep, one might however also think of conditions that build a
disjunctive premise set that answers the question
3The problem of how to identify the ‘relevant’ conditions for the truth of a counterfactual con-
sequent is already addressed in e.g. Goodman (1947). That material knowledge plays an important
role actually seems to support the stance taken in van Lambalgen and Hamm (2005) who consider
the capacity to interpret natural language to be an exaptation of the human planning faculty and
our understanding of causality. Following this it would be highly interesting to formulate a hybrid
semantics of Veltman’s theory of counterfactuals and the formalism developed in van Lambalgen
and Hamm (2005).
4The example is due to Jerra Lui Busch, p.c.
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When do you not fall asleep?
These are for instance:
If you are not tired, OR you drink enough coffee, OR if it is too noisy, OR if . . .
These cases also provide sufficient conditions that would render the conclusion of
a counterfactual true. And indeed, the following two discourses are felicitous:
(1) John did not drink coffee. He would not have fallen asleep.
(2) John drank coffee. He would have fallen asleep.
While the introduction of negation into the consequent in case of the examples
considered so far (like the drinking/becoming sick-scenario discussed in the pre-
vious chapters) immediately lead to the differentiation of the logical structure of
the premise set as either conjunctive or disjunctive, in the above example negation
does not enforce this distinction. Apparently, in both cases the default for evalu-
ation is the disjunctive premise set. What triggers this behavior of the data is not
clear to me and needs to be studied further. It might be ontological or psycho-
logical factors, and it would be in any case interesting to have an answer to this
question.
The fact that there is a disjunctive default is arguably also the reason, why the
corresponding opposites in (3) and (4) are at least in my intuition not completely
infelicitous:
(3) ?John did not drink coffee. He would have fallen asleep.
(4) ?John drank coffee. He would not have fallen asleep.
With the premise set of the consequent being disjunctively structured, the dis-
courses arguably facilitate to accommodate a rule-like fact that (in combination
with the given factual (and presuppositional) information) supports the conclu-
sion. In case of (3) the discourse is rendered felicitous if one assumes for instance
a scenario in which the coffee is poisoned with a high dose of barbiturates. Thus
accommodated, the discourse is perfectly felicitous and the consequent true, since
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although drinking coffee ‘normally’ prevents falling asleep this will not be the
case if the coffee contains enough sleeping pills. In this case one might drink
coffee, but still fall asleep. A similar accommodation of the coffee containing
sleeping pills guarantees also a felicitous reading of (4). Based on examples like
these the mechanism of accommodation becomes just the more interesting. Lewis
cautious ‘definition’ leaves enough room for further, more detailed study from
both, the theoretical, and the empirical perspective. That the non-monotonicity of
counterfactuals plays an important role at this point is obvious. Indeed, the ques-
tion whether the possibility to accommodate is based on the non-monotonicity of
counterfactuals or their non-monotonicity is due to the possibility to accommodate
is a question that is highly interesting and should be studied further. It actually
touches upon fundamental problems concerning the nature of rules (and their re-
lation to counterfactuals) that find discussion for instance in Goodman (1947) but
that still remain open.
Accommodation is central also to another point that has not been addressed in any
detail. The observation is that modals like must and can apparently exert a certain
influence on the acceptability of the data. Consider for instance the following
example that was already mentioned in footnote 22 on p. 23:
(5) John did not win the race. He would have celebrated.
For this discourse the because-paraphrase is intuitively marginal:
(6) ?Because he would have celebrated, John did not win the race.
However, the picture changes when a deontic to have to – that like must comes
with a universal modal force – is inserted into the second sentence:
(7) John did not win the race. He would have had to celebrate.
For this case the because-paraphrase is felicitous, determining a reading that John
intentionally did not win the race in order to not have to celebrate:
(8) Because he would have had to celebrate, John did not win the race.
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The modal facilitates the accommodation of a motive that could explain the sub-
ject’s behavior (like for instance that John did not win the race because he – al-
though it is customary to celebrate winners – wanted to avoid having to celebrate,
since he absolutely hates being at the center of attention).
And similar for the insertion of the modal can into the discourse initial sentence:
(9) John can not have won the race. He would have celebrated.
Here the modal enforces an evidential reading that asks the hearer pretty much to
take a look around and note that no signs of a celebration can be found. In all
these cases there is a clear interplay between the occurring modal, the expressed
discourse relation and what can be accommodated.
Another related question (but this time connected to the nature of the premise
set) is what happens in case the set of possible premises is clearly delineated and
well defined. If there is a case which turns out true on just a single condition not
only would it be impossible to differentiate the premise set as either disjunctive
or conjunctive, but since the set of possible antecedents is finite this might affect
acceptability judgements. And apparently – at least at first sight – there are such
cases. Just consider a scenario in which a soup is oversalted5. For this there exists
(naively) just a single ‘explanation’: a soup is oversalted, if and only if too much
salt is put into it. No other ‘cause’ seems possible. However, despite this, my first
intuition is that certain examples are acceptable, while others are not:
(10) John cooked the soup. It would have been oversalted.
(11) John did not cook the soup. It would have been oversalted.
(12) # John cooked the soup. It would not have been oversalted.
(13) # John did not cook the soup. It would not have been oversalted.
Apparently, while there is indeed only a single ‘direct’ cause imaginable for the
soup being too salty, it is possible to accommodate the scenario in such a way
5The example is again due to Jerra Lui Busch, p.c.
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that alternative premises become nonetheless available. The alternative scenario
in case of (10) is one in which other people might have cooked the soup (and all
of them would have put too much salt into it), while case of (11) the existence
of other agents might not be accommodated, and the discourse is ambiguous with
respect to whether the soup is cooked at all. Apparently, in (12) it is not possible
to exclude that no one else besides John would not have put too much salt into the
soup, while in case of (13), presupposing that the soup has actually been cooked,
we do not want to universally deny the possibility that John could have oversalted
the soup. Cursory as these considerations are, they should give already an idea
what questions and directions might further be pursued.
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